Phone Hacking
	 — 
	Question

Lord Fowler: To ask Her Majesty's Government what is the latest police estimate of the number of individuals whose phones have been hacked by newspapers, and how many arrests have been made.

Lord Henley: My Lords, the latest estimates by the Metropolitan Police Service indicate that there may be about 800 likely victims of phone hacking. There have been 17 arrests as a result of the continuing police investigation.

Lord Fowler: My Lords, we obviously do not know how many people will be charged, but we do now have a very good picture of how widespread phone hacking was. Is it not clear that the phone hackers and those who employed them believed that their power put them above the law? Given that, is not one of the lessons of this whole scandal that we should never again allow one proprietor or one company to own a disproportionate amount of the British media?

Lord Henley: My Lords, I am not going to comment on the last point made by my noble friend, but no doubt the House and others will have listened to that. The police have spoken to about 1,800 people, of whom, as I said, 800 are likely victims. Whether charges will result from those 17 arrests is something on which I cannot comment.

Lord Prescott: My Lords, is the Minister aware that the appalling level of these arrests and prosecutions reflects badly on the British press and was made possible only by the use of no-win no-cost litigation by those who were complainants, including me. Why are this Government in their legislation on legal aid quite prepared to meet the unanimous demands of the press that we reduce their costs in such situations and yet increase the costs of individual complainants and reduce their access to no-win no-cost litigation? Can he assure the House that those he has mentioned as having been arrested, including the Prime Minister's former adviser, Mr Coulson, played no part in changing the policy of the previous Government, who rejected the request from the media?

Lord Henley: My Lords, I can agree with the noble Lord that this has not been the finest moment for the British press. His remarks about no win no fee go wider than the Question on the Order Paper, but that is a matter that we will obviously have to take into account. On the broader issue of phone hacking, phone hacking is obviously illegal, but we must await the outcome of the Leveson inquiry before we make any final decisions in this matter.

Lord Tebbit: My Lords, would it not be in the public interest for the press to publish, however they gained knowledge of it, activities by a Minister, in his working time and in his office, which were quite clearly contrary to all standards of decency and the Government's own code of conduct for Ministers?

Lord Henley: My Lords, what the press publish is a matter for the press and not for us, but I note what my noble friend has to say about the activities of some people in the past. I repeat that we feel that we should wait until the inquiry being conducted by Lord Justice Leveson has been concluded.

Baroness Bonham-Carter of Yarnbury: Does the Minister agree with the editor of Private Eye, who said at the Leveson inquiry yesterday that we do not need new laws to govern the press, that phone hacking, paying the police for evidence and being in contempt of court contravene existing laws, and that we need proper and vigorous enforcement of them?

Lord Henley: My noble friend makes a very good point. All the matters she referred to are against the law, and we should always be very loath to pass new laws purely because we see a problem happening when there are existing laws that serve that purpose very well. The important matter is to make sure there is proper enforcement.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, why was the Minister so reluctant to comment on that part of the question asked by his noble friend Lord Fowler about concentration of press ownership? I thought the Minister belonged to a Government who were showing some concern about the wilder excesses of capitalism. Is not excessive concentration of press ownership a clear illustration of that?

Lord Henley: My Lords, I think some of the concentration of press ownership happened during the Government of whom the noble Lord was such a distinguished member in former years. I do not think it would be appropriate, as I said, to comment in advance of the inquiry that will be concluded in due course, in his time, by Lord Justice Leveson.

Lord Elystan-Morgan: My Lords, can the Minister tell the House, in general terms, whether systems of state security dedicated to the surveillance of communications worldwide can cast any light at all on the question of phone hacking? If that is the case, subject to proper safeguards, can such information can be relayed to the Leveson inquiry?

Lord Henley: My Lords, I am not sure I can assist the noble Lord on that latter point. I can say that my understanding is that it is relatively easy to hack into texts and voicemails on individuals' mobiles but very difficult to get into live calls on a mobile, which is something that only possibly the security services and others would be able to do. These things are possible but are much harder. In the main, we are talking about hacking into texts and voicemails.

Lord Brooke of Alverthorpe: Perhaps the noble Lord can help me in my ignorance. Can he say whether the Leveson inquiry's terms of remit cover the subject that was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, about the concentration of media ownership? If not, can he say what the Government will do about it?

Lord Henley: My Lords, the terms of reference for Lord Justice Leveson were set very wide indeed and it will be for Lord Justice Leveson to produce his report in due course. The timing of that report is obviously a matter for Lord Justice Leveson.

Lord Inglewood: Does my noble friend the Minister know whether the inquiries that the police made before the arrests that he described in response to my noble friend Lord Fowler's Question have been completed? If not, is there an anticipated timetable for completion?

Lord Henley: Operation Weeting, which is one of the police investigations into the matter, is ongoing. As I made clear, there have been 17 arrests so far. There might be more in due course.

Lord Hamilton of Epsom: Is my noble friend not concerned that the source of these telephone numbers in the beginning may have been the police themselves, who sold the numbers to the press?

Lord Henley: My Lords, that obviously is a concern and is one of the matters that was considered in the report from Dame Elizabeth Filkin, which was published on 4 January this year. We expect the police service as a whole to study the recommendations of that report, and various other reports including that from HMIC, and draw the appropriate conclusions.

The Lord Bishop of Chichester: My Lords, I appreciate that the question about the implications of the present Bill on legal aid was not in the original Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Fowler, but it seems a reasonable extension of it. Although I would not want to politicise the thing in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, did, it does seem there is a question about disproportionate power. It is not so much about the concentration of the power of capitalism as the concentration of power against the relative powerlessness of the individual. That does seem to be a legitimate extension of this and I would be grateful if the Minister could reflect on that.

Lord Henley: My Lords, I did not think that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, politicised this question unnecessarily and, similarly, I do not think that the right reverend Prelate has politicised it. However, I do think that does go beyond the Question on the Order Paper.

Shipping: Tax Revenue
	 — 
	Question

Lord Prescott: To ask Her Majesty's Government why, when they are able to provide estimated tax liabilities due to tonnage tax on British shipping, they are not able to supply figures for revenue received.

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, estimated tonnage tax liabilities were provided using database information from Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs. This general approach is regularly used when answering questions on tax.
	To construct reliable estimates of tax received would require HMRC checking each tax return, linking it with associated payments and estimating how much tax received related to tonnage tax. This exercise would be extremely time-consuming. However, revenues received will be broadly similar to those figures already given.

Lord Prescott: The Minister is aware that this is a successful tax. It increased the British fleet from 4 million tonnes to 18 million tonnes and that is an important factor. But I cannot accept his reply that he knows what the liability is and knows what the profits are but we cannot afford to find out what the tax liability and payments are because that would cost more, as he said in a letter to me, than a parliamentary reply. That is unacceptable. We are entitled to know.
	However, I am more concerned about this tax.

Noble Lords: Question!

Lord Prescott: I am concerned about the recent transfer of the Cunard steamship company, which enjoys this fiscal arrangement, to Bermuda. It has retained the tax but been removed from the statutory requirement to have a captain or crew of a certain kind on its ships. That is unacceptable.

Noble Lords: Order!

Lord Prescott: The loss of the "Concordia" reminds us of the importance of having a captain and safe crew. The "Concordia" is owned by the American company that owns these ships. There are two standards on cruise liners, which is totally unacceptable.

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, I am not sure how I interpret that question, but I think the relevant bit relates to the original Question, which is to do with the numbers that I gave the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, in my Written Answer. I can assure him that it is standard practice to give numbers based on the liability in respect of years. That is done in innumerable Answers to Questions. The numbers in this case, as is normally the case, will be broadly reflective and close to the actual tax paid. It is simply that the tax paid gets paid at different times according to the individual circumstances of the company.
	I am happy to recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Prescott, was Secretary of State for Transport and many other important things at the time that this important tax was introduced. Just to correct his figures, the gross tonnage of British shipping in 2000 was 5.8 million tonnes and, indeed, it has increased to 18.2 million tonnes since then.

Baroness Kramer: My Lords, perhaps I can help. One of the motivations for providing the option of a tonnage tax was significantly to enhance the training and safety of the shipping fleet. Has the tax achieved that purpose and are any records kept and tracking done on those issues?

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, the tax has achieved an estimated reduction of £45 million of tax which the shipping industry in this country would otherwise pay under conventional corporation tax. It means that we have a more vibrant and healthy shipping industry in this country. Of course there are many other associated issues that my colleagues in government keep under review and discuss with the industry.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, is the Minister not concerned that the obfuscation involved in his replies to my noble friend Lord Prescott's questions merely reinforces our anxiety, which has also been expressed by the Public Accounts Committee of the other place, that the Government may be guilty of treating large companies somewhat more favourably than ordinary taxpayers, and that this may be another instance of cover for a somewhat cosy deal?

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, I am surprised that there are any suggestions of some cosy deal. After all, this was a tax introduced by the noble Lord's Government. He now says that he might have done a cosy deal. It has put British shipping ownership on a level playing field with other countries in Europe; it involves state aid, and the EU at some stage will review it. If anything, the complaint that we get is that other countries take unfair advantage of the EU dispensations.
	As to what the other House has to say, I am sure that noble Lords will not need reminding that it was as recently as 1628 that this House stood up to another place on the question of tonnage and poundage and got us into frightful trouble, not least with the attempted impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham, who put forward the proposal. So I am certainly not going to cross swords with another place on this topic.

Lord Trimble: I listened with interest to the Minister's reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. He said that the tax, by reducing the amount payable so far below what would be payable in corporation tax, led to a huge increase in tonnage. Does that not indicate that there ought to be a similar movement in corporation tax generally and that it would be hugely successful?

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, what it indicates is that tax competition and not having tax dictated on some uniform basis from Brussels is something that we will defend to make sure that where appropriate we can take advantage of that. We will have the lowest corporation tax regimes in the G7 and then one of the lowest in the G20. That will make our industry highly competitive on tax.

Lord West of Spithead: My Lords, I declare an interest as chairman of the Merchant Navy Association. I am sure that the Minister will agree that from our maritime colleges in this country we produce some of the best qualified deck officers and engineer officers who operate in ships around the world. Does he agree that we should give more support to cadets going through these schemes? I think that there is a requirement around the world for more of these people, and we could actually provide more assistance in the way of apprenticeships to enable that to happen.

Lord Sassoon: My Lords, I am certainly happy to agree with the opening premise of the noble Lord's question, and he makes an interesting suggestion, which I will take away and refer to my colleagues.

NHS: Transition Risk Register
	 — 
	Question

Baroness Pitkeathley: To ask Her Majesty's Government whether their risk assessment of their proposed National Health Service reforms will be published before the Report stage of the Health and Social Care Bill commences.

Earl Howe: My Lords, the Government are appealing the Information Commissioner's decision that the transition and strategic risk registers should be released, for the reasons explained in my recent statements to the House. The tribunal has initially fixed the oral hearing for 2 and 3 April, but my department is urgently discussing with the tribunal how the case may be expedited further. Regrettably, however, it is not possible for this to take place before Report commences.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, the Minister's reply will be disappointing to many Members of this House, who believe with the Information Commissioner that,
	"there is a very strong public interest in disclosure of the information, given the significant change to the structure of the health service the government's policies on the modernisation will bring".
	Moreover, the noble Earl himself is, I know, on record as saying that he is anxious to get the matter decided as speedily as possible. Are the Government considering a delay in the timing of Report, so that the House can have before it all the information that it needs to ensure that this important Bill is subject to detailed scrutiny, which is such a significant function of your Lordships' House?

Earl Howe: My Lords, I understand the noble Baroness's disappointment. As I have said, my department has made strenuous representations to ensure that this process is concluded as speedily as may be possible, consistent with the need for both parties to assemble the necessary evidence and present their cases properly. In answer to her second question, of course we have considered the timetable for Report in the context of this process, but we have concluded that if the Bill is to go through its full passage by the anticipated time of the end of the Session we need to start Report at the beginning of February. So, regrettably, our conclusion is that the start of Report cannot be delayed.

Baroness Meacher: I understand the Government's reluctance to publish risk registers. Governments do not tend to be keen to publish documents that are going to be deeply embarrassing to them. However, will the Minister invite the Information Commissioner to identify key sections of the risk registers that really should be before the House of Lords before it undertakes its work on Report, and will the Government and the Minister comply with the Information Commissioner's recommendations?

Earl Howe: My Lords, this issue turns on a disagreement between ourselves and the Information Commissioner about where the balance of public interest lies. Our view is that the balance of public interest does not lie in disclosure, and his view is the opposite. It would be likely, if we gave the Information Commissioner a second opportunity to look at this, that he would come to the same conclusion as before, so we have to let due process occur.

Baroness Thornton: My Lords, the strategic health body in London was perfectly content to make the register of risks on the health Bill available, so the House needs to know, first, what the difference is-except in terms of size-in the national Department of Health making its risk register available. Secondly, I realise that in appealing the Information Commissioner's decision the Government have said, in effect, that this decision has cross-government implications. Does the Minister accept that it also has wider implications for Parliament? In this House, our ability to scrutinise legislation effectively must be in doubt if any Government withhold important information from us, so what course of action does the Minister suggest that noble Lords in this House should take under these circumstances?

Earl Howe: My Lords, to answer the second part of the question first, a substantial number of the risks pertaining to the Bill are already in the public domain and we are considering whether there is scope to draw these sources of information together in a single place, so that noble Lords can look at them more easily. To answer the first part of the noble Baroness's question, I made inquiries about NHS London. Its situation is very interesting and quite different from that of the Department of Health. NHS London developed its risk management strategy with a view to it being visible to stakeholders and the public, as its document says. It is therefore a reasonable assumption that officials will have worded their risks for inclusion in the register in the knowledge that that wording would be likely to form part of a document placed in the public domain, so there is a very real difference between the two situations.

Baroness Jolly: My Lords, as has been suggested, there are wider issues here. Could my noble friend the Minister tell the House to what extent he believes the use of risk registers might be compromised if their authors feel they cannot be entirely candid?

Earl Howe: My Lords, risk needs to be thought about and assessed thoroughly and often in worst case terms in order to inform policy development and implementation. Risk registers are therefore a basic policy management tool and, for robust risk management to take place, officials have to be free to record all potential risks fully and frankly, with absolute candour, in confidence that anything they say will not be disclosed. If officials knew or believed that what they wished to say was going to be disclosed, that would inhibit them in expressing views fully and frankly. That, in turn, would erode confidence in policy-making and impede good government.

Lord Wills: My Lords, apart from the specifics of this case, there is clearly an issue of constitutional significance when this House is being asked to scrutinise legislation without having available to it all the centrally relevant information. That is clearly the case here. Which committee of which House would the Minister recommend looks at this particular constitutional issue?

Earl Howe: My Lords, with respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that is a matter for me. Obviously, if there is a committee that feels able and willing to look at this matter, we shall of course co-operate and comply with that committee to the fullest extent.

Lord Owen: My Lords, there is a Motion on this very subject before the House in my name, and I hope that there will be an opportunity well before we reach Report for it to be debated. Since public companies are under strict obligations to publish their risk assessments-they have to weigh very carefully what they say because they could be sued by shareholders in their companies-why is it so different for Her Majesty's Government in the circumstances in which the Information Commissioner has expressed the view that this is a legitimate case that ought to be made available?

Earl Howe: The Freedom of Information Act was framed specifically in a way that would protect the process of policy-making within departments. Our view is that the risk register forms an integral part of policy-making and implementation; the Information Commissioner came to a different view. It is about the balance of public interest here: we wish to see this process adjudicated further.

UK: Union
	 — 
	Question

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: To ask Her Majesty's Government what measures they propose to take to consult the whole of the United Kingdom about the future of the Union.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, following the outcome of the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections, the Government accept that there is a case for holding a referendum in Scotland. If there is to be a referendum, we believe that it should be legal, fair and decisive. Therefore, we are consulting on the best way to achieve this. I can reassure the noble Baroness that the Government look forward to receiving views from across the United Kingdom during the consultation process.

Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean: My Lords, does the Minister agree that the break-up of the United Kingdom will affect us all throughout the UK? If so, will we all have an equal right to make our views known, and why not through a referendum? We have had an equal right to express our views on AV; we are told that we will have an equal right if competences move from this country to the EU, so why is there not an equal right throughout this country to vote on the most important constitutional issue to face any of us in our lifetime?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I am sure that most, if not all, of your Lordships would find it very grievous indeed if the United Kingdom were to break up. Nevertheless, in the 11 referendums that have taken place since 1973, only two were held nationwide. Indeed, previous referendums have been held in only one nation of the United Kingdom-in London and in the north-east of England. We believe that whether or not Scotland should leave the United Kingdom and become a separate independent state is a matter for the people of Scotland. It would not be good for relationships within the United Kingdom if it were felt that some parts of the UK had been prevented from doing so by others. Our sincere belief, which I am sure we share, is that that will not happen-that those of us who believe that the values which we share across these islands are to be upheld will win a comprehensive victory, and that Scotland has contributed to the United Kingdom in the same way as the United Kingdom has contributed to the good of Scotland.

Lord Forsyth of Drumlean: Does my noble and learned friend not agree that if the separatists in Scotland wish to leave the United Kingdom, that is a matter that needs to be settled in Scotland? If, on the other hand, the so-called devo-max option is being considered, whereby matters other than foreign affairs and defence are considered in Scotland, that is a matter for the United Kingdom as a whole. It would effectively create an English Parliament and a federal Parliament, and that would have to be settled by a UK-wide referendum.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I agree with my noble friend that if the separatists were to have their way and Scotland were to vote to leave the United Kingdom, that should be determined by the people of Scotland. I also agree with him that the so-called devo-max proposal, as far as one can understand what it is-in our exchanges last week, noble Lords suggested that it was a product without a brand or a brand without a product; I cannot remember which way round it was-has implications for other parts of the UK, and we are certainly well seized of that fact.

Lord Martin of Springburn: My Lords, as a Scot, I do not want separation. I feel strongly that there should be only one question in the referendum, and one question alone. I ask the Minister to give some advice to the Prime Minister: the best thing that he can do would be to stop appearing arrogant in his interventions. It does not help those of us who want to retain the United Kingdom.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, one of the issues in the consultation to which I referred is the number of questions in a referendum, although the United Kingdom Government have made it clear that our preference would be for a single question on whether Scotland should remain part of the United Kingdom. To do otherwise and to import questions such as devo-max would only muddy the waters and lead to a very indecisive outcome. We want a referendum that is not only legal and fair but decisive as well.

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon: The Government this week announced the establishment of the new Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons. There are some excellent members on it, but why was there no consultation on the membership with the Official Opposition? Who will be looking at the consequences of devolution for the House of Lords?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, the noble Baroness is right to draw attention to the fact that, as was announced yesterday, there will be a Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons. It is important to point out that the panel, which will be chaired by Sir William McKay, a former Clerk of the House, comprises six independent, non-partisan experts. There is no question over party balance in this. With regard to the consequences for the House of Lords, I am conscious that, although a Scot, I am a Peer of the United Kingdom.

Lord Maclennan of Rogart: Would the Government support a broad-based British organised public discussion of the United Kingdom, in the manner of the Scottish convention, to help inform the debate that should lead to the decision on whether to dismember the United Kingdom? Is it not critically important that people's opinions are sought not just in a snap decision but having had an extensive discussion in which they can all be involved?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I do not think that there is any chance of it being a snap decision. I am very conscious that, in your Lordships' House, many Lordships bring to bear from their respective experience examples of where Scotland has made a contribution as part of the United Kingdom to the common good of Scotland and of where Scotland has in turn made a valuable contribution to the United Kingdom. In the debates that take place on this I hope that people will be prepared to speak out and show that our shared values are of great importance, and that it would be a backward step to break up our United Kingdom.

Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (Dissolution) Order 2012
	 — 
	Motion to Approve

Moved By Baroness Rawlings
	That the draft order laid before the House on 29 November 2011 be approved.
	Relevant document: 36th Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, considered in Grand Committee on 16 January.
	Motion agreed.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Committee (4th Day)

Relevant documents: 21st Report from the Constitution Committee, 22nd Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, 21st and 22nd Reports from the Delegated Powers Committee.
	Schedule 1 : Civil legal services
	Amendment 36
	 Moved by Lord Clement-Jones
	36: Schedule 1, page 116, line 4, at end insert "and under section 140 of the Learning and Skills Act 2000 (assessments relating to learning difficulties)"

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, from the outset I should stress that this amendment is strongly supported by the Special Educational Consortium of special needs disability charities. The consortium and I believe that access to a suitable and challenging education is a right for all children, and that parents need to be able to enforce a legal obligation when they are let down by the system. When parents do not have the financial resources to bring an appeal on their own, they should be supported to do so in the interests of justice.
	The Government initially consulted on removing legal aid for all appeals against local authority decisions on the provision for children with special educational needs. I welcome the Government's subsequent decision to retain special educational needs appeals for children of school age within the scope of legal aid. The Government clearly recognise the importance of these children's entitlement to an appropriate and challenging education. Nevertheless, the Bill as currently drafted will mean that young people with special educational needs who are aged between 16 and 25 will no longer be eligible for legal aid.
	The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that young people aged between 16 and 25 with special educational needs continue to be eligible for legal aid when appealing against decisions made about special educational provision. Removing access to legal aid for young people aged 16 to 25 with special educational needs, as the Bill currently does, is inconsistent with the Government's position on the importance of the rights of young people with SEN and, in particular, with the aims of the SEN and disability Green Paper, Support and Aspiration, of March last year. I very much welcomed the Green Paper, which sought to develop a streamlined system for children from birth to the age of 25. I hope that this is an oversight rather than a deliberate move to exclude these young people with SEN from the scope of legal aid. Surely there is no justification for cutting this off at the age where young people might be transitioning from one educational institution to another, and when some young people with SEN continue to face barriers to getting the support that they need.
	For young people with SEN and their families, the transition to adulthood can be a particularly difficult time as support from children's services falls away and is often not replaced by support from adult services. As the Green Paper recognises, many young people who are disabled or who have SEN can face additional challenges during their teenage years. It states:
	"Too often the opportunities and support available to disabled young people and young people with SEN fall short of what they need to make a successful transition to adult life".
	Those words come directly from the Green Paper.
	I welcome the Government's plans to extend support for young people with SEN up to the age of 25 through the proposed education, health and care plans in order to improve the support that young people receive during this difficult transition period. Cutting legal aid for this age group is inconsistent with the rest of government policy in this area. Therefore, I urge Ministers to accept this amendment to ensure that all young people with SEN remain, up to the age of 25, within the scope of legal aid. I beg to move.

Lord Howarth of Newport: My Lords, special educational needs is a particularly tortuous and difficult area of administration and, equally, for negotiation and representation. Young people with special educational needs are almost by definition ill equipped to represent themselves and to handle these difficult challenges on their own behalf. The system, at least in so far as children with special educational needs are concerned, provides very fully developed support, but there is something of a cliff edge beyond the period during which children are eligible for statements. While, admirably, the Government are seeking to improve the structure and quality of provision for special educational needs later on, it seems particularly unfortunate if, in this important area, they are to take away help for the very people they are otherwise seeking to improve their support for. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will find it possible to look sympathetically on the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, which was so well moved by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones.

Baroness Browning: My Lords, I, too, support this amendment. My noble friend has exchanged correspondence with me on this matter. I support the points that have been made on the necessity to take into account the ability to obtain legal aid up to the age of 25, particularly for children with special needs. As my noble friend will be aware, the Young People's Learning Agency, which took over from the Learning and Skills Council, has an obligation to meet the special needs of those who have not attained 25 years of age. Although the agency is being phased out, a general educational obligation will remain unless this Bill closes that gap. As my noble friend knows, if this is not dealt with, the alternative would be to bring cases under the Disability Discrimination Act, which is a very disruptive route for young people and their carers to have to go down. Therefore, I hope that this is just an anomaly and an oversight between two different government departments and that my noble friend will be able to reassure the House today.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: My Lords, I rise to support Amendment 36 and to speak to Amendment 82ZA. The proposals arising from Amendment 36 are useful and we support them. In doing so, I declare an interest as a governor of a BESD school. Given my experience there, I echo the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about the need to support young people and their parents as they make the transition to adult life.
	Our Amendment 82ZA is concerned primarily with the decision of the Government to remove all areas of education law from the scope of legal aid, with the exception of SEN provision, which we welcome but regret that it does not go far enough.
	The Ministry of Justice consultation paper says that education cases cannot be accorded the same level of importance as those concerning an,
	"immediate threat to life or safety, liberty",
	or protection against homelessness. Yet education is a basic human right and is one of the key children's rights in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. We now know beyond doubt that without access to an appropriate education, children from poor backgrounds or with SEN are more likely than their peers to end up in the youth justice system and be significantly greater social and financial burdens to the state for the rest of their lives. It is therefore a false economy to cut proper assistance and representation across this sector.
	The present spend from the legal aid budget on education cases is about £4 million per annum, and the estimated savings for their excision from scope are probably less than £1 million per annum. According to Legal Services Commission statistics, at least 92 per cent of education cases are successful, so there is obviously a real need here as well as high value for money.
	As to the detailed points, we wish legal representation for SEN cases to be available for First-tier Tribunals and to ensure that specialist witnesses can be called at such hearings as well as just provide reports. In addition, our amendment would return into scope exclusions, admissions and bullying. Excluded children are at considerably greater risk than their peers of falling into the youth justice system. We should do what we can to ensure that such exclusions are necessary and appropriate sanctions. The Government appear to argue that school exclusions fall into a category of personal choice and that the child has always behaved in the manner alleged by the school or local authority. Surely every child has the right to be heard on such matters.
	Removing access to legal aid for school admissions will have a disproportionate impact on particular groups of children, including refugee and asylum-seeking children. Many of these children find it difficult to secure school places, despite there being a clear statutory duty to provide suitable full-time education for all children of compulsory school age. We take the view that it is essential that legal aid is available to ensure that local authorities, and in future individual schools, meet their obligations and guarantee a suitable school place for all children.
	Bullying is common in many schools across England. Research undertaken by Bullying UK in 2006, for instance, found that out of a sample of more than 2,000 parents, 87 per cent reported that their child had been bullied in the past 12 months, and 77 per cent reported that their child had been bullied more than five times. It is important that children and parents or carers have access to legal services at an early stage on legal avenues of redress for bullying. Bullying can cause many children to miss school for significant periods or to withdraw from attending school completely, and can lead to other negative social and health outcomes throughout a child's life.
	In her response to the Ministry of Justice consultation on the reform of legal aid, the Children's Commissioner argues that many education clients achieve what they do for their children only with the help of legal aid. Whether it be support and therapies for their child's special educational needs, admission to a particular school, transport to and from school, or winning a battle for reinstated education after a period without it, legal aid-funded advice has often made a huge difference to their children's life chances.
	The Children's Commissioner goes on to say:
	"The net result of these proposals would, in our view, remove the rights of access to justice by vulnerable and marginalised members of our society where no other alternative source of funding or route to resolution can be secured, and in circumstances where litigants' ability to represent their own case has not properly been considered".
	She concludes with a point that I hope the Minister will respond to when the time comes. She states that:
	"The proposed redefinition of scope for legal aid",
	to remove education other than SEN,
	"appears to show a serious disregard for the rights of the child under both the UNCRC, and the recent guidelines adopted by the Council of Europe on child-friendly justice".

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I welcome this debate and in particular thank my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for introducing an important amendment that would seek to make a change to paragraph 2 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill. This is the paragraph that brings special educational needs within the scope of the new scheme.
	The Government, in response to our consultation on this package of reforms, recognised the compelling arguments that stakeholders made concerning special educational needs cases. As a result, we altered our position on special educational needs, which has been recognised in the contributions to the debate. The Bill included provision for these cases when it was published.
	Our intention is to cover all matters that can legitimately be classed as special educational needs issues. It has been brought to our attention by stakeholders, particularly the Special Educational Consortium, that the current wording in paragraph 2 does not cover all SEN matters-in particular, learning difficulty assessments under the Learning and Skills Act 2000 for 16 to 25 year-olds. My noble friend and others made a very compelling case on that point. Although I have no reason to doubt the drafting skills of my noble friends, I hope that they will understand if I do not accept their amendment at this time. The focus on Section 140 of the 2000 Act would include Wales only. That might be because of the hand of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford-that is no criticism-but I can assure the Committee that my officials are working closely with the Department for Education to ensure that the issue that noble Lords have raised is addressed and that the contents of paragraph 2 encompass all SEN matters. I assure noble Lords that the Government in principle accept the point and that we will table a technical amendment on Report to ensure that SEN matters are fully within the Bill's scope.
	The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, spoke to Amendment 82ZA, which, as he indicated, would bring into scope all education matters not already covered by Schedule 1. As he said, we have retained legal aid for any education case that involves a contravention of the Equality Act 2010, such as cases concerning disability discrimination, and current legal aid funding for appeals on special educational needs matters, as we have just discussed. We have also retained legal aid for education judicial reviews.
	In practice, the amendment would retain legal aid for all education matters, including advice on admissions and exclusion decisions and for educational negligence damage claims, and would mean lost savings of approximately £1 million. The judgment that we have had to make has been to prioritise funding on the most important education cases, which are special educational needs, discrimination and judicial review. We believe that those are of the highest priority, and that advice on, for example, admissions, exclusions and damages claims are not. Of course, those are not unimportant, but where parents are not satisfied with an admissions refusal they can appeal to an independent panel. That requires them to set out in writing why they disagree with the admissions decision, and why they think that the admissions arrangements have not been followed correctly. Those are not usually legal arguments, and the local authority choice adviser can assist parents and attend the appeal hearing with them.
	Parents who wish to challenge a temporary or permanent exclusion may do so by writing a letter to the school governors, setting out their reasons for challenging the exclusion. Again, if they are unhappy with the decision permanently to exclude their child, they can appeal-currently to an independent appeal panel, but from September this year to an independent review panel. The Department for Education will fund the Children's Legal Centre to provide advice to parents on appeals to the independent review panel both online and through a telephone advice line.
	Parents can also appeal to the First-tier Tribunal if the appeal concerns disability discrimination, and legal aid is being retained for advice and assistance in such cases. Advice is also available on admission and exclusion matters, although I recognise that the organisations involved, such as the Advisory Centre for Education and the Children's Legal Centre, face the same difficulties as others in the current financial climate.
	The other tier or category is education negligence claims, which have been excluded from scope, along with most other damages claims, because we do not consider that claims for money will generally be of the highest priority. We have therefore focused legal aid only on money claims that concern a significant breach of human rights or abuse of position or power by a public authority, an abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or sexual assault. The vast majority of education negligence claims will not fall under one of these three headings and will be removed from scope. For many meritorious cases, a conditional fee agreement will provide a suitable alternative funding arrangement.
	I have heard my noble friend Lord McNally say from this Dispatch Box on a number of occasions that very difficult tough choices have had to be made on these issues and that there has had to be prioritisation. We believe that we have focused resources on education cases of the highest priority. I hope that the House will recognise that, and I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Clement-Jones: My Lords, I propose simply to respond on Amendment 36, so if those on the opposition Front Bench wish to respond on Amendment 82ZA, I shall briefly pause. I see that they do not.
	First, I should have declared an interest as the president of Ambitious about Autism, the education and special needs charity for autistic children. I know that both it and the Special Educational Consortium will be delighted by the Minister's response. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, for their contributions. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, used a very felicitous phrase, "something of a cliff edge", about the 16-to-25 period. Of course, the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, in this area is enormous, and I particularly welcome her contribution.
	I very much welcome the Minister's response and the fact that he has recognised the compelling arguments that have been made to him and to the Department for Education not only for the phase up to 16 but for the 16 to 25 year-old phase. I recognise that the amendment might not be fully technically correct but it might cover other sections-Section 139A is a possibility-that may need to be covered in the drafting.
	I think that many noble Lords around the Committee are hoping that this is but the first swallow of summer as we progress through the Bill, but I am very content with the response today and beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 36 withdrawn.
	Amendments 36A and 36B not moved.
	Amendments 37 and 38 had been withdrawn from the Marshalled List.
	Amendments 39 to 41 not moved.
	Amendment 42
	 Moved by Baroness Butler-Sloss
	42: Schedule 1, page 120, line 11, at end insert-
	"( ) Civil legal services provided to an adult ("B") in relation to a court hearing in a matter arising out of a family relationship between B and another individual ("A") where B has abused A or there is the risk of such abuse and where the court certifies that due to the probability of cross-examination of A there is a need for both parties to be represented at that hearing."

Baroness Butler-Sloss: My Lords, this is the first of a group of amendments relating to domestic violence. Some of them overlap and are repetitive but they all have the same desire at their core-that the Government should listen a little more carefully to the very real concerns of many people about the incidence of domestic violence and the fact that the Bill, if not improved, may do a lot of damage to extremely vulnerable people.
	I have also put my name to Amendments 45, 46 and 48. Amendment 42 relates to a situation where a woman alleges domestic violence against a man and he is not represented. He will therefore be asking her questions about the abuse which she says he has perpetrated. If that abuse has occurred, it will be an extremely painful experience for her to undergo that questioning without the intervention of a lawyer. I well remember the Minister pointing out on Monday that judges are there to keep matters in order. I can only say to him that that is not entirely easy because there is a right of cross-examination and any defendant has a right to put his or-sometimes a woman is an abuser-her case to the person making the allegations. Therefore, as I know from experience, the judge's ability to stop the sort of questions that will be asked will be quite limited. Some of those questions will have to be asked, but being questioned by the man who has committed the sometimes very serious domestic violence is in itself a form of abuse against the woman; as I said, occasionally a man is the victim.
	I hope that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, will be speaking to Amendments 45, 46 and 48, so I shall make only one or two brief points about them. I notice that Amendment 44 is very similar to Amendment 45, although our amendment is slightly broader. The definition of domestic violence currently proposed is, in my view and I think the view of many others, inadequate and requires to be much broader, particularly in relation to threatening behaviour and psychological behaviour. Some men drive their wives or their partners almost to suicide by never putting a finger on them; in many ways, psychological and threatening behaviour is even more dangerous and even more debilitating than the man who returns home drunk on Saturday night and knocks his wife around but who does not ill treat her from Sunday to Saturday. Psychological abuse is usually daily and nightly and, therefore, it requires a rather broader interpretation.
	I ask the Minister to pay particular attention to Amendment 46. The proposals of the Government about what will be acceptable domestic violence in order to get legal aid are profoundly too narrow. There are so many situations. For example, no woman goes willingly to a refuge. I do not know whether the Minister has ever been to a refuge, but no one in their right senses would want to go there unless they were driven by real abuse from their partner. That is an absolute minimum. A woman who has been accepted in a refuge really should be treated as a victim of domestic violence. I hope that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, will say more about these matters; they are of enormous importance and, so far, the Government have given an inadequate response to matters which I know they take seriously. However, if they do not give a sufficiently adequate response to these amendments, they will not be seen to be treating them sufficiently seriously. In relation to Amendment 42, I beg to move.

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven: My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 43 and 44, to which I have attached my name, and to a part of the group which focuses on the question of domestic violence and the way in which the Bill approaches domestic violence.
	The history of the justice system and domestic violence is not a very happy one. For many years, crimes within the home were hardly regarded as the business of the state; they were, in the rather grim phrase, "domestics"-issues to be sorted out as best as they could be between the parties. Of course, the problem was that the parties were very rarely equal. Children, who are often the most damaged victims, are the least equal of all. In all the years that I was a prosecutor, I saw the effects and consequences of that injustice. At its most brutal, I dealt with a startling number of women who had been murdered by their partners, and who had repeatedly been victims of persistent and escalating assault. In too many cases, those assaults had gone completely unpunished and undetected and they were allowed to escalate into killing. It would be difficult to imagine a worse failure of law enforcement policy.
	When I was the DPP, the prosecution service and the police, notably aided and encouraged by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, when she was a distinguished Attorney-General, spent a great deal of time on this issue, as she knows. We did research, we spoke to victims and to experts, and we educated ourselves, prosecutors and police officers. The most important lesson that we learnt was that the signals sent out by victims of domestic violence can be confused and difficult to read. Sometimes they have to be decoded and understanding that was the key to all the reforms that we undertook. Of course, people in these situations do not send out confusing signals or sometimes behave in ways that are, for us, counterintuitive because they are necessarily lying, but the complex human relationships that are in play do not always allow for a rational train of evidence, so the police and we as prosecutors had to think differently and imaginatively about this category of crime. The Government also have to do that.
	At the most basic level, a woman who has been beaten up does not always come forward to make an official complaint, but the absence of a complaint is not evidence that a crime has not occurred. The British Crime Survey tells us that up to 25 per cent of women have experienced domestic violence, but the numbers coming forward are far below that: indeed, on the Bar Council's figures from another survey, only 16 per cent of victims of domestic violence come forward.
	The truth is that an abused woman will not always report her assailant to the police. Often, she will not. If she does, she will not always support a prosecution. Often she will not; often she will return home to face more violence. No doubt sometimes she has children who want their father. Sometimes he is the breadwinner and she fears destitution without him. Sometimes she may simply continue to love him in some way that draws her back. As prosecutors, we learnt not to take the behaviour of victims of domestic abuse at face value. We learnt that we had to get beyond those responses if we were to get the assailant. That was the key: to get beyond the responses. The result was that prosecutions of domestic abusers rose dramatically, as did the rates of conviction. This was painstaking work and it would be a very great shame to see any of it undone.
	Which of the lessons that we learnt have the drafters of the Bill learnt? The answer is: not enough of them. Frankly, in their understanding of domestic violence, the proposed legal aid reforms could have been written 10 or 15 years ago. It is a matter of great regret that a Bill presented by the coalition Government of which my party is a member appears to step backwards in expecting victims of domestic violence to conform to a stereotype of conduct, so that they will not be believed, their gateway will be shut and they will not get legal aid. This risks condemning many victims of domestic violence to a future with little or no legal succour. It is a policy with which the Government should not be associated.
	In essence, the Government have done the right thing in Schedule 1 by retaining legal aid in private family law cases where domestic violence is present, but have done the wrong thing by requiring categories of evidence to support the existence of domestic violence that are very commonly absent, such as a criminal conviction, a finding of court and so on. So often, the victims of this sort of conduct seek advice and help from sources other than the authorities.

Lord Clinton-Davis: Has the noble Lord made representations to this effect? If so, what has been the reply?

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven: I am certain that the points that I and other noble Lords made were carefully considered by the Government, who I hope will continue to consider the points. My point was that frequently victims of domestic violence seek support other than from the authorities, for obvious reasons; they seek it from doctors, support organisations, social services and the like. Material from these sources should be acceptable as evidence for the purposes of the legal aid gateway.
	We can dress up the Government's present scheme in any way we like, but the reality is that the legal aid budget will reduce as a direct result of the reluctance of many victims of intimate domestic violence to expose themselves and their children to the threat of more abuse by identifying and reporting their assailant to the authorities. That is unacceptable. Of course, we all hope that victims will come forward and seek protection for themselves and their children. It is important to give them every encouragement to do so. However, often they will not, and if they do not they should not be denied legal aid for that reason.
	The Government's justification for the Bill's approach is if anything less attractive than its substance: namely, that we need a conviction or some other officially reported evidence of abuse, in case women are tempted to make up allegations of assault in order to get legal aid. This is a rather depressing reinterpretation of the old stereotype of the woman who cries rape. Of course, women very occasionally invent allegations of rape but, in my experience both as a defence counsel and as chief prosecutor, these cases are exceedingly rare and very heavily outnumbered by cases in which the woman has been attacked. A vast and overwhelming number of women do not invent the attacks that have been visited on them. Domestic abuse is real and far too widespread, as I know the Secretary of State and the Minister realise and understand.
	It is particularly difficult to understand why the definition of domestic violence in this Bill is different and, on any analysis, narrower than the definition used by ACPO and the Crown Prosecution Service in detecting and prosecuting these crimes. I hope this is an accident. If it is, let the error be rectified at once. If it is not, let the Government think again. What possible justification can there be for this Bill to contain a definition of domestic violence that offers less protection to the victims of domestic violence than the definition used successfully day in and day out by our law enforcement agencies? If that is the reality, as I believe it is, this definition has no place in this Bill.
	I accept that the legal aid budget must reduce. It is for this reason that I am able to support, as the Minister knows, many of the reforms proposed by the Government. Indeed, I have no problem at all with some of the more controversial proposals, including competitive tendering for criminal legal aid, although this does not make me very popular with many of my professional colleagues, but I have a major problem-

Lord Scott of Foscote: Can the noble Lord help me on one point? I think I understand well what psychological, physical, sexual or emotional abuse might consist of, but I find it very difficult to see what the adjective "financial" adds to a case where none of those elements is present.

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven: One can imagine a category of abuse that is primarily financial. Of course, it could carry in its train some of the other features that the noble and learned Lord has alluded to, but it adds something to the definition of domestic violence. We all know that financial power is an important aspect of the power relationship that can exist between men and women, particularly, as he indicates, women who are being abused in other ways. My view is that the adjective "financial" is an important part of the realistic and modern definition of what can cause and amount to domestic violence.
	I have a major problem with an approach that risks rolling back decades of progress in our understanding of a crime that is an absolute scourge, not least in the way that it condemns so many of the children who live with it to disordered and chaotic later lives of their own. Talking of cost, that brings its own very high cost, which all of us have to pay. We must have a system of legal aid that works properly to protect the victims of domestic abuse, understanding that it is money well spent. We must have a Bill with the modern definition of that crime and including provision for those who may be too scared or desperate to call the police. As we all understand, domestic violence brings a cycle of damage and despair that is deeply destructive and anti-social. No Government should ever find themselves on the wrong side of this argument.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, I support these amendments. I will particularly refer to Amendment 46. It seems to me that sub-paragraphs (g) (j) and (k) are particularly important. They relate to the less formal types of evidence as opposed to court convictions and the like. These amendments have been eloquently and accurately moved by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Macdonald, and I do not want to add too much, apart from a couple of examples. Before I give them, I shall make a point of principle. From my experience as a legal practitioner, it is clear to me that the earlier legal aid is given for the earliest possible intervention, the least harm is likely to be done. I urge the Government to accept that as a very sound principle. I will now give my two illustrations that lead me to that principle.
	On one occasion many years ago, when I still practised family law, I was asked to obtain an injunction for a lady from a small town in rural Wales. I was then practising in Chester, and the town in which she lived was about 50 miles west of Chester. She had been driven by various forms of abuse by her husband, some financial-the deprivation of money for daily expenditure for herself and the children, so she could not even buy the children shoes-some emotional and some physical, eventually to go to that daunting place, the local solicitor's office on the high street. The great solicitor Mr Jones-and he really was called Mr Jones-decided to apply for an injunction, and I was instructed.
	When she came to my chambers in Chester, she told me that this was an absolutely terrifying experience for her; she had never been to England before. We went and obtained the injunction in the judge's domestic dining room. She left the occasion much mollified and placated by the friendliness of the law-not least because she had won. However, much worse consequences could have ensued if she had not finally had the courage to go to Mr Jones's office. Over the years I have appeared for both the prosecution and the defence in murder cases where there had been clear domestic abuse but the steps which that lady took had not been taken and eventually distraction arose.
	My second example is much worse and I am afraid it has haunted me for the last 30 years. After a great deal of domestic abuse, a wife was eventually driven to obtain orders from the local county court, again in west Wales, against her husband. On the face of it they were both extremely nice, professional people. They were able to pay for their own proceedings because they were local small-business people. So much heat had been generated during the period before proceedings were taken, that not very long after the orders were obtained from the county court, unfortunately, the husband killed both the children in absolutely tragic circumstances that left scars on a whole community.
	It seems to me that if legal aid were given for early interventions to take place, we could avoid not only those kinds of tragedies but the costs for other parts of the public service that ensue if legal aid is not made available. The consequences of late intervention can lead to mental health services being involved, and it is worth recording that if somebody ends up in privately run mental health services as an in-patient, albeit paid for by the NHS, it can cost as much as £150,000 per week-I repeat, per week-for that kind of intervention to take place. These figures are readily available. There can also be educational difficulties which hold back children for the whole of their lives. People can end up in prison, which is very cheap compared with mental health services: it costs a mere £40,000 per year for each prisoner, even if sentenced to short terms of imprisonment.
	I say to my noble friend the Minister that the Government are cutting off their nose to spite their face with these provisions. There is absolutely no evidence of real savings being made, and the real social cost may be dramatic and very serious.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, it is a real privilege to follow the last three, very powerful, speeches in support of this series of amendments. For completeness, I declare my interest as the chair of the All-Party Group on Domestic and Sexual Violence, and founder and patron of both the Corporate Alliance Against Domestic Violence and the Global Foundation for the Elimination of Domestic Violence.
	I am particularly grateful to follow those three powerful speeches because your Lordships have had a taste of the different elements that participate in the criminal and civil justice process to bring relief and succour to victims of domestic violence. Those elements are the experience of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as a judge and previous president of the Family Division; the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in his sterling work dealing with these issues while he had the privilege of being our Director of Public Prosecutions; and, of course, the wealth of experience of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile.
	I do not propose to reiterate everything that they have said about the nature of domestic violence but it is important for us to remember that it can affect one in four women in our country and one in six men, and that the secondary victims of domestic violence are the children in those families. Between 750,000 and 900,000 children in the United Kingdom are adversely affected by domestic violence. Tragically, we see them overrepresented in every indices of dysfunction, whether it is alcoholism, mental illness, criminality or lack of educational and physical milestones being met. The breadth of domestic violence has been well understood.
	To say a word in response to a question about financial violence from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, regrettably-as the Minister will know from his own readings of this subject-financial violence can often be the tool used to restrict a woman and a victim's movement, and to impose on them situations which cause them physical and emotional harm. Having no money, being controlled and being restricted can have a very deleterious effect.
	What the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald and Lord Carlile, have said is correct about the way in which we have learnt about domestic violence. Over the past 30 years, the learning has come, regrettably, at the cost of listening to victims who have suffered from the mistakes that we made in the past; namely, our inability to understand or to respond in a holistic and joined-up way.
	The work that has been done, not least in this House by Members and elsewhere, has enhanced our understanding and the definition in Amendment 45, which is tabled in my name, that of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester and the noble Lord, Lord Blair, is not innovative. It is the accepted definition of domestic violence used on a day-to-day basis by courts, prosecutors, advocates, third-party non-governmental organisations, individuals and elsewhere. The way in which that definition has been crafted has been influenced by the experience culled over a period of 30 years.
	Before this Bill, there was never any suggestion that any amendment of that definition was immediately necessary to prevent people taking advantage of it in a way that was not proper. As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has said, the real issue that has troubled many of us is how we persuade and enable those who are in need of the succour that can be provided to come forward, not how we stop them from making false allegations. That problem has been alleviated but not expunged. We still have to encourage. Regrettably, 89 per cent of repeat victims of domestic violence happen to be women. One in six is a man, but it is a lower level, but they tend not to be repeat victims, so the problem remains.
	The definition adopted by the Association of Chief Police Officers has served us well. I do not for a moment suggest that the Government are not committed to alleviating domestic violence. The fact that the Government have excluded domestic violence victims from the general legal aid ban on family law is important. I acknowledge that immediately and we should applaud it. I know that the Minister's colleague in another place, Mr Djanogly, said in terms:
	"If domestic violence is involved, the Government believe that legal aid should be provided".-[Official Report, Commons, 31/10/11; col. 638.]
	We say to the Minister today that, in order to fulfil that acknowledged commitment, the definition used in the Bill has to be changed and should reflect the accepted definition which has been used on a day-to-day basis by everyone.
	If it is not, we run the risk of excluding about 46 per cent of the domestic violence victims who are currently eligible for legal aid. What the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said was absolutely right: we need prevention and early intervention. We have been encouraging victims to come not when they reach the stage of being a high-risk victim on the multi-agency risk assessment Richter scale, because, quite frankly, that is sometimes almost too late. To satisfy that high-risk criterion, victims have to be at risk of death or grievous bodily harm. We have encouraged victims to seek appropriate intervention and relief at an early stage, when there is a punch, a kick or a push, and that has started to happen. We are winning on that. The Minister will know that, since 2003, when we jointly started to look at his issue in a more concentrated manner, we have reduced domestic violence according to all the figures by 64 per cent and have saved-I know how important is the economic cost at this moment of real austerity- £7.5 billion a year. That is a real saving and we in this country now know how to deliver it.
	A key component of that early intervention and reduction in economic costs was, and always has been, the availability of legal aid for victims who need it. By intervening early, we have reduced the level of deaths. The noble Lord also knows that, if we are dealing with a murder investigation, it will cost the state at least £1 million from interdiction to conviction. If children are involved, we can be looking at £2 million per case. One has only to do very simple maths to work out that failure to give legal aid at a judicious moment will cost us far more in the long term than giving it early and allowing, quite often, the woman and her children to have appropriate protection, because the damage that is done to children can affect them for the rest of their lives.
	So I strongly urge and invite the Minister to ask his right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor to think again. On Monday night, I know that the Minister waved his white flag. I would encourage him to wave it even more vigorously in relation to this issue, confident that he can return to his right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor and assure him that in so doing he will save lives and cost. If the Minister has any information that indicates that there will be an economic saving in costs, we would obviously be most grateful to hear on what basis those savings will be found.
	Turning to the evidential base, I want to add a little to what has been said in support of Amendment 46. The Minister will recognise all the forms of evidence that are laid out there because those are the sources of evidence that the UK Border Agency currently uses. An applicant asking for an extension of stay or asking for the right to remain here will have to produce them if they wish to establish that domestic violence has been visited upon them. Noble Lords will know that since these provisions were introduced and applied by the UK Border Agency, no difficulty seems to have arisen in relation to misuse or abuse of them-both with the definition and with the sources of evidence. We know beyond peradventure that this works. Although I hear what his honourable friend in the other place says about wanting to restrict these sources of evidence in order to discourage those who would seek to make unmeritorious claims, I can certainly assure the Minister that no such unmeritorious claims seem to get through the sieve if you apply the sources of evidence that we have referred to in Amendment 46.
	It is important to think about the reality of the damage that would be caused if these sources of evidence are not accepted. We should look at the average case, such as when a woman has run from her home. She manages to go to her GP, who sees the injuries and notes them and then sends her to hospital because there are fears that she may have cracked a rib or another bone. She is seen by the medical staff and they verify that the injuries that she complains of are genuine. Her neighbours may have come in to rescue her from an assault. They may not have seen the assault taking place but have noted what was happening and taken her away. Social services may have come along and examined the children, spoken to them and heard what they had to say. All of that might have been used by the police who then came along and arrested the man. He may then acknowledge that he has indeed committed the offences that are alleged against him. Even if all those things had happened, under these provisions the woman would not be entitled to legal aid. That cannot be right.
	As the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, has made clear, quite often women will stay for a long time in such circumstances. Recent research shows that on average a woman with children will stay for five and a half years in such a situation before she leaves. She may go to court and get an injunction or an order against the husband. He may be convicted of grievous bodily harm, sentenced to five years in prison, serve two and a half and come out. There is still a real risk to his wife and his children. The police may agree that he continues to present a risk to them. Under these provisions, because it would have been beyond the 12-month period, such a woman would not be entitled to legal aid. I know that cannot be what the Government wish to happen.
	The injustice of these provisions is plain and I cannot believe it is intended. I do not wish to believe that the Government intended to turn the clock back not 15 years, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald suggests, but actually by 30 years. We started this work with the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and thereafter legal aid has been there throughout the whole period. I do not believe that this is the noble Lord's intention or that of his noble and learned friend the Lord Chancellor. Therefore, I must believe it is because the Government do not understand. That is disappointing and sad, because I thought that both the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Members had been with us and that all of us were on the same journey. If the Government have lost their way, I am glad to see there are many on the Liberal Democrat Benches-and I am sure there will be on the Tory Benches, too-who will help them out.
	I also want to speak in support of the amendment spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. She is right when she says that legal aid should be granted where cross-examination is conducted by the perpetrator of the abuse, so I ask the noble Lord to think again. There will be even more rejoicing-not just in this place but elsewhere-if the noble Lord can say in reply that, on mature reflection, the Government see the merit of not taking forward the provisions that they currently have in the Bill and that they would prefer to continue with the received and agreed joint wisdom that is apparent in the ACPO definition and in Amendment 46.

The Lord Bishop of Chichester: Before the noble and learned Baroness sits down, could she help me just a little? On Amendment 45, it does seem to me that relying upon a known, approved and accepted definition is clearly right. Of course I accept that, for all the very powerful reasons that have been given. However, since this was crafted, we have got a lot more experience in respect of other kinds of domestic abuse, in particular that of the elderly. We have become very aware recently of the danger to people in care homes but not quite aware enough of the possibility of domestic violence against the elderly as well. Although it is probably too late to bring this into the Bill, could she help me in pressing the Minister to respond as to whether, where it says at the end,
	"regardless of gender or sexuality",
	we ought to assume "regardless of age, gender or sexuality"?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, that is right. We tend to think of familial violence as violence within a family group and people living together in partnership. Regrettably, the right reverend Prelate is right in saying that age does not prohibit violence-domestic violence is no respecter of persons, irrespective of age, ethnicity, economic background or any dividing issue one can think of. Regrettably, domestic violence affects everyone, and this definition, which has been used, continues to be efficacious and would include those issues.
	I should also say that of course the Government themselves have been undertaking a review of domestic violence strategy. In part of that strategy, the definition is being considered and, from what I understand of the consultation, they are seeking to widen the net and not restrict it. That is why these provisions are so concerning and-I have to say-utterly surprising. If there was one area in which I did not believe that there would be any dissent at all among the parties or any of our Benches, it would have been this. So there is deep concern and surprise but also bitter disappointment that we are having this debate.

Lord McNally: My Lords, the other evening I said that a smile always came to my face when the noble and learned Baroness reached the Dispatch Box. I think there is usually an exception, and that is when you are in the firing line from her formidable advocacy.
	The noble and learned Baroness put her finger on it when she said that domestic violence has its impact on every index of dysfunction in our society. I think that we all accept and understand that. My noble friend Lord Macdonald made the point in acknowledging that the Government have from the very beginning, as the noble and learned Baroness said in quoting my honourable friend Jonathan Djanogly, intended to put domestic violence within scope.
	This debate is about whether we have got the definition right. Obviously in discussing that, I have to take into account the comments of a former President of the Family Division, a former Director of Public Prosecutions, a former Attorney-General with considerable lateral experience as well in these matters, and even my noble friend Lord Carlile, who in this case is just an honest jobbing barrister. Obviously, if one gets that weight of evidence, we go back and look carefully at what has been said. I did not realise that this Government were so radical, as was suggested by the query of the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis. Of course, I have talked to my noble friends and have tried in the course of the Bill to be available to Members on all sides of the House. However, as I said at an earlier stage, I am trying to use this Committee stage to listen and to take on board and match our aspirations for the Bill with the experience and wisdom that we receive in Committee to see whether there are areas in which we will make changes when we get to Report, or areas where we simply say to the House that we simply disagree. The spirit is one of listening.
	I agree with the noble and learned Baroness that it should be a matter of cross-party co-operation to deal with this scourge of domestic violence. I visited Holloway Prison and was taken to see an ongoing programme of training and educational skills for girls. I went around talking to a number of them. The lady who showed me round suddenly said something that really chilled me. I said, "This seems to be working very well". She said, "Yes, of course, but you know these girls are probably in the safest place that they have ever been in their lives". So please do not think that our approach is either frivolous or without concern for the very real problems that domestic violence causes. Again, in a phrase that was used by my noble friend Lord Macdonald, it is certainly not our intention to roll back the decades of progress.
	Let me deal with the amendments. Points have been made that might not be exactly the facts. For example, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, gave the illustration of a man who has been imprisoned for violence for five years but comes out in two and a half. I am advised that the time limit will not apply to a conviction for an offence of violence against the application for legal aid, so if a woman's partner were convicted of such an offence against her and imprisoned, the conviction would be a qualifying form of evidence following a release, even if that were more than 12 months after conviction. There were many other points that people have made. Let me read the Hansard of how those points have been made and let noble Lords read the reply that I am giving. Then, as the noble and learned Baroness said, we can look at this issue, because I am not in the business of either rolling back decades of progress or ignoring a very real problem about that I know all Members of this House are deeply concerned about.
	Amendment 42 would bring into scope legal aid for the perpetrator or alleged perpetrator of abuse if the courts certified that there was the possibility of cross-examination. I understand the concerns that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to address here, but we are seeking to ensure funding for the most vulnerable in society. We do not think that automatically extending funding to alleged perpetrators fits well into this, nor do we think that it is necessary. It would be a mistake to assume that the only means of protection for the prospective witness is to fund representation for the prospective questioner. I think that we had something of this debate the other night and I take the point that there are limits to what a judge can do. However, there are also powers which a judge has. I am not going to cross swords with the noble and learned Baroness about this, but I merely make that point.
	The situation which the noble and learned Baroness seeks to address can already occur in the courts. Should a victim of abuse face questioning from their abuser, judges have the power and the training to manage the situation and to make sure that the court's process is not abused, and that hearings at which oral evidence is given are handled sensitively. For example, the court in family proceedings is specifically empowered to limit cross-examination and it can have questions relayed to the witness rather than asked directly, use video links or intervene to prevent inappropriate questioning. We recognise the importance of funding in a range of cases where the interests of victims of domestic abuse are paramount, and this is reflected in the final decisions that we have reached.
	I turn to Amendments-

Lord Carlile of Berriew: Before my noble friend moves on from that point, can he go a little further in answering the issue raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about cross-examination? Yes, of course the judge has power to limit inappropriate cross-examination, but the judge cannot prevent the person concerned putting their case, and putting it fully and properly. That is the issue that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to deal with. It is in that situation that the allegedly abused person faces real anguish, and in which the protection of the judge is but a very small instrument.

Lord McNally: I will take this back but, again, I am speaking as a layman to professionals. As far as I understand it, there are increasingly ways in the courts of preventing that kind of face-to-face, aggressive cross-examination. I think that there was a case recently which caused a good deal of public comment and distress. I will take the matter away and take further advice but, as I say, both my impression as a layman and the advice that I have are that there are safeguards to prevent that kind of brutal, face-to-face, intimidating cross-examination. I hear what my noble friend says and I will take further advice on the matter.
	I turn to Amendments 43, 44, 45, 46 and 48 and start by reiterating why we are taking most private family law cases out of the scope of legal aid. The cost of legal aid as it stands is, we believe, simply unsustainable, and legal aid resources need to be focused on those cases where legal aid is most needed. Accordingly, for most divorces, child contact applications or ancillary relief applications to divide family assets, legal aid will no longer be available. We believe that it is right to encourage families, where appropriate, to resolve their disputes without going to court. We want to prioritise mediation, which can be cheaper, quicker and less acrimonious than contested court proceedings. Legal aid will therefore remain available for mediation in private law family cases. We estimate that we will spend some extra £10 million a year on mediation, taking the total to £25 million a year.
	We accept, however, that mediation might not be suitable in every case-particularly, as we made clear, in cases involving domestic violence. It is important to remember that the inclusion of this provision is to ensure that legal aid remains available for private family law cases where there is evidence of domestic violence, creating a disadvantage for one party, and cases where a child is at risk of abuse.
	Amendments 44 and 45 would put in paragraph 10 of Schedule 1 to the Bill, in place of the existing definition of abuse, parts of the definition of domestic violence first used by the Association of Chief Police Officers but subsequently more widely adopted for operational purposes-although not, it should be noted, by the courts. The existing definition of abuse used in the Bill is a broad and comprehensive one, having been drafted deliberately and explicitly so as not to be limited to physical violence. It should be noted that it is used elsewhere in Schedule 1: in paragraph 3, which provides for legal aid to be available in relation to the abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, and paragraph 11, which provides for legal aid to be available for a person seeking an order to protect a child at risk of abuse.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: I hope that the Minister will forgive me for interrupting him. Can he explain what is wrong with the ACPO definition and why it is preferred to have a different definition, twice to be found in the Bill but not to be found elsewhere? As far as I know, there has been no broad definition by the judges of domestic abuse, which has been referred to in all its various forms. I am absolutely certain that the courts accept the ACPO definition.

Lord McNally: I will write on this matter, but I think that here the noble and learned Baroness is wrong. As far as I understand it, the Supreme Court did not accept the ACPO definition of domestic violence. If the noble and learned Baroness will bear with me, I will come to that point in the brief-there is a part that deals with this.
	Any consideration of the definition in one paragraph should not be undertaken entirely in isolation from the others, lest confusion should result. The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill's structure and the purpose of the paragraph where it appears.
	I want to know-"like most normal people", I was going to say-why on earth, if there is a perfectly good ACPO definition, we do not use it. The Supreme Court held that domestic violence could extend to psychological abuse but did not adopt the ACPO definition. However, the majority of the court indicated approval of the approach of what is now Practice Direction 12J, supporting the Family Procedure Rules2010. For its purposes, it defines domestic violence as,
	"physical violence, threatening or intimidating behaviour and any other form of abuse which, directly or indirectly, may have caused harm to the other party or to the child or which may give rise to the risk of harm".

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Was that not a case in which the Supreme Court was being asked to determine whether a specific aspect of emotional abuse was to be included so that someone could get relief and, in so doing, referring to that aspect rather than any other? Could the noble Lord tell the Committee to which case he is referring?

Lord McNally: If I am misleading the Committee in any way in this exchange, I will of course write and correct it. The Supreme Court did not adopt the ACPO definition of domestic violence in the Yemshaw case. If the noble and learned Baroness questions me any more, she will go way above my pay grade in terms of the law.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: One of my colleagues has just suggested that maybe the noble Lord is in need of a little legal aid.

Lord McNally: Every time I look up, the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, is speaking somewhere in the Chamber. The Opposition are overworking the man-give him the night off.
	The definition should also be seen in the light of the Bill's structure and purpose. Paragraph 10 reflects the underlying policy of ensuring that a party to private law family proceedings who has been subject to domestic violence by the other party to those proceedings and is likely, as a result of that abuse, to be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in presenting his or her case, should have access to legal aid. It does not provide that any individual who has been the subject of, or is at risk of being the subject of, abuse-as defined in that paragraph-will qualify regardless of what evidence of abuse might exist. Not every such individual will be intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged in the way that the paragraph is intended to address.
	The paragraph establishes a description of legal services. Whether an individual qualifies for them in any specific case requires not only that the individual falls within the categories in paragraph 10 but that the individual meets the criteria to be established in regulations made under Clause 10. As has been explained in the Government's response to consultation and in debates on the Bill, those criteria will set out the specific requirements as to the evidence of the fact or risk of abuse. Therefore, the definition of abuse itself is only a preliminary part of the picture. However, it is important that we get it right. I suspect that the Committee will say "hear, hear" to that.
	The definition of abuse presently in the Bill embraces mental as well as physical abuse, neglect, maltreatment and exploitation. These references would cover, for example, abusive behaviour relating to family finances-a point that was raised earlier. The definition in the Bill would not exclude from scope any of the types of abuse covered by the definition used by the Association of Chief Police Officers, so this part of the amendment is unnecessary. This could lead to the understandable question of why we do not simply adopt the ACPO definition, given its general recognition. However, the ACPO definition is not set in legislation anywhere and is therefore not permanent, as demonstrated by the recent consultation announced by the Home Office. It could change but legislation would not change with it, at least not without subsequent primary legislation.
	The ACPO definition is operational in nature and purpose. Legislation serves a different intent in setting the framework for the way in which legal aid systems will operate and the definition is drafted to better fit this purpose. I reiterate that this does not mean that there are circumstances covered by the ACPO definition which are not covered by that in the Bill. Indeed, my colleague the honourable Member for Huntingdon, Jonathan Djanogly, issued an invitation during Report in the other place for Members to give any examples of cases that would be excluded by the Bill's definition compared with that of ACPO. It might also be noted that in terms of the range of persons involved the ACPO definition is narrower than that in the Bill, the Bill's definition being linked to that already used in the legislation governing family homes and domestic violence in Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996. I speak as a lay man. That is the explanation. That is why we did not move ACPO into the Bill en bloc. I ask noble Lords to study Hansard. If the explanation does not stand up, I invite the noble and learned Baroness and others to come back to me on that point between now and Report.
	Before I move on I would like to address one other issue relating to these amendments which could be misleading. The reference to "any incident" might be read as securing legal aid for any person who could point to some sort of incident regardless of whether it was serious or minor, such that the victim would not genuinely feel inhibited in pursuing litigation against the other party. That would not reflect the underlying intention nor be the effect in practice if the regulation required certain forms of proof. The touchstone for whether a party obtains funding must be whether the abuse was such as to inhibit the ability to present their case against the other party. The circumstances that will be accepted as evidence of abuse will turn on the application by courts, prosecutors and other agencies of their existing criteria. Where the courts and others have determined that the abusive conduct is of a level that protective action or prosecution must be taken, legal aid will be available.
	Amendments 46 and 43 would set out a range of forms of evidence that would be accepted as demonstrating domestic violence for the purpose of qualifying for legal aid in private family law cases. We want victims of domestic violence to have the benefit of legal aid in such cases where they will be disadvantaged by facing their abuser as the other party. It is important to remember that our proposal is that victims of domestic violence remain in scope of legal aid provisions. However, we heard many concerns during the consultation that this proposal could see a rise in unfounded allegations and we want to guard against that. Therefore, we need clear objective evidence of domestic violence in order to target taxpayers' money on genuine cases where the victim needs assistance because of being intimidated or otherwise disadvantaged by the fact of facing the abuser in proceedings. The forms of evidence that will be accepted for this purpose are not set out on the face of the Bill. Instead, our intention is that they will be set out in regulations under Clause 10. We believe that it is appropriate to set out these detailed provisions in secondary rather than primary legislation, which can be amended to respond to particular issues which may arise in the practical operation of the scheme.
	We indicated the intended forms of evidence in consultation and listened to views expressed in response to that consultation about what should be accepted as evidence of domestic violence. As a result we have widened the range of forms of evidence. Only one of these forms of evidence will be needed, so legal aid will be available for victims of domestic violence in private family law where any one of these criteria is met: a non-molestation order; an occupation order; a forced marriage protection order or other protective injunction against the other party which is either in force or has been made in the past 12 months; if there is a criminal conviction for domestic violence committed by the other party against the applicant for funding unless the conviction is spent; if there are ongoing criminal proceedings against the other party for a domestic violence offence by that party against the applicant for funding; if the applicant for funding has been referred to a multi-agency risk-assessment conference as a harassed victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party; or there has been in the court a finding on fact of domestic violence by the other party, giving rise to the risk of harm to the victim.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I hesitate to interrupt the noble Lord but can he help me on a point about legal aid being withdrawn from private law cases? He will know that one of the main ways of there being a finding of fact is through those private law situations. If there is an impecunious litigant, can he help me as to how that litigant-normally a woman-is going to get those findings of fact if she does not have legal aid to do so? That is one issue.
	Secondly, has the noble Lord seen or read the recent survey by Women's Aid, Rights of Women and Welsh Women's Aid that found that the majority of respondents did not report abuse the first time it occurred but typically did so after being assaulted between three and five times? Although 99 per cent had reported at least one incident to the police and/or the police had attended an incident, only 8.3 per cent would be able to prove that they had had an ongoing criminal proceeding in the previous 12 months. There seem to be a lot of practical difficulties and I wonder whether the noble Lord can help the Committee in relation to those matters.

Lord McNally: The Welsh Women's Aid report has been published very recently and we will look carefully at it. I should point out that the organisation surveyed women who are in receipt of domestic violence services rather than women who are seeking legal aid for private family matters. It is a distinction but it means that the survey may not fully square with the issues that we are looking it. We know that this latter group will often, for example, seek a domestic violence injunction at the same time as they take their private family law action, and thereby will qualify for legal aid. None the less, we will look closely at this matter and I will perhaps write to the noble and learned Baroness on her other point.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I do not by any means want to harry the noble Lord but, given what he said about the need for flexibility and certainty, will he consider putting all the evidential issues into the schedule and providing us with an amendment we can look at? Perhaps we could have something such as an affirmative resolution in relation to these issues, which would give us flexibility-if that is what the Government think would be necessary-and clarity as to what evidence would acceptable. I am making a suggestion to the noble Lord that I will not necessarily be bound by, but I just want him to think about it.

Lord McNally: I will very happily think about it and I naturally assume that the noble and learned Baroness is trying to help me. I am very grateful for that. This reply and this whole debate will need to be looked at to see whether we are achieving our real objectives of getting something that is fit for purpose-although I hate using that phrase-in terms of addressing a matter of genuine concern right across the House. There are no differences on this and I freely admit that I do not have noble and learned Baroness's detailed experience of these matters. I hope that she will accept that I share her commitment that we get this right.
	It may be helpful to give some idea of the prevalence of those forms of evidence. About 24,100 domestic violence orders were made in 2010; about 74,000 domestic violence crimes were prosecuted in 2009-10; and there were 53,000 domestic violence convictions. About 43,000 victims of domestic violence were referred to multi-risk assessment conferences in the 12 months up to June 2010. Clearly, those numbers will overlap to a certain extent but, to compare, the Legal Services Commission funded legal representation in about 69,000 private family law cases in 2009-10, not including legal aid for protective injunctions. The forms of evidence we intend to accept will meet a very high standard of objectivity. We are concerned that many of the additional forms of evidence suggested in the amendments would rely on the word of those involved and provide an incentive to make allegations where none presently exists. However, I also heard what both the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, and the noble and learned Baroness said.
	Let me be clear. We are not questioning the integrity of genuine victims. However, during the legal aid consultation, concerns were expressed about providing an incentive for unfounded allegations. Accepting self-reporting without objective evidence would prevent us from focusing assistance on those victims of domestic violence who would be unable effectively to present their case against the other party because of the history or risk of abuse by that party. Both amendments referred to evidence from professionals in a variety of roles. We have widened our criteria, so that legal aid will be available where the victim has been referred to a multi-agency risk assessment conference as a high-risk victim of domestic violence, and a plan has been put in place to protect them from violence by the other party. Those referrals can be made by a range of professionals. Further, a finding of fact in the court that domestic violence has occurred will trigger legal aid and the court will be able to assess any relevant evidence.
	Amendment 48 would prevent a time limit applying to any evidence. We have already said that a 12-month period, where relevant, will apply, but we consider that 12 months will be an appropriate period to protect victims and enable them to deal with their private law issue. The point made by the noble and learned Baroness about an intervening prison sentence would not interfere with that rule. If the criteria were to rise again-for instance, if a second protective injunction is made-the period would start again. It is also important to remember that legal aid will remain available for exceptional out-of-scope cases where the failure to provide such funding would amount to a breach of an individual's right under the European Convention on Human Rights, in particular Article 6.
	This has been one of the most important debates on the Bill because, as all those who have contributed said, it is essential that we get this right. There have been some very well informed and committed speeches. I have put on record the Government's approach, which is to get it right on domestic violence and the legal aid that we provide to those who are subject to it. With that, I hope that the noble and learned Baroness and others will not press the amendments today but allow me to go away, study the debate and the proposals made, match the commitment that we all share to what is in the Bill and return to the matter at Report.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: My Lords, I thank all those who, with a great deal of knowledge, have contributed to this important and anxious debate. It is obvious that the Government are entirely committed to doing their best to combat domestic violence, so the only issue between the various speakers in the debate has been the best way to achieve it in the legislation before the Committee.
	I am very grateful to the Minister for his obvious concern, and I hope that he will go away and think about what those of us with some knowledge of these matters have said. If I may respectfully say so, it is equally important that the Lord Chancellor reads and takes account of what has been said.

Lord McNally: That can be taken as implied. I assure the noble and learned Baroness that when I tell him who has spoken and what they have said, he will listen. Taking up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, it is not that we do not talk to each other; we are following the process of the Bill. I am grateful that the Committee is taking this approach, as we can look at the arguments that have been made and think very hard about the issue before Report. I assure the noble and learned Baroness that when I say that I shall be taking the matter away, I mean that I shall be taking it back to the Lord Chancellor.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: I thank the Minister. I found it absolutely irresistible to say that. Each of the points that we have been dealing with is important but two of them are particularly so. The first is the definition. I think that we might all do more work in looking at the definition-in particular, by accepting the Minister's invitation to see whether the wording in Schedule 1, as he has explained it, really does meet the ACPO requirements. If it does not, we should ask why not, and to what degree it does not meet them.
	The second point is the very important list in Amendment 46. With respect, I would adopt the suggestion of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland, that these formulae for triggering legal aid in domestic violence should be in the schedule. As I understand it, the Minister's alternative suggestion is that they should be in the regulations. It would be enormously helpful, before Report, to have a rough draft of what the regulations are likely to provide so that we may know that what we are all worried about will be found in them. The Merits of Statutory Instruments Committee, of which I am a member, is all too well aware that a statutory instrument either comes in or goes out. There is absolutely no possibility of amending it unless the government department is prepared to take it back and rewrite it. It would be much better if we knew in advance what was going to be in the regulations, rather than having to attack a statutory instrument at a later stage, which is always an unhappy situation. However, as I said, I am personally very comforted by what the Minister has said.
	I want to make one point about Amendment 42. I suggest that the advice that the Minister receives is theoretical rather than practical and on the ground. I wonder whether any of those who have given him advice about what goes in court appreciates that a defendant always has the right to put his case. That is the point that I made in my preliminary observations and it was a point also made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The judge cannot stop that, but it can be a real extension of the domestic violence. I pursued that matter because one has to bear it in mind. Judges can ameliorate the position but they cannot prevent the defendant having the right to put his case. If he does not have that right before the judge, he can appeal to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to Strasbourg under the articles of the convention. Therefore, human rights apply to the defendant as well as to the victim. That is the problem and it is why legal support for the defendant would be a protection for the victim. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 42 withdrawn.
	Amendments 43 and 44 not moved.
	Amendment 45
	 Tabled by Baroness Scotland of Asthal
	45: Schedule 1, page 120, leave out lines 42 to 45 and insert-
	""abuse" means any incident or repeated incidents of threatening behaviour, violence or abuse (whether psychological, physical, sexual, financial or emotional, and including acts of neglect, maltreatment, exploitation or acts of omission) between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of gender or sexuality;"

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I shall not move Amendments 45 and 46, but I can reassure the noble Lord that, if his efforts prove to be unfruitful, we shall certainly be back.
	Amendment 45 not moved.
	Amendment 46 not moved.
	Amendment 47
	 Moved by Baroness Butler-Sloss
	47: Schedule 1, page 121, line 47, at end insert-
	"( ) Civil legal services provided to an individual who has, or it is alleged will, put the child at risk of abuse in relation to a court hearing in a matter in relation to the orders and procedures set out in sub-paragraph (1), and where the court certifies that due to the probability of cross-examination there is a need for them to be represented in that hearing."

Baroness Butler-Sloss: This is another aspect of a situation in which the possible perpetrator, unrepresented, cross-examines a witness. The Minister said in respect of an adult victim of domestic violence that they would not necessarily be the most vulnerable of the people who come before the courts. The amendment relates to the most vulnerable because it relates to the pretty unusual, but not absolutely exceptional, situation in which a child has made allegations against the father not in a public law case but in a private law case. Norgrove, in the family justice review, underlines the fact that a proportion of abuse cases come through the private law sector. In that sort of case, the father has the right-it could be the mother, although generally it is the father-to cross-examine the child if the child is making the allegations and comes to court. If the father cross-examines the child about the abuse that the child has said he or she has suffered at the hands of the father, that is a further form of abuse of a really appalling kind. It would be rare and there would be very little expense. It would happen only where the judge said that the child has to give evidence-in most cases children do not give evidence-and only where the father wanted to ask the child questions.
	Again, the father or the mother who is accused of abuse has the right to put the case to the child that it is not true. This can be done by a lawyer. It is upsetting for a child, but it can be done with a considerable degree of discretion. It is done very regularly in the criminal courts by barristers and solicitors, many of whom have had training in how to ask questions. What on earth would the Minister think of an eight or nine year-old who is able to explain very clearly what has happened to him or her being cross-examined by the father about the intimate allegations of how the father has behaved? I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I support the noble and learned Baroness in this matter. She is absolutely right that these cases are rare, but unfortunately they tend to be the most painful. The opportunity for the judge who is managing such a case to be able, if he or she thinks it appropriate, to invite legal representation for that part of the case, and there being legal aid available for the judge to so invite, may be extremely important. It is very unlikely that this avenue would be used very often, but I respectfully suggest that it would be important, in support of what the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, says, for that opportunity to be available for the better protection of the child, whose best interests would in those circumstances of course be paramount.

Lord McNally: My Lords, I do not want to get into a situation where I take things away and give the impression that the case has been made. However, again, I must listen to a former president of the Family Division and a former Attorney-General when they say that there is a problem. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said that my advisers cannot have much experience of what happens in court. I can only say that our position is based on the assumption that judges are able to manage their cases in such a way as to prevent the kind of confrontation that we are concerned with here.
	I will go away and take further advice on this. It has been examined in the other place. I do not want to leave a situation where very rare cases are not covered. On the other hand, we do not want automatically to extend funding to alleged perpetrators because that is not our line of travel as we try to focus aid on the most vulnerable and needy. It would be a mistake to assume that the only means of protecting a prospective witness, however vulnerable or young, is to fund representation for the prospective questioner. However, the two noble and learned Baronesses speak from considerable experience. I will test that experience with my advisers. If the noble and learned Baroness will withdraw her amendment, I will either reassure her before Report or we will come back to this then.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: I am very grateful for the support and experience of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland. As a distinguished former family practitioner she knows exactly what I have been talking about. There are only two former family judges in the Chamber at the moment: the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, and me. He has just indicated that he agrees with me, in particular that a judge could not protect a child where the father or mother had the right of cross-examination in order to put his or her case. That is the problem. It is rare. Therefore, dealing with it would be very inexpensive. It might happen once or twice a year at most, and the judge would be required to certify the case. Judges will be well aware that legal aid is not to be easily given. They will be well aware that to certify a case would be very unusual. However, the situation exists and children require protection. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that he will at least take away the matter and think about it. No doubt he, and all of us, should have great respect for his advisers, but they do not understand the rights of defendants quite as well as those of victims. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 47 withdrawn.
	Amendments 48 to 52 not moved.
	Amendment 53
	 Moved by Lord Thomas of Gresford
	53: Schedule 1, page 125, line 31, at end insert-
	"Best interests of patients
	16A Civil legal services provided in relation to any question whether particular medical treatment is in the best interests of a person who is incapable of giving or withholding consent to such treatment.
	Exclusions
	16B Paragraph 16A is subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
	Definitions
	16C For the purposes of this paragraph "medical treatment" has the same meaning as in the Mental Health Act 1983."

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, the amendment was suggested by the Bar Council to put a particular issue into scope. It refers to:
	"Civil legal services provided in relation to any question whether particular medical treatment is in the best interests of a person who is incapable of giving or withholding consent to such treatment".
	It arises out of a case called Re M, which was heard very recently by Mr Justice Baker. It was a case where someone was in a vegetative state, or the equivalent, and the family made application for the withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration from the person concerned. It was one of those terrible cases that one hears about from time to time. The judge made this particular series of observations, which I draw to your Lordships' attention, in the course of his judgment. He quite deliberately set out observations for future cases. In paragraph 260, he said,
	"given the fundamental issues involved in cases involving the withdrawal of ANH, it is alarming to the court that public funding has not been available to members of the family to assist them in prosecuting their application. In the event, the Applicant's team has acted pro bono throughout the hearing and during much of the very extensive preparation. I stress that this has not caused any disadvantage to the Applicant ... the family could not have had better representation. But it is intolerable that the family should have been dependent on the willingness of lawyers to work without remuneration. In this case, the "playing field" was level because of the exceptional generosity of the Applicant's lawyers. In other cases, members of a family who wished to ask the court to authorise the withdrawal of ANH but did not qualify for means tested public funding may have to appear in person, given the very high costs of litigation. Such a situation would seem to infringe the family's rights under Article 6 of ECHR. There are many demands on the restricted legal aid budget, but consideration should be given to extending the right to non-means tested public funding to family members seeking to bring this type of application. At present such non-means tested funding is available to parents whose children are the subject of care proceedings under the Children Act 1989. That provision is justified by the fundamental and life-changing consequences which flow from the making of a care order. The same argument applies to applications for the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration".
	Your Lordships will appreciate that these cases unhappily happen from time to time, and when they happen, they exercise the family members, the practitioners and the judge to a very considerable degree. Each case has to be very carefully examined. In this case, the judge refused the application and said that the life of the individual concerned should be allowed to continue. The Bar Council's proposed amendment would ensure that these cases come within the scope of legal aid, and I invite the Government to make an exception in these rare, but extremely expensive, cases.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: My Lords, I support this amendment. I declare an earlier interest in that I was the judge who tried nearly all the permanent vegetative state cases for the withdrawal of hydration and nutrition. I never had the case of M, although I very nearly did. In fact, the patient, who was on the verge of being in a permanent vegetative state, died. It is an extremely rare case where it is uncertain whether somebody is in a permanent vegetative state or has minimal consciousness. At the moment, the only decision has been against withdrawing nutrition and hydration. This situation will arise from time to time. It will be very rare. It is intensely distressing for the family and intensely difficult for the doctors and nurses who care for these people who may, or may not, have minimal consciousness. It raises an incredibly important problem as to the point at which the doctors are ordered by the court to withdraw the artificial nutrition and hydration. It is perhaps the most difficult of all decisions that might come before a court. In cases of permanent vegetative state it is nearly always the hospital that brings proceedings, but if a family brings proceedings, or wishes to be part of the proceedings brought by a hospital, it would be very difficult for the family to put forward a case of this extreme difficulty if it had no access to legal aid, particularly with the medical evidence that would be required.
	Again, as I said on the previous amendment, this is not going to cost very much money because it is not going to happen very often, but it is a particularly important fallback position. These are terrible cases to try, as I know to my cost.

Lord Beecham: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on raising this matter and moving an amendment that could greatly assist a family, or others, in the context of the tragic and ethically challenging circumstances that he has so clearly outlined and which the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has also addressed.
	There is another set of circumstances in which the noble Lord's amendment might well be applicable. While entirely endorsing his amendment on the grounds that he has advanced, I would like to refer to the suggestion of Mind in relation to the occasional need for people in detention under the Mental Health Act to also receive legal advice concerning treatment that may be prescribed for them. The system allows for legal aid to challenge the detention of someone who is being treated in a mental health facility but not in relation to treatment that might be proffered, or indeed insisted upon, by those in whose charge a patient might find himself.
	Mind has provided helpful advice to people in detention who are unable to give consent for treatment. I will quote briefly from the document it has produced which is available to those in that position. The document outlines a whole series of things, including the definitions of various matters and persons, and then it asks:
	"Can I be treated without giving consent to the treatment?".
	It goes on to say that,
	"if ... you have the mental capacity ... you are generally entitled to refuse it and no undue pressure should be placed on you. However, the law does allow treatment to be given to an adult without consent where the adult lacks the mental capacity needed to give consent and where certain sections of the Mental Health Act apply. If you are experiencing mental distress and are offered treatment, you need to be aware of any legal powers that could be used if you refuse. However, the powers must not be used as threats to coerce you into consenting, and if you feel this is happening"-
	this is the crucial point-
	"seek independent legal advice and consider making a complaint".
	It suggests discussing concerns with a general practitioner and so on, and goes on to say:
	"If you are under 18, the law is complex and it is best to seek specialist legal advice. It may be that you can consent on your own behalf, but this does not necessarily mean you have the same right to refuse. Others, such as your parents, guardian ... may be able to consent on your behalf".
	Although the circumstances are very different and, I hope, of a less tragic character than those that have motivated the tabling of this amendment, there is a similarity in the situation of the clear need for legal advice to be available to people being detained under the Mental Health Act with regard to the treatment envisaged for them by those in whose care they find themselves. I would hope that the Minister will accede to the argument advanced hitherto by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas. In that event, the amendment would also cover the circumstances that I have outlined and which Mind has helpfully suggested.

Lord Newton of Braintree: Perhaps I may briefly intervene, having been frightened off by the fact that no one else, other than lawyers, has dared to speak this afternoon-it is just the Minister and I who share this disadvantage, disability or whatever it is. On a number of occasions I have declared an interest as chair of a mental health trust, which is no longer the case because it merged with another one on New Year's Day. I am now fancy-free as far as the NHS is concerned for the first time in about 15 years.
	However, it means that I know a certain amount about this issue. It occurred to me, too, that mental capacity issues appear to be covered by this amendment. It would be very helpful if the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, could tell us whether he intended that. It would also be helpful if the Minister could tell us whether his interpretation is the same as that of noble Lords on the opposition Front Bench; namely, whether this proposal would provide additional protection or access to legal aid for the relatives of someone who has been ordered to have treatment which they think is wrong, and which the subject of the treatment cannot challenge for mental capacity reasons, but where there should be some right to raise a challenge to the professionals.

Lord Beecham: I am very grateful to the noble Lord for his intervention. On behalf of all those who have benefited from his wisdom and experience as chair of a mental health trust, perhaps I may express the gratitude that they would wish no doubt to convey to him on this aspect of his very long and very distinguished public service.

Lord McNally: I echo that tribute to my noble friend Lord Newton. I passed him in the corridor the other day and said that he was in grave danger of becoming a national treasure but not necessarily one on whom the Government can rely.

Lord Beecham: That is what makes him a national treasure.

Lord McNally: My Lords, on the treatment issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and others, I am advised that the Bill covers them. The matters covered by the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005 are covered in paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, which includes treatment issues. Amendment 53 seeks to insert a paragraph to provide legal aid for cases concerning whether medical treatment is in the best interests of those incapable of giving or withholding consent. The amendment is unnecessary.
	As I have explained, paragraph 5 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 already provides for legal aid to be available for cases arising under the Mental Health Act 1983 and the Mental Capacity Act 2005, including cases concerning medical treatment of patients or those who lack capacity. Furthermore, paragraphs 9 and 15 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 provide for legal aid for advocacy for mental health cases before the Mental Health Tribunal. Paragraph 4 provides for advocacy before the Court of Protection where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual-for example, medical treatment, including psychological treatment, life, liberty, physical safety, capacity to marry or enter into civil partnerships, capacity to enter into sexual relations, or the right to family life.
	Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Part 3 of Schedule 1 provide legal aid for advocacy for any onward appeals to the Court of Appeal or Supreme Court on mental health or capacity issues concerning medical treatment. Furthermore, public law challenges to the lawfulness of public authority actions could be brought by way of judicial review, which is in scope under paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. We believe therefore that this amendment is unnecessary and I hope that my noble friend will agree to withdraw it.
	I am advised that in the particular case to which he referred the issue was the eligibility of the family for legal aid, because of their means. We have continued to emphasise that legal aid is means-tested in these circumstances and that our intention is to focus it on those who are most needy. I hope that, with those references and that explanation, my noble friend will agree to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for their contribution to this discussion and thank the Minister for his reply. Do I take it that he is saying that these cases are covered subject only to the means test? I see him acknowledging that that is the case. I would like him to consider before Report whether in cases of such tragedy as this a means test should be applied at all. Is it appropriate that a person should fail to receive legal assistance except pro bono, as happened in the Re M case, because of their means? I hope that I will be able to discuss that issue and perhaps clarify the purpose of the amendment with the Minister between now and Report. For the moment, I seek leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 53 withdrawn.
	Amendment 54
	 Moved by Lord Carlile of Berriew
	54: Schedule 1, page 125, line 38, leave out "paragraph 15" and insert "paragraphs 1 to 5, 8 and 15"

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, the amendment stands in my name and that of other noble Lords. I should make it clear that I shall speak specifically to Amendment 54 and not to the other amendments in this group, which I shall leave to others. Amendment 54 relates to paragraph 17 of Schedule 1 and deals with judicial review. This is an amendment on which the background work has been done by the Bar Council. I should declare an interest as an elected member of the Bar Council-despite that, I agree with it concerning this amendment.
	I welcome the Government's proposal generally to retain public funding for judicial review claims. Judicial review claims are an important part of the rule of law. They are all subject to an important qualification, which is the requirement to obtain the permission of the court for the claim to be pursued. That is not a light procedure. Your Lordships should know that when an application is made for permission for judicial review it goes through quite rigorous stages. The first stage is for the papers to be placed before a High Court judge or a deputy High Court judge-I do from time to time carry out the latter function in judicial review-where they are considered in full. In the great majority of cases, probably in about 95 per cent or possibly more, permission to apply for judicial review is refused at the papers stage. So the permission stage is quite a formidable hurdle. If permission for judicial review is refused, the matter can go for an oral hearing and there are stages thereafter. So this is quite a difficult procedure for potential claimants. It is not easy to be able to bring a case for judicial review.
	However, paragraph 17 as drafted causes a difficulty which I and others are anxious to resolve and which may have arisen through inadvertence in drafting. Some of the most important judicial review cases brought in recent years have concerned the way in which public bodies have acted in relation to events giving rise to, or in the aftermath of, death or serious injury. Many of those cases have enjoyed or suffered a large amount of publicity and, indeed, debates in this House and another place. Other significant cases have concerned the exercising of powers enabling a body to seize goods or to enter land-again, a considerable intrusion with the rights of citizens on the face of it. The grounds on which the courts may grant remedies in judicial review are a signal of the excellence of our legal system. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, in his place and he has more experience than most, both at the Bar and on the Bench, in seeing judicial review developing the law in a way that I hope he would agree has become the envy of the world. The public body concerned in judicial review cases is either a statutory body that is alleged to have acted beyond or contrary to its powers, or a Minister or other Crown body exercising some statutory function, or occasionally other bodies that are like public bodies.
	The Bar Council and I are concerned that the current drafting of Schedule 1 fails to make it clear that the relationship between paragraph 17 and the exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 leave a fair and level playing field. A number of the exclusions in Part 2, including paragraph 8, which refers to "breach of statutory duty", could on the face of it remove from the scope of legal aid from a wide range of claims for judicial review. The following are examples that may be excluded. A challenge to a decision by a public authority to demolish private property, for example as part of a planning procedure, would be excluded, as would a judicial review to enforce the performance of a statutory duty such as housing a homeless child under the Children Act-I can tell the Committee that such applications are very frequent leave claims, at least permission claims in judicial review. A challenge to a hospital that refused to provide emergency life-saving treatment would be excluded-such claims sometimes arise in relation to elderly people or even in relation to people to whom treatment is denied because, for example, of a history of smoking. Also excluded would be a judicial review into a decision not to hold an inquiry into the violent killing of a young offender. Those are all examples of cases of real importance.
	I hope that the Minister will say either that the intention is not to exclude any of those categories, as a statement to that effect would be of great utility in the event of ambiguity being perceived by the courts in such matters, or that he will say, preferably, that as there may be some ambiguity, the Government wish to clarify the matter by producing their own amendment for Report so that there is no lack of clarity or ambiguity. The simple way of doing that would be to remove any doubt by disapplying the exclusions in paragraphs 1 to 5 and 8 of Part 2. This is an important matter. I do not propose at this stage to spend more time on it because I hope that we will hear a helpful response from my noble and learned friend. I beg to move.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, I speak to Amendments 55 to 59 which are in my name and that of other noble Lords. I recall when I first started as a lawyer there were some 400 to 500 certiorari applications every year. It was a very limited field but under the guidance of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and others, the field of judicial review has expanded very considerably.
	However, there is a problem. Unmeritorious claims are undoubtedly brought before the court in immigration cases, which take up a great deal of time but are not ever going to get a full hearing in any event. Attempts have been made to curb this, and it is a provision now that only certified people can give immigration advice and representation. It is regulated so that only solicitors, barristers, legal executives and those in a scheme run by the Office of the Immigration Services Commissioner are permitted to give immigration advice and representation in the course of a business. A voluntary agency or charity cannot unless it complies with certain requirements of the Immigration Services Commissioner. Despite all that, these claims are still brought. Some 70 to 80 per cent of immigration judicial review applications are not brought with legal aid, because in order to get legal aid at all there is a merits test, which the particular application has to pass before a solicitor is entitled to take the case forward.
	The purpose of Amendment 55, which I have put forward, is to keep the scope of judicial review as it is under paragraph 17 but to remove the restrictions on immigration cases that are set out in sub-paragraphs (5) to (7). The immigration-specific exclusions that are now contained in that paragraph were not part of the original consultation. When the consultation was first put forward in November 2011, the Government said, quite robustly, that they regarded judicial review as a particular priority because:
	"These proceedings ... represent a crucial way of ensuring that state power is exercised responsibly".
	In their response to the consultation, the Government said, in relation to unmeritorious judicial review applications, that:
	"The current criteria governing the granting of legal aid in individual cases would generally preclude such funding".
	So, on the one hand the Government are saying that they think judicial review is very important in making sure that the UK Border Agency acts properly, and on the other hand they are saying that the granting of legal aid will require the passing of the merits test, which will generally preclude such funding. That was their attitude then; however, when they produced the Bill, they excluded these cases, which they acknowledge are crucial to ensuring the responsible exercise of state power. I am looking to hear an explanation from the Minister of why, between the consultation and the publication of the Bill, it was thought necessary to exclude immigration cases in that way.
	Amendment 59 is intended to retain legal aid for an immigration judicial review where a previous appeal or judicial review has been successful or has not been brought with legal aid. Under the Bill, a previous appeal or judicial review proceedings will prevent or exclude legal aid for any subsequent immigration judicial review applications-whatever the merit of subsequent applications and whatever the result in the previous appeal or judicial review proceedings. Whether the earlier proceedings were successful, or whether the UK Border Agency has failed to act on the previous decision or it is flouting the decision, it is not possible to have legal aid to bring a second judicial review. The Bill will remove legal aid generally for all non-asylum immigration matters. This means that those unable to pay for legal advice and representation will in immigration cases not be able to obtain legal aid for advice about their immigration situation or representation in dealing with the UK Border Agency or any immigration appeal. The immigration-specific exclusions relating to judicial review effectively ensure that those affected cannot have any legal aid at any stage of the immigration process. As I have already said to your Lordships, immigration is a problem, and it is brought forward in unmeritorious cases, generally without legal aid backing it. But now not even in the meritorious cases will legal aid be granted.
	Amendment 56 has the purpose of retaining legal aid for an immigration judicial review when there has been no previous appeal. Sub-paragraph (6)(a) excludes legal aid for a subsequent judicial review of removal directions if a decision to remove has been made. The Government have suggested that any challenge to the earlier decision to remove can be dealt with on appeal, but a decision to remove does not of itself entitle a person to appeal before he or she has left or been removed from the United Kingdom. Therefore, on the Government's own analysis, a decision to remove ought not to be a trigger for excluding legal aid for any judicial review application because it does not provide an opportunity for any oral hearing before a tribunal judge prior to the proposed removal.
	Amendment 57 deals with a defect in the Bill. Sub-paragraph (6)(b) refers to decisions to refuse leave to appeal at a stage where such decisions cannot be made at the point of appeal to the First-tier Tribunal. Appeals at this stage are brought as of right; there are no leave-to-appeal decisions, so sub-paragraph (6)(b) is defective and should be removed.
	Finally, Amendment 58 would align the preservation of legal aid for judicial review in connection with refusals of asylum with the scope of asylum as provided at paragraph 26(1) of the schedule. The Bill currently preserves legal aid in relation to fresh asylum applications but only in so far as the EU procedures directive applies. This is potentially problematic because that directive refers to an application for asylum as,
	"a request for international protection ... under the Geneva Convention".
	Other EU directives and UK domestic law treat other applications as applications for protection where the refugee convention may not strictly apply but the level of harm, such as torture or execution, which the individual faces is no less. In 2010, the UK Border Agency made 3,488 initial decisions to grant asylum under the refugee convention, compared with 91 grants on non-refugee convention grounds. While the cases where the distinction is critical are few, the exclusive reference in the sub-paragraph to the EU procedures directive is likely to cause confusion and litigation. The directives should be read altogether as one body of law and the relevant protection in relation to fresh asylum applications should not be limited to refugee convention applications. The seriousness of the cases involved is indistinguishable. By aligning the provision in sub-paragraph (7) with paragraph 26(1), that distinction will be closed, and it would better meet the Government's stated intention to prioritise asylum, to avoid the potentially complex and expensive litigation and avoid the bureaucracy that likely will be required to operate the exceptional cases scheme. Given that the affected cases are relatively few, there is little financially to be gained by the Government from retaining the distinction between cases brought under the convention and those not under the convention.
	As I said to the noble Lord, Lord McNally, we are here to help, and we believe that these amendments would improve the structure of the Bill.

Lord Bach: My Lords, the Committee should be grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Thomas of Gresford, for moving and speaking to their various amendments in this group. From this side of the Committee, we unreservedly support the series of amendments that make up this group. They are important amendments.
	I have two things to say to start with. Apart from supporting the amendments, which is the first thing I have to say, the second is to say how much we support the Government in having kept judicial review in scope in general terms as part of legal aid. It plays an important role. However, they seem to intend to be too restrictive on immigration matters. The position of the Official Opposition on legal aid for immigration matters is clear; we believe that immigration law should remain within the scope of legal aid. It is an important, if qualified, check on poor decision-making by the UK Border Agency and other agencies, and it ensures that immigrants, many of whom are vulnerable, disorientated and scared, are able to assert their rights by accessing what may be a confusing new judicial system. Moreover, it keeps the machinery of justice working efficiently as well.
	We regret that the Government have carved out immigration law from the scope of legal aid and judicial review, which are important areas, save, of course, where their advisers-and here I have no doubt that it was experienced and leading counsel-told them that it would be in breach of their convention obligations. Asylum cases remain pretty much in scope, although not entirely, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has just pointed out. Judicial review was an area that we thought likely to be uncontentious. The Government themselves have said, as we have said, that judicial review is the safeguard against mad or bad decision-taking. The test is not an easy test to meet, if you are an applicant, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, showed very clearly a few minutes ago when he referred to the Wednesbury test.
	It is worth reminding the Committee what the three limbs of that test are: that the public authority, in making the decision, took into account factors that ought not to have been taken into account; that it failed to take into account factors that ought to have been taken into account; or that the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable authority would ever impose it. In other words, as stated in another leading case, it must be,
	"so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it".
	Just to state those words shows what a high hurdle has to be reached for someone to succeed in a judicial review against the state.
	Of course, such worrying decisions are occasionally taken by government or emanations of government. It happens, and the fact that there is a remedy in our law is a huge advantage to our law and very much respected around the world, but surely the answer for those who have suffered in that way is not to punish them for the bad decision-making that has been made by the state. There have of course been problems with judicial reviews being used as a weapon by some people-letter before action, in particular. However, as has been stated, the tests are very rigorous and do not permit vexatious or tendentious proceedings. They effectively act to safeguard the public purse, and we have heard no arguments at all to suggest that there has somehow been a failure of the system in the areas that are being taken out of scope of judicial review. It is really incumbent on the Government to show that there has been a failure of the system before taking these cases out of scope.
	The Minister in another place, the honourable Mr Djanogly, stated in response to a query by my honourable friend Mr Michael Connarty as to how many cases there were that showed the failure of the system:
	"We do have figures, but I do not happen to have them with me. I will write to the hon. Gentleman with figures".-[Official Report, Commons, 31/10/11; col. 650.]
	In his response in writing, however, he said:
	"We do not keep these specific figures".
	I raise that not to make some petty point but only to invite the Minister-who, if I may say so, I am delighted to see in his place as it seems a long time ago, perhaps about a year, since we last faced each other across the Dispatch Box; crossed swords is perhaps putting it too highly-to please go back and double-check whether there are any of those figures.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I cannot resist asking the noble Lord whether he would also class as a failure of the system the fact that more and more legal aid practitioners in immigration and asylum have withdrawn from the scheme altogether, because they tend to be concentrated in city centres and the current rates of remuneration for this work are such that they are simply not sustainable? As I say, I could not resist adding that to his catalogue.

Lord Bach: I cannot blame the noble Lord for asking an-ex Legal Aid Minister that question. In immigration law over the last 20 years or so-this has been hinted at already in contributions, and no one really can gainsay it-it was spotted that there were those who practised immigration law who did not do their profession any credit. Perhaps I might put it as cautiously as that; it is probably a good deal worse, frankly. The previous Government, with general support, therefore took steps, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, reminded us, to make sure that the industry, as it were, became regulated. Thank goodness for that, but the rewards to be gained from doing legal aid work properly in this field are not very great. I have to concede that.
	Will the Minister please double-check in the Ministry of Justice, which I know is not his department, whether any figures can be employed for the Government's case for taking these parts of judicial review out of scope? As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed out with some force, there was no consultation on this point, nor was there any comment in the Government's response to consultation-presumably because it was never referred to in the first place. We believe that judicial review is an important safeguard. Obviously the Government believe that too. That is why we support these amendments, because we want to know why the Government intend to take this part of judicial review out of scope.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, we have come to an important part of Schedule 1, relating generally to immigration, asylum, removal directions and judicial review, although the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Carlile of Berriew was of much more general application to judicial review, which is an important part of our legal system, as he very clearly and eloquently set out. Amendment 54 seeks to disapply certain exclusions set out in Part 2 of the Bill for judicial review claims. It would appear to be aimed at ensuring that funding for judicial review is available for judicial reviews concerning, for example, breaches of statutory duty.
	Our position is that we believe the amendment largely to be unnecessary, because the exclusions at paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 are not intended to prevent funding for judicial review. Rather, the exclusions are intended to prevent the funding of, for example, tortious causes of action, typically for damages. While I hope that that would reassure, perhaps I can follow it by making it clear that our intention is to retain legal aid for most judicial review claims, including those relating to personal injury or death and breach of a statutory duty. I assure the Committee, and indeed my noble friend, that because we have obviously had representations on this point, we are actively and seriously considering whether in the light of this amendment and the points which my noble friend has made in moving it, we need to bring forward amendments of our own to clarify the position and to give proper effect to the intention.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend. He has been extremely helpful. Can he clarify one point? Sometimes when judicial review claims are brought there is included in the claim a claim for damages, which can be awarded under judicial review. I take it from what he said that if a claim for damages is part of a judicial review, that part of the claim would also have legal aid available to it. It is one legal aid order.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: This is quite important. As my noble friend will recognise, the overall structure of what is proposed to be in scope does not provide for legal aid for damages. However, I recognise what he says about damages being part of an overall judicial review claim. It is important that we look at this and ensure that what appears in the Bill delivers the intention. I am sure that we will return to this matter on Report.
	My noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford spoke to Amendments 55 to 59, which concern the exclusions from legal aid which we have made for some immigration judicial reviews. Before I turn to the specific amendments, it might be helpful if I briefly remind the Committee of the Government's reasoning on this matter. My noble friend raised the question of the lack of consultation-as did the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who I am delighted to engage with again at the Dispatch Box. I think that the last time we did so was in the debate on the fixed-term Parliaments legislation. It has been six months but seems like a year.
	My noble friend and the noble Lord raised the question of a lack of consultation. However, in response to our consultation on legal aid the Judges' Council of England and Wales highlighted the large number of immigration judicial reviews that were without merit. That point was raised in the consultation and my noble friend has accepted in speaking to his amendments that there are a number of unmeritorious cases taking up time. This change was made against that background. Although only a minority of those cases would currently receive legal aid, the Government's view is nevertheless that it is wrong in principle for such cases to remain within the scope of funding. We are therefore seeking to remove two classes of immigration judicial review from the scope of legal aid, again subject to certain exceptions which I will come on to discuss.
	The noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked whether I would double-check the figures on taking these parts of judicial review out of scope. Of course we will double-check them, and if there is further information we will make it available not only to the noble Lord but to all those participating in our proceedings.
	The first category of case that we seek to exclude is one where there has already been at least one appeal before the tribunal or another judicial review within the past year on the same or a substantially similar issue. The second category concerns judicial reviews of removal directions rather than the underlying immigration decision. Such proceedings are often brought at the last minute-sometimes literally as people are being put onto a plane. We recognise that there will be some genuine, if unusual, cases within these categories that could still warrant legal aid. That is why we have made exceptions to our proposed exclusions-if the Committee will bear with the double negatives, which seem to be quite frequent in this part of the Bill. These are intended to take into account the potential for changes in an individual's circumstances over time. In both categories, the exclusion is subject to a one-year time limit. We have also made exceptions for judicial reviews of decisions by the Home Office to certify under Section 94 or Section 96 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. These provisions curtail asylum appeal rights in certain circumstances and so maintaining legal aid for a potential judicial review is, we believe, an important safeguard.
	We are therefore keeping judicial reviews of a decision by the Home Office to refuse to treat further submissions as a fresh claim for asylum. Again, this maintains the availability of legal aid for judicial review asylum cases where there may not have been an appeal to the tribunal. It has been suggested that most types of immigration cases will not be able to get legal aid, but most types of immigration judicial review will still be in scope. The provisions in the Bill remove only two relatively limited types of judicial review, and even these provisions are subject to the exceptions that I have outlined.
	On the specific amendments spoken to by my noble friend Lord Thomas, Amendment 55 seeks to keep all immigration judicial reviews within the scope of legal aid. From what I have said, noble Lords will see why the Government do not agree with that amendment.
	Amendments 56 and 57 relate to the operation of the exclusion of judicial reviews on removal directions. The Government seek to exclude judicial reviews of removal directions from the scope of legal aid because there will already have been a chance to appeal the underlying decision. More specifically, Amendment 56 would in effect retain legal aid for these judicial reviews in circumstances where there had been no appeal of the original underlying decision, or at least no appeal before the removal had been effected.
	It is true that some decisions to remove can be challenged only by appeal from overseas, as Parliament decided. While judicial review can still be used as a means of challenging this, it does not follow that legal aid should be available in all these cases. As I explained earlier, in asylum cases where there is no right of appeal or where, as in Section 94 cases, any right of appeal arises only outside the UK, legal aid will remain available for judicial review. However, we believe that choosing not to exercise this appeal right should not bring someone within the scope of legal aid.
	Amendment 57 raises a technical point, as my noble friend recognised. It is based on the belief that the provision around the "leave to appeal" in paragraph 17(6)(b) is unnecessary because there is no provision to appeal to the First-tier Tribunal in these cases. However, there is a leave-to-appeal stage to the Upper Tribunal, so we think that the current drafting is sound, albeit that this is a very fine technical point.
	The intention of Amendment 58, as I understand it and as was stated by my noble friend, is to avoid a potential definitional problem to do with the meaning of asylum across the 1951 refugee convention, the EU procedures directive and the qualification directive. Again, it is recognised that this is technical but of course important, and it is about the definition of protection cases-that is, non-refugee convention cases.
	The Government understand the concerns but on balance we think that they are misplaced. Our view is that the reference in paragraph 17(7)(a) of Schedule 1 to an asylum application within the meaning of the EU procedures directive is sufficient to cover all applications for international protection. I am happy to put it on the record that that is our intention. However, the amendment goes further than the Government intend; it seems to provide legal aid in all judicial reviews connected with asylum matters, not just those where there has been no previous opportunity to appeal. I believe that it would be wrong to retain legal aid for judicial review cases that are very likely to be without merit, regardless of whether or not they are asylum cases. Nevertheless, I express my appreciation to my noble friend for raising this issue and regarding the specific points that he made, we will certainly look at whether anything further is required here.
	Amendment 59 seeks to add two further exceptions to the exclusions. The first is to make an exception for cases that have not previously benefited from legal aid. I understand the logic: without legal assistance, someone may not have put the right arguments forward first time around, so when it comes to potential judicial review, should they not have legal aid to ensure that they get it right? Our response is that if legal assistance means that they can put new arguments forward-sufficiently new that the court or tribunal is considering a different issue-they would still be eligible for legal aid for the judicial review. This is because exclusion applies only where the judicial review is in respect of the same or substantially similar issue. However, if they are still raising the same or substantially similar issue, even with the potential benefit of a lawyer, we do not believe that they should be eligible for legal aid.
	The second exception, as sought by Amendment 59, relates to cases where the appellants have been successful in their previous appeal for judicial review. We think that there is an issue here and we will certainly look at that.
	I hope that we have given a satisfactory explanation. This is a technical matter but I do not for a moment deny that these are serious issues. In asking my noble friend Lord Carlile to withdraw the amendment in the light of the assurances that I have given, let me give him a further assurance. He asked whether judicial review funding would cover the damages remedy sought through the judicial review, and the answer is yes. If we can find the right words, we will give proper effect to our intention.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: Before my noble friend Lord Carlile replies regarding his amendment, I thank the Minister for his reply to my amendments, which raised difficult technical points. I hope that he will forgive me if I read what he has said with some care, as no doubt he will read the whole debate with some care. I look forward to seeing what technical amendments he may feel are necessary to deal with the points that I raised. I am also grateful to him for the assurances that he has given, certainly in relation to part of the amendments.

Lord Carlile of Berriew: My Lords, in relation to Amendment 54, I am grateful for the explicit support from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on the opposition Front Bench. So far as my noble and learned friend's response is concerned, as he spoke, I reminded myself that when I was a young man and he was a very young man, we shared a flat for a period within the Division Bell area. When you have shared a kitchen with someone, albeit one in which the most used utensil was the corkscrew, you get to know who you can trust. I entirely trust my noble and learned friend and always have done. I am extremely grateful for his assurances; he answered very fully the concerns that I and the Bar Council felt about this issue. I look forward to returning to the matter on Report, with those assurances intact and enhanced. In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 54 withdrawn.
	Amendments 55 to 59 not moved.
	Amendment 60
	 Moved by Lord Ramsbotham
	60: Schedule 1, page 127, line 33, after "deliberate" insert ", unlawful"

Lord Ramsbotham: My Lords, the purpose of Amendments 60 and 61 is to ask the Government to rectify an omission that denies legal aid to those who have been unlawfully deprived of their liberty by the state and their ability to obtain redress through the courts.
	The Government's consultation resulted in legal aid being denied except for cases that concern a significant breach of human rights-abuses of positions of power or claims arising from allegations of sexual abuse or attack. Abuse of power by a public authority-which is itself a position of power-is defined in paragraph 19 of Schedule 1 as an act or omission that is deliberate or dishonest and results in reasonably foreseeable harm to a person or property. Unfortunately, however, the extent of the meaning of the words "deliberate" and "harm" in the Bill is not defined. Unless it is, I fear that based on past experience, immigration authorities and police will continue to disregard unlawful or false imprisonment on the grounds that "deliberate" means something more than merely unlawful, and "harm" means injury.
	Let me give an example of what I mean. A British man spent 19 months in an immigration detention centre pleading with the Home Office that he was British, but lacking the documents to prove it. His deportation appeal, for which he was unable to obtain representation due to the cuts in immigration legal aid, was dismissed. However, a solicitor gave him the benefit of the doubt and wrote to the Home Office saying that the onus was on it, as the detainer, to prove that the man was not British. Within two days of the letter, he was released. At this point, under the new proposals, no further legal aid would have been available because on the face of it, no harm-other than the loss of personal liberty for a period-had been caused by an inadvertent and honest mistake. However, after many hours of legal aid-funded work, evidence emerged of prolonged deceit on the part of the Home Office, resulting in substantial damages having to be paid.
	Because bringing claims for unlawful deprivation of liberty under a conditional fee agreement is beyond most people's means now that legal expenses insurance premiums are no longer recoverable, most individuals placed in this situation have no means of gaining redress unless granted access to legal aid. Therefore, I am tabling both Amendment 60, which aims to make it clear that unlawful deprivation of an individual's liberty by the state is a serious abuse of power, and Amendment 61, which aims to make it clear that unlawful loss of liberty constitutes harm, in the hope that the Government will accept that there is justification for the provision of legal aid in such cases of abuse of power by the state. I beg to move.

Lord Berkeley: My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 61ZA, which is in this group. It does not much relate to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, but it raises an interesting issue to explore at this stage. It would include the Duchy of Cornwall or the Crown Estate as a public body under paragraph 19 of Schedule 1, to allow for those who believe that these organisations have abused their positions of power. My reason for tabling this amendment is the continuing uncertainty over the status of these bodies, which can be summed up by saying, "Are they private or are they public?". Are they accountable to Parliament and how do Ministers take into account the issues raised by them, including the numerous handwritten letters that they reportedly receive from Prince Charles, which must always remain confidential? There is a complete lack of transparency.
	My attention was drawn to this because of a recent case before the First-tier Tribunal of the General Regulatory Chamber on information rights between someone called Michael Bruton and the Information Commissioner and the Duchy over allegations that the Duchy allowed an oyster-growing grid to be deposited in the Helford river in Cornwall-in what was reported to have been an SSSI-without carrying out the necessary environmental assessments. The question then arose of whether the Duchy is covered by the Environmental Information Regulations, and hinges on whether it is a public body. The Duchy's counsel said that,
	"the Duchy is not democratically accountable in any meaningful sense".
	I find that rather an extraordinary statement. We can debate what it means, but the tribunal's decision hinged on the definition of a public body. The tribunal found that the Duchy was a public body under the Environmental Information Regulations. Its judgment hinged on the fact that the Duchy is the harbour authority for the port of St Mary's in the Scilly Isles. The Duchy has appealed so we do not yet know the result.
	It is interesting because, at the same time, I have a Private Member's Bill that is going through your Lordships' House rather slowly. I was told by the Clerks that I would have to ask the Minister to write to the Duchy to ask permission for the Bill to be taken forward because it affects the private interests of Prince Charles. Clearly, in this House it is believed that having an interest in a harbour is a private interest, whereas the information tribunal thinks that it is a public interest. There are around 120 harbour authorities in this country. I had to ask why the Minister had to write to just one and not the other 119 but that is probably something of an aside. There is a lot of uncertainty there. I do not know how Mr Bruton is funding the appeal or the original work but he certainly did not get legal aid. Perhaps that should have been considered.
	I turn quickly to the Crown Estate. Noble Lords will be aware that the Treasury Sub-Committee in the House of Commons investigated the workings of the Crown Estate. Its report was the first for around 20 years and it was clearly frightened by some of the issues that came back. It is interesting that the Government have recently changed the method of funding the public activities of Her Majesty by going back to pre-George III times and agreeing to give 15 per cent of Crown Estate revenue. However, they cannot tell what the future revenue of the Crown Estate will be because there could be very large revenue from North Sea oil and all the wind farms that are being built. Until now, that revenue has gone to the Treasury. We do not know what will happen in the future but I fear that there will be a lot of uncertainty about this. It is still not clear how one can ask questions about the activities and financing of the Crown Estate. Is it a public or a private body?
	This uncertainty, coupled with the fear of some people and the unwillingness of the Government to subject the Duchy and the Crown Estate as public bodies-if that is what they are-to proper scrutiny, is a major hurdle for anyone willing to take them on in the courts. That is probably what is intended but it is unfair. It seems that these bodies decide whether they are public or private as it suits them in particular cases, which is all wrong. Therefore, there is very little precedent and, no doubt, much higher costs for any appellant. I will be very interested to hear what the Minister has to say about this. Does he believe that it would be equitable for legal aid to be available in such cases? Alternatively, or additionally, will the Government set up a review of what is private and what is public in these cases to produce some clarification and transparency, so that everyone who has to deal with these organisations knows where they stand?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, I shall speak in favour of Amendment 60, for which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has made a strong case. I expect the Minister may say that, ipso facto, an abuse of power is unlawful. The problem is that if that is the argument, the way that sub-paragraph (6) is drafted apparently provides a complete definition of the phrase "abuse of power" in the context of paragraph 19, and the totality of that definition is in sub-paragraph (6)(a) and (b). It seems necessary to include the word "unlawful" although, as I say, it seems manifestly obvious that any public authority acting unlawfully is, by definition, abusing its power.
	I would also be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the word "deliberate" here means the same as "intentional". I rather assume that it does, but some explanation is needed of why the normal terms-"intentional" or "with intent"-have been changed in this instance to "deliberate". Does the definition as drafted exclude the careless exercise of power on the part of a public authority because there is a difference between a reckless or careless exercise of power and one that is deliberate or intentional? I hope that the noble Lord will refer to those points when he sums up. As I say, I am happy to support this amendment.

Lord Howarth of Newport: I, too, would like to say a word in support of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. He has raised very important points. Surely, what he has argued for is self-evidently right in principle. As the noble Lord suggested, public authorities are almost by definition powerful in relation to citizens. It is, of course, incumbent on all public authorities to act lawfully. Ignorance of the law on the part of a public authority should be no excuse for that public authority any more than it is on the part of the citizen. Therefore, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, would repair an omission in the drafting. Otherwise, it would be possible under the Bill as drafted for the public authority to say, "We did not realise. We did not mean to do this. It was not intentional. It was not done knowingly". Or it could tell lies, but it will be caught that way. If the public authority said that it was sorry and that it had made a mistake of law, it certainly seems to me that the citizen ought to be entitled to some redress.
	Amendment 61 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is also very valuable. From time to time a number of us may be rather concerned at the readiness and apparent arbitrariness with which people seeking immigration status can be detained. It must be beyond question that deprivation of liberty, whether or not it was deliberate or dishonest, is a harm. Therefore, it is surely right that the two amendments that the noble Lord has proposed should go in the Bill. They make evident good sense and they are proper.

Lord Judd: My Lords, I, too, commend this amendment for very serious attention. In the economic pressures under which we are operating and which are very much a factor in everything we are considering under this legislation, it seems to me that this provision is another example of a heavy penalty falling on the most vulnerable and those in the worst possible psychological situation. Sometimes we need to break away from our legal preoccupations and think of the predicament of the individual. They go through an extraordinary nightmare in many of the circumstances that we are discussing. We are discussing an authority of the state doing something which is a denial of everything that the state says it is about. In our immigration and other policy, we expect people to give undertakings and to prove that they understand the culture of our society and why it matters. Here is a provision which is an absolute denial of what this country is about-the deprivation of liberty. I would have thought that if we realised such a thing had happened, we would fall over backwards to put it right and to give a positive indication of our disapproval of what had happened and our sympathy for the individual concerned.
	I hope that I may be allowed to make a wider point. I sometimes think that in our preoccupation with specific legislation we fail to make connections. All the time we are worried about stability, terrorism and the appeal of extremists. However, this kind of thing plays into the hands of agitators who portray these issues as examples of the hypocrisy of our society. It is hypocritical for an agent of the state to do something that is a denial of what the state is about and for the state to give no assistance in making sure that the wrong is put right. A terribly important principle has been raised in this amendment.

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: My Lords, my name is attached to Amendments 60 and 61 which were spoken to by my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham. Having listened to the contributions that have been made, it is clear that the whole area needs rewriting. The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, queried the various phrases that are used. Not to hold public bodies to account when they have behaved unlawfully is something which a country that prides itself on decent behaviour should not allow.

The Earl of Sandwich: My Lords, I am not sure whether this is the appropriate amendment, but having had some experience of immigration and immigration detention I just wanted to make one point. I know that we are coming on to issues related to that. I declare an interest as a patron of visitors to Haslar detention centre in Portsmouth.
	Like others, I understand that the protection of liberty is one of the primary factors in the allocation of legal aid. Yet the advice I have received is that this Bill will fall heavily on the most vulnerable people in our society-asylum seekers and those in detention who are awaiting removal to their home country. In many cases, it will mean that a vulnerable person, perhaps a victim of torture and perhaps as young as 16, will be unable to present their case without access to any formal representation and whose legitimate cries for help under international asylum law will simply be unheard. Applications for bail will be refused even more often than they are today simply because of the lack of legal aid and proper representation, if I have understood the situation right.
	I well understand that the Minister has to defend the Government's position in difficult times but I would like some reassurance that the test of vulnerability under this legislation will be reasonable. Perhaps he could explain how it will conform with international human rights law.

Lord Beecham: My Lords, I rise to deal with the amendments in this group, one of which, Amendment 90ZZA, is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Bach. It might be thought odd that that amendment is included in the group we are discussing, but I will deal with that later.
	I wish to deal first with the amendment spoken to by my noble friend Lord Berkeley. I suppose that it can only appropriately be described as an original amendment as it relates to the Duchy. However, it raises an interesting constitutional point which needs to be explored, although, it may be thought, probably not in the context of this Bill. The noble Lord raises a legitimate concern and he is not responsible for the grouping. The matter does not fall entirely within the purview of the group that we are discussing and perhaps not of the Bill, but no doubt those matters will be addressed in some other way at an appropriate time.
	I wish to touch briefly on the government amendments which are wholly uncontroversial and entirely acceptable to the Opposition. The Minister may not offer a detailed description of those amendments as they speak for themselves.
	We certainly support Amendments 60 and 61, which were spoken to so ably by the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. We entirely agree with him that we need clarity as to what constitutes harm for the purpose of the Bill, and in this context the loss of liberty must certainly be included. I trust that that is acceptable to the Minister. Frankly, it would be absurd if that were not the case. There is a question in my mind, and perhaps those of other noble Lords, about the precise meaning of "deliberate" in this context. Does that refer to the act of omission or commission-the substantive act-or to the fact that the consequences which are complained of were intended all along or ignored in a negligent way? It seems to me and to other noble Lords who have spoken that this amendment deals very adequately with those matters, and should be accepted.
	The noble Lord who moved the amendment properly referred to immigration. In a briefing provided by Bail for Immigration Detainees, the point is made that the Bill does not define what "deliberate" or "harm" mean. It expresses concern that the ministry will seek to interpret "deliberate" as more than unlawful, and "harm" as injury, and that that would result in the exclusion of many claims for damages for unlawful intention or false imprisonment brought by individuals who lost their liberty as a result of unlawful acts by the immigration authorities or the police. In that event, it is quite unrealistic to suppose that without legal assistance such claimants could properly make their case. No doubt, the Minister will clarify the intention of the Bill in that respect.
	However, these matters are not necessarily confined to immigration cases. There might well be other cases in which liberty might be lost, arrests made and people detained-for example, under the auspices of defective warrants. It may be that arrests are unlawful on the grounds that the requirements of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act were not observed, where the actions of officers were unlawful but were not thought to be deliberate. Other cases might arise out of breaches of the Data Protection Act, where a disclosure might wrongfully be made about someone that, for example, alleged that he had a criminal record when that was not the case and damage might be occasioned. Another example might be where someone in custody, either in a police station or prison, might be assaulted by someone else simply because of the negligence of those operating the facility in question. I should not imagine that the Government would seek to exclude the provision of legal aid in those cases.
	Amendment 90ZZA refers to a rather different set of circumstances-in fact, an entirely different set of circumstances-that bring into play the position that might arise in the Court of Protection. On an earlier amendment, we heard the noble Lord, Lord McNally, restraining his glee at pointing out the defects in amendments moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, and supported by me, on the applicability of Court of Protection proceedings. However, this amendment relates to a different case. It seeks to insert "mental or psychological" harm, in addition to physical harm, into paragraph 4 of Part 3 of Schedule 1, relating to,
	"Advocacy in the proceedings in the Court of Protection".
	At the moment, legal aid would be limited to,
	"a person's right to life ... a person's liberty or physical safety",
	and some other matters. However, physical safety is not by any means the be-all and end-all, and there are clearly cases where people might be subjected to psychological or emotional harm and may require legal assistance. One can think of people with learning disabilities being abused or taunted, generally suffering as a result of the actions of others, and needing the protection of the Court of Protection-and therefore needing legal aid to pursue their remedy and obtain protection. It is fair to say that it is unlikely that there would be many cases of this kind, and therefore, as has been suggested in respect of other amendments that we have discussed, the cost would be likely to be limited. However, the Court of Protection can deal with such matters by granted orders and injunctions to protect people from harm that may amount to physical or emotional harm, in addition to the ordinary rights that would be available regarding legal aid.

Lord Clinton-Davis: I am concerned about the position of the Official Solicitor. Would he not be inhibited from acting at all in certain instances? Therefore, the vulnerable person concerned would be exposed to increase vulnerability.

Lord Beecham: That certainly must be a risk, and the need for the assistance of the Court of Protection is therefore enhanced. I am grateful to my noble friend for allowing that point to be emphasised. It is therefore essential that legal aid is available so that the court can be approached and the Official Solicitor can represent the person in question. Otherwise, he would be unable to do so because there would be no provision for costs.
	I hope that despite the odd location of our amendment the Minister might look at it with some sympathy, and that if he cannot come to a conclusion on it, given that it was tabled very late, he will at least agree that he will take this matter back to look at before we reach Report.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for introducing this group of amendments. Arguably, there is nothing more fundamental for a parliament to discuss than the relationship between the state and the citizen. His amendments have given rise to an important debate, with contributions from my noble friend Lord Phillips, the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, and the noble Lords, Lord Judd and Lord Howarth. I hope that I can reassure Members of the Committee in my response.
	Amendment 60 seeks to make civil legal aid available for claims in relation to any alleged unlawful act by a public authority that causes reasonably foreseeable harm. In general terms, Schedule 1 makes legal aid available for the most serious cases and for proceedings that seek to hold public bodies to account for their decisions. This includes civil legal services for judicial review of an act, decision or omission, and provides a means for people to challenge the lawfulness of a public authority's actions on public grounds.
	In terms of private law claims primarily for damages, while we consider that such claims do not generally justify funding, an important exception to the rule provided for in the Bill is for the most serious claims against public authorities. The Bill ensures that funding may be made available for tort and other damages claims against public authorities for an abuse of position or powers, a significant breach of human rights, allegations of the abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or allegations of a sexual offence. The definition-about which I shall say more-of:
	"Abuse of position or power by public authority",
	is intended to cover the most serious misuses of state power. That is why it is defined in the Bill as an alleged act that is deliberate or dishonest, and that causes reasonably foreseeable harm to a person or property. Our definition would exclude from scope a range of less serious cases against public authorities-a point made by my noble friend Lord Phillips-including simple negligence claims such as "slipping" or "tripping". He asked if "deliberate" abuse of position or power is the same as "intentional". The answer is yes. As to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who asked whether "deliberate" referred to a deliberate act or deliberate consequences, the word refers to the act or omission that is complained of and for which legal aid is sought. Legal aid would therefore be available for deliberate or dishonest acts or omissions by a public authority that cause reasonably foreseeable harm.
	Amendment 60 would widen the scope of paragraph 19 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to make legal aid available for claims in tort or other damages claims for any alleged unlawful act by a public authority that causes harm. Noble Lords will be interested to know that unlawful acts are already covered by paragraph 19, which covers situations where an act is deliberate and dishonest, and results in foreseeable harm. However, the concern is that the amendment as tabled would widen the coverage beyond what we believe should be within scope.
	Alternatively, public law challenges to the lawfulness of a public authority's action can be brought by judicial review, which is in scope under the Bill. We have focused limited resources on those who need them most and the most serious cases, in which legal advice or representation is justified. I accept that that approach means that public funding will not be available for each and every claim involving a public authority, but it is intended to be available for the most serious cases and to address serious abuses.
	Specifically, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, highlighted the important issue of the loss of liberty. He seeks to amend paragraph 19(7) of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to specify that harm includes loss of liberty. Currently, paragraph 19 provides for civil legal services to be provided in relation to abuse by a public authority of its position of power. That allows, typically, for damages claims to be funded for the most serious claims against public authorities.
	Paragraph 19(6) provides that an act or omission by a public authority does not constitute an abuse of its position or powers unless the act or omission is deliberate or dishonest-we have already indicated what is intended by deliberate-and results in harm to a person or property that was reasonably foreseeable. Paragraph 19 already covers the situation where the harm suffered by an individual results in the loss of their liberty, as long as the act or omission which resulted in that loss of liberty was deliberate or dishonest and the harm, in the case of loss of liberty, was foreseeable as a result of that action.
	By way of illustration, paragraph 19 would allow for legal aid to be provided for a person to bring a false imprisonment claim where they had been unlawfully detained by a public authority and the actions of the authority were deliberate or dishonest. Noble Lords should note that legal aid may also be available for bringing claims in relation to a loss of liberty such as false imprisonment claims under paragraph 20 of Schedule 1, providing that the act of a public authority involves a significant breach of convention rights. It also retains within scope legal aid for other means of challenging detention or loss of liberty. For example, civil legal services provided in relation to a writ of habeas corpus have been retained in scope under paragraph 18. Public law challenges to the lawfulness of a public authority's actions could be brought by judicial review, which is in scope under paragraph 17. The Bill also allows for the provision of civil legal services in relation to immigration detention, including bail applications. I hope that that gives some reassurance to the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who raised that matter. That is available under paragraph 22.

Lord Avebury: Although paragraph 26(1)(a) allows claimants to be granted legal aid in respect of asylum, it does not extend to the families of refugees who seek to rejoin the principal member of the family in the United Kingdom. Anxiety concerning that omission has been expressed by the UNHCR. Can my noble and learned friend say anything on that?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: It is an important point, which has been raised before in the context of the Bill. I think that Amendments 69 and 71 in the name of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford-to which we will come, dare I say, sooner rather than later-raise the point about families of asylum seekers. I hope that when we come to that, we will have a proper debate on the important issue that my noble friend raises.

Lord Howarth of Newport: The Minister is defending the Bill's drafting against the proposal of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in Amendment 60. Is he therefore saying that if someone is the victim of a mistake by a public authority-not a deliberate mistake or one dishonestly intended but none the less an egregious error arising from ignorance of the law, which ought to be known by the people working in the public authority-there is to be no legally aided redress for the citizen, even if the harm is considerable?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: As I said to my noble friend Lord Phillips, the Bill does not include negligent actions of a public authority. I made very clear that it is intended for the serious-end range of abuse of power and the harm that results. It is not intended to include all that lies by way of negligence.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I am sorry to interrupt the Minister's flow, but this is a valuable opportunity to get to the bottom of this. From what he is saying, a reckless act on behalf of the state would be neither deliberate nor dishonest. If it was reckless, there would be no redress. Can that be right?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My noble friend well knows that where recklessness goes into intent is not always very clear. I very much hear the point that he is making; I want to reflect on it. There is a continuum, but I have made it clear that it certainly does not include negligence. That is why we are concerned about "unlawful", because that opens the provision beyond what is intended and could lead to cases of damages for what are not by any stretch of the imagination serious consequences or serious harm for the individual.

Lord Neill of Bladen: On Paragraph 19(6), the Minister said that the word deliberate would not cover negligence. What is a deliberate act intended to cover? Most people, when they do things, do them deliberately. Is that what it means, or anything beyond that?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: As I said earlier, when my noble friend asked whether deliberate meant intentional, that is what it means: it is an intentional act of a public authority. The question is: if it is a mistake that leads to considerable harm but is not deliberate or dishonest, will legal aid not be available? I hope that I have indicated that no, under paragraph 19 it would not be available but, as I said, paragraph 20, which covers a significant breach of human rights, might nevertheless allow for funding in those circumstances, or cases might be taken forward by way of judicial review, which might be available for funding.
	There is a range of provision in Schedule 1 for cases to be taken forward against public authorities, not solely on the particular part of the schedule to which the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, is directed.

Lord Mayhew of Twysden: We quite understand the point that the noble and learned Lord is making: that the intention of Ministers is to restrict legal aid to serious cases and that that is the measure. Would he reflect on the position of someone whose liberty has been wrongfully denied and whether it would be any consolation to know that that resulted not from a deliberate act but from some oversight-a mistake, to use the words already employed, of an egregious kind? It does not seem to me that it makes much difference, if you are unlawfully detained, whether it was just by mistake.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I recognise what my noble and learned friend is saying. I said at the outset that we intend to focus on those areas where there is serious abuse by the state and where serious harm has resulted. It is an effort to target limited resources-I think that there is recognition that resources are limited-where there is the greatest abuse of power or position by the state. In those circumstances, we believe, as I have tried to explain, that abuse does not cover negligence. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Neill, asked what it covers. The paragraph covers the most serious abuses, which may not include mistakes but could include abuses such as misfeasance in public office. I think that that would fall within the definition here.

Lord Bach: Why should it be only the most serious abuses that allow the victim to get legal aid? There are all kinds of abuses. We know that there are some petty abuses and perhaps I would agree with the Minister that not every petty abuse should allow the victim to get legal aid. There are very serious abuses, which the noble and learned Lord says his Bill intends to cover, but what about medium-sized abuses? I am talking about abuses that are pretty severe for the victim. Should the state be stopped from dealing with those? Why should the victim not be able to get legal aid in order to get a remedy in such a case? Why are the Government saying that the abuse has to be really serious?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, as I have sought to explain, we are trying to recognise in the Bill that there are limited resources and to ensure that those limited resources are best and most fairly targeted. I think that in asking the question the noble Lord, Lord Bach, accepted that not all abuse should lead to a claim. That is what we are seeking to do: we are trying to strike a balance between where it would and would not be appropriate for legal aid to be made available. That is why, along that continuum, it is at the serious end where we have sought-

Lord Clinton-Davis: Did the Minister really say that in no circumstances would legal aid be available where the infringement immediately appeared to be minor? Does he not recognise that lawyers often come across cases that appear to be minor but later become rather more serious? What remedy is available in such an instance? Is the Minister really arguing that, once it is decreed that a situation is minimal, there is no possible remedy?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: It is not that there is no possible remedy; it is a question of whether legal aid would be available-whether it is within scope. I do not shy away from the fact that these are difficult judgments to make, but the resources are not unlimited. The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, refers to a minimal infringement. If the resources are limited, it is very difficult to see why a minimal infringement, which may be one of error, should attract the same level of resources as a case where there has clearly been a misuse or abuse of power on the part of a public authority.

Lord Clinton-Davis: I am talking about the solicitor who originally investigates a case being not very competent. He concludes that the case is minimal but he might be wrong. Why should legal aid not be available later?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I am not sure that I fully understand the point that the noble Lord is making. Obviously, if at a later stage a case clearly qualifies for legal aid under the definition here, one would expect legal aid to be available. Furthermore, in many of the cases that we are talking about where legal aid might not be available, conditional fee agreements might provide a viable alternative where there is clearly merit in the case but it would not qualify under the definition here.

Lord Beecham: I am sorry to intervene and I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. Are the Government approaching this matter as though it is to deal only with claims for damages? Of course, other forms of relief might be sought-injunctive relief, declarations and so on-that might bring a spotlight to bear on the alleged abuse that has occurred. That might be the most powerful way of dealing with the error in the first place. Is that not something for which legal aid should be available?

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I have tried to identify the other parts of Schedule 1 where other remedies are indicated to be within scope. If I can find the place in my notes, I shall be able to make them very clear. I think I made it clear that judicial review, referred to in paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, is within scope of legal aid. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that there may be many cases where that is the most appropriate route to go down and it would be within scope. However, I have indicated that, where damages are concerned, the criteria that I have tried to set out are the ones that would apply at the serious end of abuse. I gave specific examples of things that are within scope within the schedule, judicial review being possibly the most obvious.

Lord Howarth of Newport: Will the noble and learned Lord consider very carefully whether he is really content that through the Bill the Government are in effect carving out a significant area of immunity for their agents where they might have acted incompetently or irresponsibly-not deliberately or dishonestly but incompetently and irresponsibly-and, in so doing, have caused considerable damage to individuals? In stipulating that legal aid should not be available to enable individuals to secure redress and damages in such a situation, surely the Government are acting to protect themselves in a way that is simply wrong when one considers what the proper relationship between the state and the individual should be.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, at the risk of repetition, I have already said that numerous routes within scope, other than a damages claim, might be open to an individual and might be even more appropriate in addressing the situation where a public authority or the state acts in a way that the individual citizen wishes to challenge. Indeed, as I have indicated, other means, such as conditional fee agreements, might also be appropriate in some cases that are not at the serious end.

Lord Judd: My Lords-

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: Part 1 of Schedule 1 indicates a number of remedies that are available and within scope. We have sought to make available a range of remedies, particularly with regard to the protection of the liberty of the subject. A deliberate policy choice was made to try to ensure that legal aid would be available to safeguard the liberty of the subject. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Judd, is being patient.

Lord Judd: I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is being given quite a cross-examination at this stage in our considerations. Before Report, when he is considering what has been said in this debate, I plead with him to remember that this is not just a private matter between the individual concerned and the authorities. In this very sensitive area of public policy there are bound to be much wider ramifications. Ultimately, this is about the credibility of the Home Office and its policies and how they operate. If there appears to be a reluctance to put right generously what has been done indefensibly, that will hardly help to achieve public confidence in the general policies as they are applied. I hope that the Minister will take away that general point, because it is crucial to our deliberations.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I recognise the important point that the noble Lord, Lord Judd, makes. I assure him that, in trying to allocate limited resources, we have sought to ensure that a proper balance is struck. As I indicated, it is of course a balance, and we will weigh in what has been said in this debate. However, I have sought to indicate that we are dealing here not just with claims for damages; we have deliberately included a whole range of remedies within scope in Schedule 1 because we recognise the importance of proper safeguards in the citizen's relationship with the state. I hope that the noble Lord will recognise that a whole range of remedies will be eligible for legal aid.
	The noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has no doubt been waiting for a response to his Amendment 61ZA, which would include within the definition of "public authority" the Crown Estate and the Duchy of Cornwall. The position is that paragraph 19(7) uses a definition of "public authority" that is used in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. At Section 6(3) of that Act, the definition of a public authority includes,
	"(a) a court or tribunal, and
	(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature,
	but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament".
	Section 6(5) of the Human Rights Act goes on to provide that,
	"In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private".
	Therefore, the point is that this is not so much about the name of the body but about determining whether the function is of a public nature. It is the nature of the service or function that is determinative, rather than the legal status of a body that is performing the function. One noble Lord asked whether we could have a definition of that. Ultimately, it must be for the courts to determine whether a body is a public authority, given that definition for the purposes of the Human Rights Act.
	The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said that there may be another time and place to discuss the Crown Estate and the Duchy of Cornwall. I know that the Scottish Affairs Committee in the House of Commons is currently looking at the work of the Crown Estate. It is an issue that has attracted more attention, but as regards this amendment and this Bill the definition is used in the Human Rights Act and is a proper definition to import into this Bill.
	I will briefly address a number of government amendments in this group. Amendments 79A and 79C address predecessor claims under the pre-Equality Act 2010 legislation to ensure that legal aid continues to be available to people who have live claims under predecessor equalities legislation, and not just in relation to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010.
	At present, paragraph 38 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 limits legal aid cases to cases where the Equality Act 2010 has been contravened. The 2010 Act presents a new unified legal framework for addressing harassment, victimisation and discrimination based on any of eight protected characteristics. Where previous equality enactments have been repealed, we recognise that certain claims will continue to be capable of being brought under these enactments by virtue of the transitional arrangements introduced by the 2010 Act. For this reason, we seek to amend paragraph 38 to allow funding for predecessor claims that might still need the benefit of public funding. This amendment will also amend paragraph 38 to put beyond doubt our intention to retain funding for civil legal services relating to the breach of equality clauses and rules and non-discrimination rules.
	Government Amendments 78C, 78D and 78E ensure that civil legal services are provided in circumstances where a sexual offence has actually been committed or is alleged to have been committed. They also ensure that civil legal services are provided in circumstances where a sexual offence has not actually been committed but there has been: an incitement to commit a sexual offence; an offence committed by a person under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, in relation to which a sexual offence is the offence which the person intended or believed would be committed; conspiracy to commit a sexual offence; and an attempt to commit a sexual offence.
	Additionally, the amendment to paragraph 34 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 will ensure that civil legal services are capable of being provided in relation to conduct that would be an offence mentioned in sub-paragraph (3)(a) or (b) of the existing definition of "sexual offence" but that is not considered an offence under the present definition because it took place before the relevant provision came into force. At present, paragraph 34 limits legal aid to cases where a sexual offence has been committed under the provision of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and to cases where an offence has been committed under Section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which deals with indecent photographs of children. We recognise that it is possible that offences committed before the present legislation came into force might need the benefit of public funding, and for this reason we have amended paragraph 34 to allow for funding.
	I am not sure why Amendment 90ZZA is in this group, but I hope the Committee will recognise that this is a serious attempt to ensure that where there have perhaps been gaps due to prior legislation, we seek to fill them. Amendment 90ZZA would bring into scope advocacy within the Court of Protection where a person's mental or psychological safety is concerned. This echoes debates on Amendment 53. The current position is that advice is available for any mental capacity matter and that representation is available for the Court of Protection in limited circumstances where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual.
	Paragraph 4 of Part 3 provides for advocacy before the Court of Protection where there is to be an oral hearing and the case will determine the vital interests of the individual-for example, medical treatment, life, liberty, physical safety, the capacity to marry or enter into a civil partnership, and the capacity to enter into sexual relations or the right to family life. The amendments go beyond what is currently provided through legal representation by the current civil legal aid scheme. We have had to focus unlimited resources on the most serious cases and on the interests of the individual that are vital. We do not seek to go beyond what is already the present position. I hope that the noble Lord will reflect on that and, when the time comes, not move his amendment.
	It is some time since the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, moved his original amendment, but I hope he is assured that the serious issues involving state public authorities and the citizen are addressed by this. With regard to the liberty of the individual, there are a number of specific provisions, quite apart from the more general provision that loss of liberty is seen as a harm to the individual. I hope, on the basis of these reassurances, that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Ramsbotham: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for summing up in a very complicated summing-up situation. I am also extremely grateful for the many powerful interventions that were made both immediately after the amendment was moved and during the Minister's summing up. I think that their content has increased understanding and has pointed out many more aspects of the problem than I was able to point out in moving the amendment. Some very serious points have been raised and I think it behoves us all to read very carefully in Hansard what has been said in the House this evening. I think and I hope that it will be possible, having done that, to have a discussion with the Minister and with the officials concerned with this issue before we bring it back on Report. Issues involving people who are in the hands of the state should not be allowed to be dropped until we are absolutely certain that the legislation is clear and protects the most vulnerable who are up against the state. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 60 withdrawn.
	House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 8.27 pm.

Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland
	 — 
	Question for Short Debate

Baroness Harris of Richmond: To ask Her Majesty's Government what assessment they have made of the final report of the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: My Lords, the intent of my Question is to ensure that we do not forget about Northern Ireland and to remind the House that this is still a work in progress. We have a responsibility to ensure that a politically devolved Northern Ireland remains committed to transformation of its society. We spend a great deal of money-£14,000 million, or £14 billion-to help it through this process and it is important that we keep ourselves informed about progress. Since the 26th and final report from the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland was presented to the House in July last year, a number of extremely violent incidents have occurred there. Although everyone must be relieved that the appalling terrorist activity has apparently come to an end, it has not completely disappeared and we must be vigilant about any recurrence.
	I believe that the IMC has done a fantastic job. It was set up five years after the signing of the Belfast agreement, at a time of great turmoil in Northern Ireland. There was no real political agreement on a way forward and there was a continuing atmosphere of mistrust between political parties. As the report recognises, at the time that the IMC was set up paramilitary groups had not decommissioned their weapons and, although generally not attacking the organs of state, they were still engaged in illegal and often violent activity. Some also had strong links to political parties. Article 3 of the terms of the agreement stated that the IMC was set up,
	"to carry out its functions ... with a view to promoting the transition to a peaceful society and stable and inclusive devolved Government in Northern Ireland".
	It had a very difficult task to perform. During its time it reported on abductions, murders, violence of a terrible nature, robberies on a grand scale-most notably that of the Northern Bank in Belfast-and ongoing feuds between paramilitary organisations.
	As well as its six-monthly paramilitary reports, the IMC produced a number of ad hoc reports on various initiatives that it had undertaken, either on its own or at the behest of the Irish and British Governments, and the progress evident through these reports is remarkable. They chart the steady progression towards a normalised society. All those concerned with the IMC over the years are to be warmly congratulated on their work, bravery, dedication and commitment to the building of the very different Northern Ireland that we see today, some seven and a half years since they began their task. I pay particular tribute to my noble friend Lord Alderdice, who is unable to be with us tonight and who was a member of the IMC throughout its term of office.
	The IMC's work must, at times, have been utterly gruesome. Covering a land area not much bigger than that of my home county of North Yorkshire, Northern Ireland had four paramilitary murders and more than 200 brutal paramilitary shootings or assaults in 2005, a year after the IMC started its work. In the seven years since, there have been 21 murders and more than 800 reported casualties of paramilitary violence and a resurgence of serious violence by dissident republicans. Can the Minister tell me how many paramilitary-related incidents have taken place since the IMC's last report was published? How many incidents classed as violence have occurred in Northern Ireland in the past six months, and how does that compare with the preceding six months?
	I was privileged last year to meet some of the victims of these crimes. They were cared for and supported by an extraordinary organisation called WAVE, led by a young man called Alan McBride. The organisation offers support to people bereaved of a spouse as a result of violence in Northern Ireland. I met many other truly inspirational people who are doing a marvellous job helping those afflicted as a consequence of the Troubles. My programme was organised by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Consortium, to which I owe a huge debt of gratitude for showing me the magnificent work done by these groups. They all work tremendously hard in desperately deprived areas of Belfast, which we must visit if we are to understand the difficulties that organisations face in their efforts to support those in most need.
	Northern Ireland is different. Paragraph 5.6 of the report states:
	"Members and former members of all paramilitary groups remain very active in non-terrorist types of crime-a bequest from the Troubles which will dog Northern Ireland for years and will require a substantial continuing effort from law enforcement agencies".
	Perhaps I may ask the Minister how many PSNI officers there are now compared with six months ago, and whether it is the Government's assessment that these numbers are sufficient to ensure the safety of the people of Northern Ireland.
	We should never forget how far we have come since 2004, when there were still more than 14,000 British troops in Northern Ireland, occupying 24 bases in an area-I remind your Lordships-not much greater than that of North Yorkshire. Army personnel were based in 13 police stations, and nine sites were used for observation and communications. For 38 years there had been a regular military role in law enforcement-the largest in British military history so far-and the IMC clearly had a huge role in helping Northern Ireland overcome the terrible years of mayhem, when it seemed to many that there would never be peace. However, much still needs to be done and the Secretary of State has promised regular six-monthly reports to the House about progress towards a shared future. Is the Minister able to confirm that a report will be presented shortly?
	My sincere hope is that there will be much more integrated education to enable the young people of Northern Ireland to live together, respecting each other's cultures, instead of being separated as they have been for too long. I pay tribute to the tireless work of the noble Baroness, Lady Blood, who has been an indefatigable promoter of integrated education, as has the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. Neither of them is in their place this evening.
	Finally, I will quote again from this excellent report. On page 55, in the section "Looking Ahead", it states:
	"In our view, Northern Ireland should now address its continuing issues by conferring full responsibility on its own political and other institutions. ... Paramilitary violence is still a real issue. Dissident republicans are an active and serious threat, especially at the moment against members of the PSNI. ... Loyalists ... have yet to inspire confidence that they are capable of finally going away as paramilitary organisations, as PIRA has. Some members and former members of all groups remain heavily involved in a wide range of serious crime ... presenting a challenge to law enforcement which is significantly more serious than it would otherwise have been. ... Northern Ireland's political and other institutions, and the UK Government in respect of national security, therefore have a heavy continuing responsibility to complete the process whereby paramilitary groups finally cease to play a part in society. That responsibility goes wider, to the communities in which paramilitary groups still play a role. ... There are some in those communities who have to learn that paramilitary groups hold back their social and economic development and that only by rejecting them and whole-heartedly supporting public and voluntary institutions and the rule of law can they fully throw off the bequest of the Troubles. ... The main responsibility for dealing with these challenges rests with the Assembly, the Executive and local politicians, working in conjunction with community leaders, churches, the law enforcement and other public institutions, and ultimately with the people of Northern Ireland as a whole. ... It is this inclusive leadership which must now jointly guide Northern Ireland along the rest of the road".

Baroness Garden of Frognal: My Lords, perhaps I may point out that the timing on this debate is very tight. The minute the clock shows that five minutes have elapsed, noble Lords should sit down; otherwise, other noble Lords will be denied their chance to speak.

Lord Trimble: My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, on securing the debate. I also congratulate the four persons who have been commissioners of the Independent Monitoring Commission over the past seven years, and thank them for the excellent job they have done.
	Perhaps I may be permitted some purely personal reflections. It was my colleagues and I, during my time as First Minister of Northern Ireland, who suggested to the Government that such a body should be created. We did this in more specific terms, saying that as we had an oversight commissioner for the police and one for the justice system, we should have one for paramilitarism. The proposal evolved somewhat after it was originally made. I am sorry to say that when we put it to the Government we encountered fierce resistance from the Northern Ireland Office. Indeed, I remember a very senior member of the Northern Ireland Office saying to me that he was not going to have some other person overseeing what he did. He was quite right to have that concern because, while one put the proposal in terms of having independent reportage and oversight of what paramilitaries were doing, the whole object of the proposal was to try to curb the behaviour of the Northern Ireland Office, which unfortunately at times was not satisfactory. Respect for the Northern Ireland Office hit bottom when a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, after a paramilitary murder, dismissed it as merely "internal housekeeping" by a paramilitary organisation. That sort of licence to murder was something that no government Minister should have been issuing. We were worried about the way in which the Northern Ireland Office would allow expediency and other political considerations to affect what should have been the administration of justice.
	It took quite some time before the concept was formally announced in, I think, July 2002. A few months before, there was a crisis that resulted in the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and I have always felt that if we had had this body in existence before then, we might very well have avoided that collapse and the consequent nearly five-year hiatus in the institutions in Northern Ireland. But it came, and it had a very positive effect.
	I do not want to try to go over all the detail, but I must say that my eye was caught by a sentence on page 45. The Independent Monitoring Commission says that one of the tasks it set itself right at the outset was to deal with the ceasefire mentality, which in its view had,
	"for too long been used to obscure and avoid the challenging implications of the Belfast Agreement: that there had to be a complete severance between politics and paramilitary activity, and that this could come about only if those paramilitaries ceased to act as such".
	I have to say that it was not just the ceasefire mentality that was used to obscure those implications; there were political parties working overtime trying to obscure them. I am thinking primarily of Sinn Fein and its allies, but it was quite shameful at the time that there were some unionists who supported that activity by Sinn Fein by assuring it that the republican paramilitaries were not under any obligation to decommission or to cease to exist at that time. Thankfully, they have changed their opinion, but it took some time before that happened.
	In opening, the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, said that we still have a responsibility with regard to these matters, and that is right. She also mentioned the expenditure that we engaged in. I notice that the expenditure of the Independent Monitoring Commission averaged out at less than £1 million a year. I venture to suggest that very few million pounds have been spent in Northern Ireland so usefully and to such good purpose, and I do not think it would have caused any great difficulty for government expenditure if that had continued. It was-as I read this report, and obviously this is a matter of interpretation-largely at the instance of the British and Irish Governments that the commission was wound up. I regret that. I think there is still a valuable role that it could have taken. If we are now without that, it increases the responsibility on us to see that this matter is not forgotten. Speaking to me earlier, the noble Baroness said that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland said that he was going to make regular reports to Parliament on these matters. I hope that happens and that we in this House get an opportunity to receive and to repeat such reports and to scrutinise them effectively.

Lord Browne of Belmont: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for tabling this Question and thus facilitating what I am sure will be a fair and balanced discussion of the role and nature of the Independent Monitoring Commission. Over the past seven years, the IMC has had a challenging and onerous task, one that I believe it carried out with scrupulous independence. During that period, the commission published 26 separate reports. In many instances, they were strongly criticised by commentators in the media and by politicians of all parties. However, it is now generally accepted that the IMC's conclusions were fair, unbiased and based on the best available evidence derived from careful and meticulous investigations. I did not envy its task. When the facts or circumstances that it presented rebutted a publicly accepted assumption, the commission members were often pilloried by politicians and in the press. The task of publicly presenting uncomfortable truths, often when the peace process in Northern Ireland was known more for its fragility than for its stability, was as controversial as it was unpalatable, but without the IMC we would not have attained the necessary levels of public trust and confidence to allow the restoration of the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland in 2007. Without the IMC, the two communities in Northern Ireland could not have been convinced that their political enemies would make a positive contribution towards the creation of a better society for all. For that, I am very thankful.
	In conclusion, I should mention the IMC's final report, which focused, unfortunately, on civil disturbances of a sectarian nature in east Belfast, the constituency that I represented for 25 years at council and assembly level. I had very much hoped that events of this nature had been relegated to history, and the report was indeed disturbing and depressing to me. Nevertheless, I take comfort from the fact that both communities continued to co-operate, the men of violence were sidelined and a descent into a spiral of sectarian violence was avoided. Perhaps we may conclude therefore that the fair and balanced final report of the IMC contributed in no small measure to achieving reconciliation between the two communities in Northern Ireland. Perhaps the Minister will agree that the greatest achievement of the commission is the general agreement in Northern Ireland that it is no longer required.

Baroness O'Loan: My Lords, I would like to express my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for securing this debate. I would also like to pay tribute to the members of the commission, who have done a wonderful job in securing the trust of the people by the way in which they went about their work.
	The commission's 26th and final report includes three important issues. The first is that a "culture of lawfulness" is,
	"evidently lacking in communities dominated by paramilitaries".
	The second is that,
	"Dissident republicans are an active and serious threat ... Some members and former members of all groups remain heavily involved in a wide range of serious crime".
	The third is that,
	"The fundamental principle of the Northern Irish peace process ... is that politics is the way to address communal challenges and to draw the whole society into full acceptance of the institutions of democracy".
	Our troubled past still impacts on our perception of the rule of law. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, did valiant work as co-chair with Denis Bradley on the Consultative Group on the Past. They identified areas in which action was necessary, from memorials to storytelling to victims. There has been no real movement since the publication of that report three years ago. We currently have a perception that there are people who have committed crimes for which they have not been made amenable, so the two issues are the application of the rule of law and the responsibility of politicians. The systems currently established for dealing with the past involve three institutions, each of which may be involved in one case: the Historical Enquiries Team, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland and the Police Service of Northern Ireland. This is a cumbersome set of arrangement and is beset by legal difficulties for all parties, which inevitably result in significant cost.
	So how do we manage the past? The difficulties are perhaps best explained by reference to two recent developments. The first is the publication under the 30-year rule of papers relating to the hunger strike in 1981. IRA spokespersons have consistently insisted that no concessions were made by the Thatcher Government which were sufficient for the hunger strikers to bring an end to the hunger strike. The published material contradicts that assertion. It appears to indicate that lives could have been saved. Despite the facts that some of those involved are still alive, there is no threat of prosecution and that no amnesty is required, we do not have an agreed version of what happened. The second involves the recent controversy surrounding the British application for the tapes recorded by former IRA member Dolores Price and stored in an archive at Boston College in the United States. Since making that tape, Ms Price has indicated that she drove a number of the disappeared to their deaths at the hands of the IRA. Police investigating the abduction and murder of Jean McConville, a mother of 10, require access to the tapes for investigative purposes. The Boston project was predicated upon assurances that the tapes would not be disclosed until after a period of 30 years, or the death of the individual. It is obvious that such assurances could not lawfully be given. Journalists and academics are subject to the rule of law as the rest of us are, and material can and will be recovered by the police according to the law for investigation purposes.
	It is now being suggested that the only way to deal with the past would be a truth commission, with an amnesty for all individuals who appear before it. To suggest this is to ignore international law, which provides that you can have no amnesty for gross violations of human rights. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is often held up as a model, would not satisfy the requirements of international law. If we did what it did, we would have to establish an amnesty committee that would sit in public, before which people would have to appear to seek amnesty, and in the course of which they could be cross-examined by victims and their families. In South Africa 7,000 people applied; 849 were granted amnesty. Such hearings in Belfast could hardly be expected to consolidate the peace process. The consequential truth commission would hear testimony from individuals who chose to appear. Experience to date suggests there would be a very low participation rate.
	Let us go back to the investigations. A number of impediments exist. Offences committed before 1998 can only carry a maximum sentence of two years. The Northern Ireland Arms Decommissioning Act provides that you cannot use anything recovered from the process of decommissioning. The Northern Ireland (Location of Victims' Remains) Act provides that you cannot recover anything that may be found in the process of recovering the body. A number of people have also been dealt with under the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, and a variety of pardons have been granted to an unknown number of people. Our situation is as complex as that of most post-conflict societies. We need to establish the rule of law in order to limit the ongoing prospect of further recruitment by the dissidents, and further recruitment and criminality by loyalist paramilitaries.
	If we accept that we cannot just allow people to tell their stories to journalists with impunity and without challenge, because the law does not permit that; if we accept that a truth commission is unlikely to be able to provide blanket amnesties, because the law does not permit that; if we accept that the hands of investigators have been tied, what is left? There is the normal activity of storytelling; and there is a single independent unit to investigate all the unsolved murders of the past in an attempt to pick up from where we are now and to carry forward the investigation of individual cases in a coherent manner-accepting that few of them may lead to prosecutions but that the families will be told what can be told.
	We still face a significant challenge in Northern Ireland. The warnings of the IMC are very clear. Our politicians and our people have a duty to act. What positive action can the Government take to encourage this?

Lord Lexden: My Lords, as I read this clear, calm, measured report, one thought above all kept coming back to me: that the commission which produced it was a remarkable body to which not just Northern Ireland but the whole country owes a considerable debt. It is deeply satisfying that the House has been given this opportunity to pay tribute to it, thanks to my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond.
	The commission had no precedent, no previous example of similar work to guide it. Nothing like it had been seen in these islands before. Drawn from three different countries and from diverse backgrounds, those who served on the commission were clearly people of great honour and probity and not a little ingenuity. The report shows that they worked closely and successfully together, despite-or perhaps because of-the absence of a formal chairman, an interesting aspect of the commission's operations that should be noted.
	The commission was independent in name, and in every deed and action it performed. Its independence was the secret of its success-combined of course with the care and impartiality with which it examined the vast amount of material drawn from both official and private sources that was placed before it. As a result, its statements and views commanded widespread respect-the more so since they were delivered crisply and frankly.
	The commission's final service was to provide a lucid summary of its own seven-year career. It is surely invaluable to have this record of unprecedented experience. Other countries afflicted by division and politically motivated violence may wish to consult and learn from it. The IMC model may not be transferred wholesale elsewhere, but it could prove immensely helpful to others facing circumstances of civil strife. The commission itself declared that:
	"We are least well placed to judge our impact and future historians will have most to say about it".
	Speaking as a current historian, I am sure that these future historians too will feel gratitude for this report when they come to form considered historical judgments on the violence that racked Northern Ireland for so long. It would be surprising if they did not accord a position of some prominence to the IMC when tracing the factors that finally brought about the diminution of Ulster's agony.
	The commission had other important functions, but it is likely to be remembered chiefly for the thoroughness and rigour with which it monitored the paramilitary violence that continued after the formal declaration of ceasefires by terrorist organisations. As its report states,
	"we sought to bring out the human cost of paramilitary groups, in terms of both the immediate victims of their crimes and the way in which they held back the economic and social progress of the communities they claimed to represent".
	The completely impartial way in which it did this enabled the commission to give positive assistance to Northern Ireland's progress towards greater normality, particularly in the years 2004-05, when the evidence it produced of continuing links between the IRA and Sinn Fein intensified pressure on the latter to commit itself more firmly to the democratic path. The Commission also put the loyalist paramilitaries under significant pressure, exposing the details of the violence in which they remained involved while at the same time, as the report puts it, they sought to play,
	"a continuing role in community development and wanted public funds for the purpose".
	In its characteristically restrained and modest prose, the commission declared last year as it took its leave that:
	"The position as we close is very far from ideal".
	The shadow of the gunman still falls too darkly and heavily over the people, particularly those in poorer communities, in Northern Ireland. The so-called peace walls, those potent emblems of division, have increased, not diminished. The Police Service of Northern Ireland continues to have a formidable duty of community protection before it, and my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is providing an extra £200 million over four years to assist it in this task during this time of national austerity.
	What our fellow countrymen and women in the Province need above all is a cross-community political strategy for a shared future. The Independent Monitoring Commission's report welcomes the establishment of an inclusive devolved Government. With it now rests the main duty of creating,
	"a genuinely shared future; not a shared out future",
	as my right honourable friend the Prime Minister has put it. Sadly, the Northern Ireland Executive has so far shown insufficient resolve in rising to this challenge. It must take some serious decisions if the people of Northern Ireland are to enjoy to the full the legacy of the work done by the Independent Monitoring Commission.
	Parliament must itself keep abreast of the activities of the Executive to help it secure progress. We must not repeat the error made after 1920 under the Province's first system of devolved government, when Parliament closed its eyes to the internal affairs of this part of our country. As the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, said at the outset, we must never forget Northern Ireland.

Lord Empey: My Lords, I join with others in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for securing this debate.
	The inception of the IMC was primarily a confidence-building measure. It was negotiated at great length, and one person who deserves some mention for it, as I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, will know, is her right honourable colleague, Paul Murphy, who played a significant role as Secretary of State and Minister of State in Northern Ireland. As my noble friend Lord Trimble said earlier, during the negotiations we found there were those who did not want it to shine a light on some of those people who were conducting very unsatisfactory activities right across the Province.
	The reality was that when eventually it did come on the scene, late in the day as it was, the IMC was derided and criticised. It was referred to as a paper or toothless tiger that would never gain the confidence of people in the community. However, as all noble Lords who have spoken so far have conceded, it made a very significant contribution to the progress that has been made.
	As I have said to the Minister-and I hope that he will respond to this when he answers-I feel that it was premature to wind the commission up at this stage. I suspect that it was never intended to last for seven and a half years but, nevertheless, it successfully shone a light consistently and independently on all paramilitary organisations. It held their feet to the fire, despite the fact that some of them were negotiating for money to keep organisations that they particularly sponsored going, whether it was from a community point of view or otherwise. Someone was there always to look, to see, to point out and to report on what was going on. That is missing at present.
	Some months ago, the Secretary of State called a meeting to which a number of us were invited and attended. Will the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State will follow that up with another meeting and that they will be held regularly so that members can be briefed on the details as the Government see them? My noble friend Lord Lexden made a very valid point? In the 1920s, once the devolution had settled and the Parliament for Northern Ireland was established, it was effectively the end of the story and people turned their minds to other things. We must not allow that mistake to be made again.
	We all understand that money is tight and that £800,000 or whatever a year is still a lot of money. I accept that. But set that sum against the colossal financial and other costs that were borne by this entire community and the very many victims in Northern Ireland, in my view it was money well spent and a small price to pay for an independent guarantee. Because governmental and other material had been put into the public domain, people did not believe that there were some people-and I pay tribute to all of them-who were not afraid to say that a particular group or organisation was doing what it was doing.
	I have to say to noble Lords that the paramilitaries still are the role models for many young males, particularly in deprived areas, because there are no others. They fall into the trap and even the dissident republicans are now recruiting among teenagers. Indeed, some of them have already been arrested and charged.
	I believe that the commission deserves to be congratulated. I am glad that we got it going and I am sorry that it did not come earlier. I am also glad that those who derided it found, ultimately, confidence in its decisions. It is a good thing and, while this chapter has now closed, at least it is something in which those who participated can take pride in the work that they have done.

Lord Bew: My Lords, like other noble Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, for securing this debate. She is well known to be a good friend of Northern Ireland and her work in bringing about this debate is yet another example of what a good friend she is to the Province. I, too, should like to recall briefly the struggle to set up the IMC. I very much agree with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Trimble. The truth of the matter is that the IMC was not enthusiastically received in the early days of debate by the Northern Ireland Office or the Irish Government. It is hard to recall that now because it has been so successful.
	I should like to pay tribute in particular to Michael McDowell, a former Nieman fellow at Harvard and recently an official at the World Bank, who from his position in a Washington think tank kept No. 10 Downing Street under siege with regular e-mails arguing vigorously for the establishment of the IMC in the months leading up to its appointment. Today, I was talking to Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair's chief of staff at that time, who recalled honestly the weight and significance of Michael McDowell's constant advocacy. It is important to pay tribute to the work that he put in on that absolutely crucial issue.
	Turning to the report itself, I should like it to be understood in your Lordships' House that the report is not an answer to questions about where Northern Ireland is now and how we move it forward. It is instead an answer to the different question: what was the modus operandi of this body? As the IMC was a unique body, it may be important to describe how it worked. The report is an attempt to answer that question, rather than being in any real sense prescriptive about the future of Northern Ireland, and it is entirely right that that should be and is so. There are a number of conclusions to the report where members of the commission outline what they think are the key lessons.
	Perhaps slightly impertinently, I should like to add a further lesson, which one should draw from the experience of the IMC-that is, a willingness to take it on the chin. The degree of criticism and abuse that the IMC received, particularly in the earlier years, was quite remarkable, as well as the strong refusal of many people in Northern Irish society to accept that it could perform a viable role or could be considered to be, in any sense of the word, independent. One of the remarkable things about the report is the way in which it quotes from some of those testimonies, including an article in the Irish News, the leading nationalist newspaper in Belfast, on 29 November 2008, which stated:
	"In reality, British intelligence operates through deceit, dishonesty, murder, blackmail, double-crossing, cheating, conniving and downright thuggery. It may sound harsh but there is simply no other way to run an intelligence service. Their use of loyalist paramilitaries and informers beat the PIRA. So the intelligence agencies will tell the IMC whatever it takes to bolster support for the current political administration. That is what intelligence services do, which means that the IMC, and other opinions based on supplied intelligence are effectively worthless".
	That is a common enough comment from this period. It is a mark of the calibre of the IMC and the people who served on it that it reprinted that quote. They took this kind of thing on the chin because that was what they had to do and then carry on with their work in a steady way.
	Finally, I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, would not mind that we should mention the names of the other members of the commission: Joe Brosnan, of the Department of Justice in Dublin; Dick Kerr, an important figure in American intelligence; and John Grieve, who had such a distinguished career in our police service.

Baroness Smith of Basildon: My Lords, we owe a debt of gratitude to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, for the opportunity for an invaluable and very interesting debate on the final report of the IMC. The debate is an opportunity to reflect on the changes tracked by the IMC since it was established in 2004-changes which, despite strong commitment from the British and Irish Governments, and the Northern Irish political parties, some doubted could be made. Indeed, once the process of change began, the pace and degree of change from some of darkest and most frightening of times is quite remarkable. It is remarkable that today a new generation is growing up with no memory of those times or how great the threat of terrorism was across the whole of the UK, both in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The final report reflects on this and has a wealth of factual information and analysis.
	As we have heard, the IMC was established in 2004 following agreement between the British and Irish Governments. Its monitoring activity of paramilitary groups provided 20 of the 26 reports; the remaining five reports on security normalisation culminated with the conclusion that,
	"the normalisation programme as a whole has been complied with".
	Despite perhaps understandable cynicism from some quarters, the Government ensured that the IMC had detailed information from the Army so that the IMC could monitor its normalisation plans. It is evident that the independent assessments of the IMC on normalisation and paramilitary activity helped to create the climate for the British and Irish Governments and the Northern Ireland political parties to edge closer to the next stage of meaningful dialogue.
	The initial fears from some republicans that the IMC would investigate only republican paramilitary activity were disproved in the very first report, when it concluded that loyalist groups were at that time responsible for higher levels of violence than republican groups. However, despite enormous progress on the political and paramilitary front, we share the IMC's deep concerns about the attacks and threats to PSNI and its assessment of non-terrorist crime.
	I have to say to the Minister that it is disappointing that to date the only response from Government to the report has been the Written Statement from the Secretary of State, Owen Paterson, on 4 July 2011 when the report was published-although it was completed in March. The Secretary of State praised the IMC and expressed his gratitude for its work and, recognising the problems that remain, wrote:
	"I am conscious that Parliament and the public will wish to be kept informed of progress on a regular basis. I therefore intend to make statements to Parliament every six months summarising the threat".-[Official Report, Commons, 4/7/11; col. 76-77WS.]
	It is now just over six months since that commitment was given. Can the Minister tell us when we can expect the first of those reports? I appreciate the work that has to be undertaken to prepare such reports, but given the seriousness of this issue, they are essential.
	The final section of the report, "Looking Ahead", provides evidence that encourages but also gives concern. Circumstances, as we have heard, have changed significantly both in paramilitary activity and the stability and responsibilities of the devolved institutions. However, paramilitary activity has not disappeared, but changed. Dissident republicans are active and a serious threat, particularly against the PSNI, as we have seen, with horrendous consequences. Although loyalists have decommissioned, albeit with varying degrees of success, the IMC is not confident that they have finally disbanded as PIRA has, and they remain involved in serious and organised crime. The IMC's conclusion is that the level of serious crime is worse than it would otherwise be, and presumably worse than in other parts of the UK, because those involved learnt their "trade" in the most violent of times. However, it should also be recognised that policing has changed and that there are now unprecedented levels of co-operation between the PSNI and the Garda in the Republic.
	The report's second conclusion is positive and encouraging in recognising that the,
	"stable and inclusive devolved Government",
	has now jointly to guide and lead Northern Ireland, along with community leaders. It is also implicit, as indicated by the noble Lords, Lord Empey and Lord Lexden, that co-operation must continue throughout the UK and within the Republic of Ireland. The continuing level of violence means that we cannot be complacent, because an increased level of violence has implications not just for Northern Ireland but also for Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland.
	Can I make a final plea to the Minister and his Government? Stability in Northern Ireland is precious. Many people, some in your Lordships' House this evening, have worked very hard for a better, peaceful Northern Ireland and continue to do so. But Northern Ireland is bearing a heavy burden, with £4 billion of cuts and the greatest loss of public sector jobs in the entire UK. I urge the Government to think very hard about the impact of these cuts-the increase in unemployment and the increase in poverty-on a society seeking to deal with these other pressures that we have spoken of. All of us want a stable and inclusive Northern Ireland, but we also need a more prosperous Northern Ireland. To achieve that, the Government need to work with the Executive, not through their economic policies make it harder for them, especially given the backlog of investment that is needed.
	I thank the IMC. The House needs to recognise that it did not have an easy task, but the way in which it conducted the responsibilities is to be praised and we should express our appreciation to all who were involved in it.

Lord Shutt of Greetland: My Lords, I am grateful to your Lordships for the quality of the contributions made to this debate this evening.
	It might be helpful to begin by providing some background to the IMC and its functions. Your Lordships will recall that it was founded as a result of an international agreement between the British and Irish Governments signed in November 2003. This stemmed from the joint declaration of the two Governments in April of that year. The commission was formally established when the agreement came into force on 7 January 2004.
	Four commissioners were appointed: the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, and John Grieve were appointed by the British Government; Joe Brosnan was appointed by the Irish Government; and Dick Kerr was appointed by both Governments on the nomination of the United States Government.
	The noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, cannot be with us this evening to contribute to this debate. I know that he would have relished the opportunity to have detailed his experiences first hand, as we would have relished hearing from him. However, I take this opportunity to thank him for the important work completed by the commission and pay tribute to him for the role that he played alongside his colleagues and for that commitment over the seven-year period of its existence.
	The commission's remit was to monitor and report on paramilitary activities, on security normalisation and on any claims that any Minister or party in the Northern Ireland Assembly was not committed to democratic means. Having completed its remit, the commission was formally dissolved on 31 March 2011.
	Tonight's debate, however, concerns the IMC's final report. I am sure your Lordships will be aware that it was very different from earlier ones. Rather than addressing the issues of paramilitary activity or security normalisation, the report focused on the changes that had taken place during the seven-year period of the commission's existence. It also provided its assessment of the factors that helped it to deliver its remit and the lessons learnt.
	The report is therefore a valuable document. It will be of interest to those who have been and continue to be involved in the peace and political process in Northern Ireland as well as to those who are involved in conflict transformation around the world. I am grateful to the IMC for this contribution and I am sure that it will be a document that has considerable longevity.
	Your Lordships will of course also be interested in the detail of the earlier reports, 20 of which covered paramilitary activity and the other five security normalisation. With the time available to me this evening, it is not possible to go into any great depth, but it is worth highlighting, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, how far the landscape in Northern Ireland has changed since the IMC's creation in 2003.
	The Provisional IRA's statement in July 2005, which announced the end of its armed conflict was, of course, a defining point. As the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, said, it was a "step of unparalleled magnitude". In response to that statement, the Government undertook their security normalisation programme. That process was to last two years.
	As I mentioned earlier, the IMC was obliged to report on that process. In September 2007, the commission published its 16th report, which confirmed that the Government had honoured their commitments and that the normalisation process was complete.
	I am sure you will agree that the IMC played a crucial part in supporting and enabling historic changes in Northern Ireland over the years. It has assisted Northern Ireland's transition to a peaceful, stable and inclusive society, and we should not forget that.
	Perhaps I may address the points raised by noble Lords. On paramilitary-related incidents, I can confirm to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that during the first six months of 2011, which is the period up to the final report, there were 30 paramilitary-style attacks and in the whole of 2011 there were 73. That compares with 94 in the whole of 2010. On 1 January 2012, 7,136 officers were employed by the PSNI, whereas in the previous July there were 7,197. So there are slightly fewer. However, the Government remain fully committed to ensuring that the PSNI has the necessary resources. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, referred to the fact that an additional £200 million has been put in by the British Government. Matt Baggott, the Chief Constable of the PSNI, has said that the service has,
	"the resources, the resilience and ... the commitment",
	to meet the threat.
	On the Secretary of State's undertaking to update the House regularly on threat levels, I can confirm that he has already done this in response to Oral Questions and other questions, but he will also make a Statement to Parliament in the coming weeks. I tried to go a little further, as the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, is also interested in this. The word "soon" is a good word and I shall have to stick to that, but I do not think that we will have to wait long for this further information. As she has indicated, work has to be done and this has to be prepared.
	The noble Baroness talked about progress towards a shared future. The Government will do all that we can to support the work of the Executive, especially in the key areas of rebalancing the economy and combating sectarianism, but the lead certainly has to come from Northern Ireland.
	There was fulsome praise from one or two noble Lords for the work of the IMC. Many noble Lords-the noble Lord, Lord Empey, got closest to this-asked whether the work is really done and whether it should have been kept going a bit longer. If noble Lords refer to the document, they will see that Article 16 states:
	"The Agreement shall continue in force until terminated by mutual agreement"-
	that is, the British and the Irish Governments mutual agreement, which was agreed on 4 November 2010. We must remember that monitoring the British Government's commitment to a package of security normalisation measures was dealt with and signed off, as it were, under Articles 4, 5 and 6. In addition, no party in the Northern Ireland Assembly has claimed that a Minister or Member has not committed to non-violence, so that has not been a consideration in seven years because no one has said, "This is someone we should be looking at". We therefore return to what has taken the most time: the continuing activity of paramilitary groups. That is the one area that obviously still causes concern, the other two areas having been dealt with.
	I have indicated that the British and Irish Governments have agreed that the agreement must come to an end, but if noble Lords look at page 55 of the 26th report, they will see that it is quite clear that the team at the IMC also takes that view. Article 15.1 states:
	"The institutions designed to facilitate transition to normality-of which we are one-are of their nature abnormal and Northern Ireland has reached a point when it is right for them to leave the stage".
	Clearly, the IMC has seen its work as monitoring the paramilitary groups that were linked to political organisations and believes that that has been achieved. The area that has not been achieved is calling a halt to dissident activity. The IMC and the Government are now saying that that is now a role for the law enforcement institutions of Northern Ireland.

Baroness O'Loan: With respect, I would like to point out that the report indicates that there is ongoing loyalist activity as well as ongoing republican activity.

Lord Shutt of Greetland: I do not know whether I said dissident republican-I think I said just said "dissident"-but if there is dissident activity, whether loyalist or republican, that is embraced in my remarks.
	Although it is not really a matter for this particular debate on the IMC, I understand the real concerns of the noble Baroness, Lady O'Loan, about dealing with the past. The Secretary of State intends to meet the political parties in Northern Ireland again to seek views on how consensus can be found. While this Government have a role to play, any successful outcome will be possible only if agreement is found within Northern Ireland.
	I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, that the 26th report is a really impressive document. It was a pleasure to read it in the sense that the team had really considered how the seven years had been spent. It may well be of interest to lots of people to understand how we came to undertake what we have been doing. I see the point that he makes.
	I think that I have covered most of the points. I clearly agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that stability is precious and that the economy is important. Of course, in her initial remarks, my noble friend Lady Harris raised the point about the incredible resources that come from the taxpayer to support Northern Ireland. Noble Lords will be aware of the work of my right honourable friend in the other place who has certainly taken the initiative in rebalancing the economy and on corporation tax. We discussed that on an earlier occasion.
	I think I am out of time and that I should conclude on that. If there is anything that I have not covered, I shall endeavour to write to noble Lords. In the words of us all, we thank the IMC for a piece of work well done.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
	21st Report from the Constitution Committee
	 22nd Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights
	21st Repors from the Delegated Powers Committee
	22nd Report from the Delegated Powers Committee

Committee (4th Day)(Continued)

Schedule 1 : Civil legal services
	Amendments 61 and 61ZA not moved.
	Amendment 61A
	 Moved by Baroness Butler-Sloss
	61A: Schedule 1, page 128, line 20, at end insert-
	"Victims of trafficking of human beings
	Civil legal services provided to a victim of trafficking in human beings ("V") in relation to-
	(a) rights to enter or remain in the UK;
	(b) an employment claim relating to the experience of trafficking;
	(c) a claim for damages relating to the experience of trafficking; or
	(d) compensation relating to the experience of being trafficked under the criminal injuries compensation scheme."

Baroness Butler-Sloss: My Lords, the Minister may be relieved to hear that these are the last two amendments in my name. They refer specifically to human trafficking, a very special part of the Bill. I declare an interest as the joint chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking. In moving Amendment 61A, I must also refer to Amendment 90A, which I hope noble Lords will consider to be self-evident from the wording.
	The European Union directive, which the Government have signed up to, to everyone's delight, has in Article 12(2) and Article 15(2) the requirement for legal aid provision and legal assistance. If the Minister will forgive me, I want to quote the words of Article 12(2), which are very similar to the words in Article 15(2), which deals with adults. The directive states:
	"Member States shall ensure that victims of trafficking in human beings have access without delay to legal counselling, and, in accordance with the role of victims in the relevant justice system, to legal representation, including for the purpose of claiming compensation. Legal counselling and legal representation shall be free of charge where the victim does not have sufficient financial resources".
	There is very similar wording on children in Article 15(2).
	The Government also signed the European convention prior to the European directive. Article 12(1)(d) requires a party-that is, the United Kingdom-to provide,
	"counselling and information, in particular as regards their legal rights ... in a language that",
	the victims of trafficking in persons can understand.
	That is the background to the four matters raised in the first of the two amendments, which aims to provide civil legal services to victims of trafficking in relation to rights to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, employment claims, claims for damages in the employment tribunal, damages in the county court or possibly the High Court, and compensation under the criminal injuries compensation scheme.
	The Immigration Minister in the other place, the right honourable Damian Green MP, suggested recently in answer to a question that victims of trafficking did not need legal aid. If he was including civil proceedings, then the Minister is mistaken. There are a number of situations in the civil and immigration areas of the law where legal aid and advice can continue to be vital for many victims, who will be disproportionately adversely affected by these cuts. They are, as noble Lords will know, a very special group of disadvantaged people. Amendment 61A would restore legal aid to victims of trafficking in the four specific areas that I have already mentioned.
	Between July and December of last year, something like 219 victims of trafficking were identified under the national referral mechanism. By no means would all of these require legal aid for the various areas that I am referring to. Some victims will require asylum while some will seek immigration status and not asylum; they will be trying to stay in the United Kingdom. However, there will be many others who wish to return home but want to make a claim against traffickers before they do so.
	The two main groups who will be affected by Amendment 61A are sex slaves-victims of sexual exploitation-and domestic slaves, who are caught in domestic labour situations. The group who have been sexually exploited would almost certainly be seeking damages in the county court if the traffickers have assets here, as some do. These traffickers are serious and well organised groups with a great deal of money available.
	The victims of labour exploitation are generally unpaid domestic servants who make their claims in the employment tribunal. The trafficker in those cases is very often an individual who has brought somebody in or employed somebody to whom he or she is not paying a single penny. They take their passport from them and make it impossible for them to leave the house. Those people are trafficked but in a different way. That sort of trafficker will have assets in this country and the employment tribunal can make orders in relation to them. I remind the Minister that it would be far preferable for victims to claim against traffickers than against the criminal injuries compensation scheme which relies, as everyone knows, on public money. How on earth are foreigners without legal advice and assistance, and with limited English, going to manage to get to the county court or the employment tribunal if these cuts take effect?
	At present, the effective system is that law centres with legal aid contracts take on an advisory role for these victims using legal aid. They get the case to the door of the county court or the employment tribunal. Marvellous pro bono lawyers, mainly barristers, then conduct the cases in the tribunal and sometimes in the county court. It is very interesting that employment tribunals are making large awards to victims of domestic exploitation-up to a quarter of a million pounds. These are far larger than those in the county court. I am told by the North Kensington Law Centre-which does the most excellent job-that if this legal aid is removed, the help will not be available and the traffickers will not be challenged by compensation claims. The only area that will retain legal aid will be claims for discrimination, which is not always the appropriate claim for a victim of human trafficking, whose main claim may be for five years of unpaid wages. I am told that a large number of these cases in the employment tribunal settle very early on for quite large sums and consequently cost very little money to the legal aid system.
	There is a further serious point. It is suggested that domestic visas may be withdrawn. The Government have said this, but I do not know whether they have yet made a decision. If they do withdraw domestic visas, women and children brought in to work in houses will be illegal immigrants. This area of trafficking will be uncontrolled and the employment tribunal will no longer be available. It will be most likely to affect children, because children can be brought into this country on education visas by fake parents or other relatives and then put to work, as they are already put to work as domestic slaves. It will be extremely difficult to stop this sort of slavery if the domestic visa is no longer available. Then, of course, these young people-or indeed adults-will be forced into the asylum system, which is already overloaded, rather than making claims and then returning home.
	A matter of particular concern is the proposed telephone gateway, which is the Government's idea-I do not mean that impolitely-or plan for how people can obtain help. Not all victims necessarily get processed through the NRM and they need to be otherwise identified as victims. As I understand it, the telephone operators will not be specialists. One would not expect that. However, a foreign victim of trafficking with little or no English, having escaped from an appalling situation of slavery, is not likely to be coherent or explicit on the telephone. He or she may say his or her passport has been withheld, or that he or she has not been paid, and probably does not know what to ask for-for example a claim for compensation or the right to remain until the claim has been processed. He or she is very unlikely to say he or she is a victim of trafficking, and is very unlikely to be identified by the telephone operator as a victim or to be referred to the appropriate specialist adviser with expertise in this field of trafficking. These are very complex cases-how on earth will the telephone operator cope? Victims are likely to fall through the net. This will be discrimination against those victims; in which case the United Kingdom will be failing in its obligations under the directive.
	I hope the Minister accepts that the Government have overlooked the effects of cuts upon this relatively small, special group of people. The wording of Amendment 61A could undoubtedly be improved, particularly in terms of identifying who is actually a victim of trafficking, but to penalise this group of seriously disadvantaged people would be contrary to the EU directive, the European convention and, perhaps more importantly, the Government's own excellent strategy document. I beg to move.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I support these amendments with great enthusiasm. The noble and learned Baroness referred to the convention, and at the end of her remarks she referred to the government strategy which I think was published in the middle of last year. That, as I read it, has two limbs: one is to deter and disrupt trafficking; and the other, quite explicitly, is improved victim identification and care. These amendments fall absolutely squarely within the strategy that has already been articulated.
	Trafficking by its nature is very largely hidden. It seems that as the unwilling but nevertheless host country in which victims find themselves, we have a number of duties. One of those duties is to enable these people to use the facilities of the state. The issues that have been listed in these amendments would fulfil that obligation. The noble and learned Baroness referred to migrant domestic workers. Those who may have been trafficked to work in cannabis farms or sometimes in restaurants-in the kitchens, not where you see them-would have similar sorts of claims. I do not want to repeat all the points that have been made or turn this into a hearts and flowers argument, as I see it as a matter of duty and central to what the Government have already identified.

Lord Howarth of Newport: I am in total sympathy with the amendments that the noble and learned Baroness has tabled, but I wanted to ask her whether she envisages that victims of trafficking who might make employment claims could also include people who are employed by gangmasters in conditions of well nigh slavery, fruit-picking or cockle-picking.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: I certainly saw the amendment as broad as that, and they may very well be able to do it through the employment tribunal. The great problem is that the employment tribunal will no longer have legal aid.

Lord Judd: I warmly commend the amendment, which I think will receive strong support from all parts of the House. The Bill in general is open to the awful charge of shifting the burden of our economic difficulties on to those who already in their lives face disproportionate difficulties and hardship. This is a particularly nasty and mean provision within that general strategy. These people are victims. They are not people who have just transgressed the law; they are victims of cruel, harsh and cynical treatment. If this country stands for anything, it must surely stand for ensuring that such people get some kind of justice after the experiences to which they have been exposed.

Lord Avebury: I would like to say a word on migrant domestic workers. First, I congratulate the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, on the wonderful work that she does on the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking, which has been influential on helping to shape government policy on trafficking, which has as she said made enormous strides in recent years.
	The particular case of migrant domestic workers is subject to a consultation being undertaken by the Home Office. From what I have heard, the Government are moving towards ending the special status of migrant domestic workers on the basis that, as the Home Office considers, employers who want to have domestic servants should employ people from the European Union and pay them the national minimum wage. This is a fantasy when you consider that many lawyers are at present already breaking the law by bringing in people under other headings, such as students, and then transferring them to domestic slavery.
	The particular case that has been drawn to our attention many times by Kalayaan, the organisation that defends the rights of migrant domestic workers, is that of people who bring in domestic workers as visitors accompanying them when they enter the country. They get leave to enter for six months, which in many cases is enough to meet the needs of the employer, but in some cases they remain on as overstayers after that period. If the Government move in the direction that I have suggested, there will be an enormous increase in the number of people brought in illegally by the employers in this way. They will really need the support that they can get only from having access to legal aid, because by definition if they manage to escape they will be destitute. They will have the support of NGOs such as Kalayaan, but without access to the courts they will be deprived of remedies that we think are their rights.
	I very much welcome the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Baroness and hope that if the Government cannot accept them in precisely the form as they are tabled today, they will find some way in which to meet this need.

Lord Bach: My Lords, we absolutely support the noble and learned Baroness in her amendments in this group. Very few crimes engender more opprobrium or anger both within and between Governments than crimes involving human trafficking. It is dispiriting that even today the illegal trade of people in this form still exists and perhaps even flourishes.
	As the noble and learned Baroness said, we should rightly be proud that the international community has worked together to promulgate the protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, adopted by the United Nations in Palermo in 2000. I am proud again that nine years later our country ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The noble and learned Baroness quoted from part of that convention. The quote that I have is from Article 15 of that convention, to which she referred. She quoted from Article 12, I think, but Article 15.2 says:
	"Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right to legal assistance and to free legal aid for victims under the conditions provided by its internal law".
	It goes on at paragraph 4 to say:
	"Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to guarantee compensation for victims in accordance with the conditions under its internal law, for instance through the establishment of a fund for victim compensation or measures or programmes aimed at social assistance and social integration of victims, which could be funded by the assets"-
	and it goes on to describe those assets. It is a pity that the Government have, so far at least, shown a somewhat less generous view of their obligations.
	The Government stated in their response to consultation on this matter:
	"There will be instances in which the Convention"-
	meaning the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings -
	"requires legal aid to be provided to victims of trafficking to fund their claims. However, we estimate that the volume of these cases is likely to be small and any obligation to provide legal aid will be met by the proposed new exceptional funding scheme that will provide legal aid where failure to do so would be likely to result in a breach of the individual's rights to legal aid under the Human Rights Act 1998".
	The feeling around the Committee seems to be, and I very much share it, that that approach on this matter is unacceptable. Neither is it worthy of our legal system and our commitment to access to justice. It is not enough to rely on the Human Rights Act 1998 and say that anything that might not be in breach of it is somehow okay.
	If legal aid is taken out of scope, it threatens to force victims of trafficking-acknowledged by the Government as some of the most vulnerable people in our country-to navigate an unfamiliar system in a language they may not understand, when they are almost certainly highly distressed and seeking legitimate redress against their persecutors. The noble and learned Baroness described the state of a number of those who had suffered in this way. To abandon them in the way that the Government intend, if this Bill were to go through unamended, for such small savings would be a violation of our positive obligations under the treaty and of our obligations under any sensible framework for deciding when the state should provide legal advice to those who need it.
	If I use an unparliamentary expression, forgive me, but this amendment really should be a no-brainer. Victims of trafficking deserve not just our compassion and help, but that of the state when they require it. If we take the Government's own analytical framework for decisions on scope for legal aid, this would seem to be a group that perfectly fits the criterion of a,
	"physically or emotionally vulnerable group".
	ILPA, the immigration lawyers' association, described this group as a kind of paradigm of that criterion and I hope that the Committee would agree.
	As far as the gateway to which the noble and learned Baroness referred in opening this short debate is concerned, it must always be remembered that the gateway is there only for matters that remain in scope. In any matters that come outside scope, the person who receives a phone call from a would-be client has to say, "I am sorry, this is not in scope". Maybe they will give the name of some solicitor or other but they will not be able to take it further themselves, because the matter is out of scope. How horrific it would be if this matter became out of scope, so that even when a telephone call was made-and that is not the most satisfactory way of doing it-they could not be helped.
	Secondly, some years ago the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, who is not in her place and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, among others, came and saw me about an issue in a criminal justice Bill that was going through this House which involved this sort of vulnerable victim. They asked us to take some action in regard to it. It was not to do with legal aid or anything like that, but I mention it because we listened to what they had to say. The arguments then were powerful; they are very powerful tonight on behalf of this group. I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord will at least take this away, and consider whether the Government cannot make what would be generally received as a very acceptable concession, if concession is the word, to the present wording of the Bill. Given all the difficulties the Government have and the criteria they set down, I ask them to reconsider their approach to this group of people. These are very powerful amendments indeed.

Baroness Hamwee: My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord has had the professional experience that I have had, where somebody who is faced with a claim which may result in quite a hefty award of compensation or damages against him finds that his mind is quite concentrated. That in itself is a very significant deterrent to continuing in the business, and trafficking is a business.

Lord Bach: I am afraid-or should I say that I am glad?-that my professional experience as a lawyer never included cases of this kind.

Baroness Hamwee: Not trafficking, but generally.

Lord Bach: In general terms, I am sure that the noble Baroness is right.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, indicated when speaking to her amendments that they were the last two that she had in this section. None the less, in dealing with vulnerable people, their importance was obvious by the end of the debate that they engendered. The more that I have learnt about human trafficking over the years, the more appalled and outraged I am by some of the abuses that go on. Various conventions have been acknowledged, such as the Council of Europe Action against the Trafficking of Human Beings, to which the previous Administration quite properly signed up.
	Amendments 61A and 90A intend to bring into scope particular areas of legal aid for victims of human trafficking. Amendment 61A would give the victims of such trafficking legal aid for immigration matters as well as for damages in compensation claims in relation to the experiences of trafficking before the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, the civil courts and the Employment Tribunal. Amendment 90A would allow for publicly funded advocacy for victims of human trafficking in cases that they bring before the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
	On the immigration element of Amendment 61A, the first point to make is a general one that was reflected in one or two contributions. In many cases, victims of trafficking want to return home. In some cases, though, they wish to claim asylum, and, for that, legal aid will remain. It is important that that point is made clear. There may be other occasions where they need to remain in the country, perhaps to help police with their investigations or on compassionate grounds if there are compelling reasons for that. There are provisions for victims to remain in these circumstances.
	As the Committee will know, the Government provide funding of some £2 million per year to the Salvation Army to provide support to victims of trafficking so that they can rebuild their lives. This includes signposting and informing victims of their rights to stay in the country, whether in the short or long term. However, we believe that specialist legal advice in respect of immigration on top of that is not required. Nevertheless, the Salvation Amy and its subcontractors signpost and inform victims of their legal rights.
	Government funding also helps to inform people about their options regarding compensation as a result of trafficking, whether through the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, the civil courts or the Employment Tribunal. Compensation orders, too, can be made at the end of a criminal trial.
	For the civil routes to compensation, which a number of contributions have revolved around, the Government made it clear in their response to the consultation on legal aid reform that the route for funding in these cases would be the exceptional funding scheme, and published guidance will reflect that. In fairness, the noble Lord, Lord Bach, acknowledged the Government's position, although he did not agree with it, and it would be unfortunate if this debate gave the impression that all avenues of funding have been cut off or withdrawn.
	The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked whether it would be possible to make claims against traffickers and whether those claims would be funded. The answer is yes-they are capable of being funded through exceptional funding. This is because the right to legal support for compensation claims, as set out in the convention, is with reference to the requirements of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and is therefore very much in line with the exceptional funding test. It is important to recognise that there is a route for funding for people who find themselves in these circumstances.
	Amendment 90A would allow for advocacy for victims of trafficking in employment appeal tribunals. The noble and learned Baroness raised the question of the consultation on visas for domestic workers, a point picked up by my noble friend Lord Avebury. My understanding is that a Home Office consultation has taken place; as far as I am aware, no response has yet been published, but I will certainly ask officials to ensure that the comments made on that important point are drawn to the attention of those at the Home Office who are dealing with the consultation.
	With regard to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, it has been observed that some very large awards can be made. Again, however, such cases would in principle be funded through the exceptional funding scheme if required by not only by the European Convention on Human Rights but European Union law. The exceptional funding scheme is available in these cases-it is not the case that support has been withdrawn. There are other means of support for those who have been trafficked. As I have said, the Salvation Army has made efforts to support and assist them. Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Butler-Sloss: My Lords, may I first thank noble Lords for their substantial and much appreciated support for these two amendments? The Government are undoubtedly to be congratulated on their strategy. They are also to be congratulated on opting in to the directive. It is the directive to which the Minister has just referred and it is the leading matter that we have to consider. The convention matters but the directive is part of English law and requires,
	"access without delay to legal counselling, and ... legal representation".
	I have to say that I am disappointed by the Minister's response. The Salvation Army, which got the contract for this work, is doing excellent work but it is expected to look after these women-they are generally women-for only up to 45 days. The fact that, out of the goodness of its heart, it keeps some of these people far beyond 45 days is not in the contract that the Government have with them. The Salvation Army is not in a position to put forward a case for exceptional funding, for instance. Until we see what sort of regulations and instructions are given to the director of legal aid about how he or she is to operate exceptional funding, I would be very unhappy that one can just say that any victim of trafficking who wanted to make a claim against traffickers, or against the CIB, has to go through the exceptional funding route. It may be extremely difficult to get into it and even more difficult to be recognised within it as someone who is in an exceptional position.
	Who is going to do that for a non-English person? We ought to look after our own people but we also ought to look after the people brought here against their will, or brought here misleadingly with promises that turn out not to be true. They are, in effect, dumped here or they escape. We have to look after them; we have a legal and moral duty to do so. Unless the Minister is able to say in due course that exceptional funding will specifically include claims by victims of human trafficking, his response will be inadequate. I should like him to go away and discuss with his advisers-and perhaps, as I asked a little earlier, with the Lord Chancellor-whether this very special and very small group of people should be specifically identified. I do not mind whether they are identified under exceptional funding or elsewhere, but they must not be left out on a limb. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 61A withdrawn.
	Amendment 62
	 Moved by Baroness Gould of Potternewton
	62: Schedule 1, page 129, line 14, leave out "indefinite"

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, in moving Amendment 62 I shall speak also to Amendments 63 to 67, 69A and 70A. I am delighted to follow the noble and learned Baroness and the previous debate. This is an added dimension, which also relates to a very small number of very vulnerable people. I shall try to explain it simply because it is complex but I will do so as well as I can, not being an expert an immigration rules, rather as the noble Lord, Lord McNally, is not an expert in the subject. However, there are principles here that it would have been impossible to avoid.
	I start with the purpose of Amendments 62 to 67. These six amendments need to be considered together. They extend the legal aid protection provided by paragraph 25 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to victims of domestic abuse whose immigration status is dependent on their abusive partner. Paragraph 25 currently provides for legal aid for migrant victims of domestic abuse whose leave to enter or remain is dependent on their relationship as the partner of a British citizen or person with indefinite leave to remain so that they may have legal aid to help them address the consequences to their immigration status of escaping the abusive relationship. These amendments would extend the same protection to migrant victims of domestic abuse whose immigration status is dependent on a partner who is exercising European free movement rights or on a partner who has limited leave to enter or remain. The Government have indicated that they are considering the first of these extensions-that related to European free movement rights-but not the second. I must add that the amendments stop short of providing legal aid in relation to immigration for any victim of domestic abuse but are restricted to those who are lawfully in the UK, where their lawful presence is dependent on that very relationship in which they are experiencing abuse.
	Several organisations, including Rights of Women, the National Federation of Women's Institutes, Southall Black Sisters and the Moroccan Women's Centre, have highlighted the situation of victims of domestic abuse who face being trapped in an abusive relationship because their immigration status is dependent on that relationship and they fear the immigration consequences of seeking to escape. However the Government have already amended the Bill to provide legal aid for some of these victims. For instance, it now provides for victims who are dependent on British citizens and settled persons. The Government have agreed to give further consideration to other victims as yet left out of the Bill, such as those dependent on European Economic Area nationals and others exercising free movement rights, those dependent on migrants with limited leave to enter or remain and those dependent on migrants whose status is irregular. Each of these classes of victim face the same or similar difficulties to the class of victim for whom the Government have now made provision in the Bill. Those difficulties were described by the Minister for Legal Aid. He said:
	"There is a real risk that, without legal aid, people will stay trapped in abusive relationships out of fear of jeopardising their immigration status. The type of trauma that they might have suffered will often make it difficult to cope with such applications. We also appreciate that people apply under great pressure of time, and access to a properly designated immigration adviser is a factor".-[Official Report, Commons, Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Committee, 19/7/11; col. 245.]
	Therefore, the Minister identified four factors relevant to why legal aid should be provided in the cases to which he was referring: the risk that the victims will stay trapped in abusive relationships for fear of jeopardising their immigration status; the trauma they may have suffered which often makes it difficult to cope with the application; time pressures that apply to immigration proceedings; and difficulties of access to a properly designated immigration adviser. These factors are borne out in that domestic abuse-related immigration applications are far from straightforward.
	Further, the exclusion of some victims from legal aid offends the Government's own factors which they identify as needing to be taken into account. They include the fact that the UK Border Agency's record in dealing with these cases is especially poor with some 61 per cent to 69 per cent of refusals being overturned on appeal; the gathering and presentation of evidence, with associated costs and risks, is often necessary for success; many applications are, sometimes wrongly, refused by the UK Border Agency on the grounds of inadequate evidence; to escape abusive relationships victims need to understand the implications for their immigration status; victims need immigration advice; only regulated advisers can provide this advice and without advice and assistance many victims will not find the confidence to escape their abuser. The Bill risks the undesirable outcome that victims of domestic abuse will remain, with their children, in abusive relationships for fear of the immigration consequences of escaping those relationships. The fact that the Government have decided to deal with some aspects but not all for people in this situation adds to the confusion. I hope that the Minister will clarify that. However, I genuinely believe that Amendments 62 to 67 would overcome the problematic and dangerous outcomes that will occur due to the present state of the Bill.
	I turn now to Amendments 69A and 70A that together would ensure that those who have experienced gender-based violence are able to access immigration advice and representation and are not placed at risk of experiencing further violence and abuse. The amendments would protect children, victims of domestic violence and trafficking, as well as other groups who are at risk of gender-based exploitation such as migrant domestic workers to whom the noble and learned Baroness referred. They would also protect others whose ability to represent themselves in an immigration law issue is impaired because of their age, illness or disability.
	The amendments would also confer a power to specify other classes of persons in regulations. The "specified person", as referred to in Amendment 70A would include children, victims of trafficking and victims of gender-based violence-men as well as women. The Government made the decision to bring back into scope legal aid for victims of domestic violence applying for indefinite leave to remain in the UK under the domestic violence rule-rule 189A of the Immigration Rules. Announcing that decision, the Minister for Legal Aid, said,
	"There is a real risk that, without legal aid, people will stay trapped in abusive relationships out of fear of jeopardising their immigration status".-[Official Report, Commons Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Committee, 19/7/11; col. 245.]
	How that can be said over and over again and yet not followed through, I find difficult to accept.
	The concerns raised by the Minister apply equally to other vulnerable applicants in immigration cases who have experienced or are at risk of violence and abuse, who simply cannot be expected to represent themselves in applications effectively because of the trauma they have experienced. These include individuals who have been trafficked into the UK for the purposes of sexual or other exploitation, and migrant domestic workers-many of whom, as the noble and learned Baroness said, are trafficked into this country and are extremely vulnerable to exploitation and abuse because of the invisible nature of their work that takes place in private households, and who, because of their dependency on their employers for their work, accommodation and immigration status, can be exploited by their employers and find themselves in a very similar position to victims of domestic violence.
	I am told that there were around 15,000 migrant domestic workers issued with a visa to work in the UK in 2010. I am horrified to hear that there might be a move to remove their right to a visa. Research shows that 41 per cent of migrant domestic workers cite abuse or exploitation as their reason for changing their employer, but under the Bill legal aid will not be available for them to seek advice on how to regularise their immigration status or, if they wish, to change their employer.
	Equally, victims of domestic violence whose immigration status may not be dependent on maintaining an abusive relationship with their spouse may also be vulnerable to remaining in a violent relationship if they cannot access legal aid to regularise its immigration status. Rights of Women indicates that it receives many calls to their immigration and asylum law advice line from women whose leave is not dependant on their spouses, yet their insecure immigration status is still used by the perpetrator as a tool of control.
	All these cases raise complex issues and affect particularly vulnerable women whose fundamental human rights, including the right to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment, are at risk. Yet what sets these cases apart from other areas of law is that there are no alternative advice providers because it is a criminal offence for anyone to give immigration advice or services unless they are qualified to do so. Removal of legal aid for the cases such as those I have identified will place women at greater risk of violence and prevent those with valid legal reasons for remaining in the UK being able to access and benefit from their legal rights.
	This is not a marginal problem, because between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2011 there were 1,481 referrals to the National Referral Mechanism, the national framework for the identification of human trafficking in the UK. We know that, in reality, the figure for individuals trafficked is likely to be higher. A further implication of the Bill is that they will not be eligible for legal aid because of the implications of being referred into the national referral mechanism, and therefore their informed consent for referral may be questioned.
	My information from Rights of Women is that it hears countless testimonies from women whose immigration status, which is often reliant on their abusers, has restricted their ability to leave a violent situation and access the advice and support services that they need.
	Without legal advice and representation, domestic violence victims, migrant domestic workers and trafficked victims remain reliant on misinformation from their abusers about their legal rights and status and are trapped and dependent upon violent relationships, placing their lives at risk. The amendments together would ensure that those who have experienced violence are able to access legal aid for immigration advice and representation.
	For too many women, their insecure immigration status is still used by the perpetrator as a tool of control. That cannot be justified. The amendments would eliminate that position. I beg to move.

Baroness Gale: My Lords, I speak in support of the amendments and thank my noble friend Lady Gould for speaking to this group in such a comprehensive manner. What we are discussing today is not whether we should have more or fewer immigrants; rather, the matter at hand is whether legitimate migrants are able to exert their rights.
	Amendments 62 to 67 work together to extend the availability of legal aid for immigration matters. The Government have proposed that legal aid will be available to a person seeking indefinite leave to remain after suffering domestic abuse by their partner. Furthermore, their partner must be present and settled in the United Kingdom. My noble friend Lady Gould's amendments would extend that to someone who is seeking any form of leave to remain, and their partner would not necessarily need to be present and settled in the United Kingdom. So they only fractionally extend the coverage to ensure that all women who suffer domestic abuse and try to escape will be given the protection they need. A failure to accept the amendments would mean that some women might feel trapped in an abusive relationship, wanting to escape from it but knowing that, because they slip through the Ministry of Justice's legislative cracks, they would not get the help that they would need.
	Amendments 69A and 70A would extend legal aid to immigration matters relating to entering or remaining in the country for three classes of persons: those under 18; those who have been subjected to gender-based violence; and those unable to represent themselves due to a physiological or psychological condition. Amendments 69B and 70B would extend legal aid to immigration matters relating to entering or remaining in the country for those under 18.
	We support all the amendments. I am pleased that my party's position is that immigration matters should remain in the scope of legal aid to the same extent that they are now. That forms part of our overall commitment to keeping social welfare legal aid fully in scope by re- tendering criminal legal aid contracts in line with our 22 March 2010 paper, Restructuring the Delivery of Criminal Defence Services. Unamended, the Government's approach means that significant cracks will form in the provision of immigration law legal aid. Many claimants with very good cases will fail to exert their rights legitimately because of the current proposals' failures. My noble friend Lady Gould's package of amendments clearly demonstrates one of these cracks.
	A failure to accept the amendments might mean that people could be forced into accepting domestic abuse for fear of losing their children, their friends and the life they live in the United Kingdom. It could be regarded as a charter for abusers because of the difficulties that women will face in removing themselves from an abusive relationship. It will lead to chaos in the immigration system. Legal aid advice and representation oil the system, allowing interactions to occur professional to professional. Our system, which some would regard as creaking under the weight of poor decision-making and a high volume of cases, cannot afford this kind of radical deprofessionalisation.
	I have one final, quite specific question for the Minister. Will Clause 9 funding be available for vulnerable children in complex immigration cases? The Government's long-standing position is that Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to immigration, and I believe that that would prevent these cases ever being funded under Clause 9. This ties in somewhat with Monday's debate on the needs of young people.
	I urge the Minister to listen to what has been said tonight. Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord McNally, proved to be in a listening mood when he replied to the debate on domestic violence and child abuse. The aim of this amendment is perhaps of a similar nature in that it deals with women suffering from domestic abuse. Therefore, I urge the Minister to continue in the vein of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, this afternoon when he said that he was prepared to listen-and indeed it seemed to me from his responses that he was listening. I hope that the Minister will continue to listen tonight. Noble Lords who have put their names to this group of amendments should be confident that if the Minister does not listen, we would support the amendments if they were brought forward at a future date, and we would take our own position on the provision of immigration law legal aid.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, first, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gould of Potternewton, for introducing the amendments, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, who encouraged me to listen. I hope to indicate later that in some respects we have already been listening.
	Amendments 62 to 67 propose to make an amendment to paragraph 25 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. This paragraph provides for those applying for indefinite leave to remain on the grounds that they have limited leave to enter or remain as a partner of another individual present and settled in the United Kingdom and that the relationship has broken down permanently as a result of abuse. Such matters are to be within the scope of legal aid. The arguments regarding partnerships which have broken up and the power relationship that can result were very well made.
	Amendment 62 seeks to extend the scope of legal aid to those applying for "leave to remain" as opposed to "indefinite leave to remain". Amendment 65 seeks to remove the need for a person's partner to be present and settled in the United Kingdom, and Amendments 66 and 67 are consequential amendments, removing the definitions of "indefinite leave to remain" and "present and settled in the United Kingdom". We do not believe that these amendments are necessary. The provision as currently worded in the Bill is directly linked to Rule 289A of the Immigration Rules, which deals with applications for indefinite leave to remain by victims of domestic violence on a limited spousal visa. This is deliberate: other than via the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, the appropriate route for someone to apply would be through the Immigration Rules. Where the person's partner has only a temporary form of residence, it is not clear that they intend, or indeed whether they would have a right, to reside more permanently in the country. As such, we do not believe that these cases require funding.
	Amendments 63 and 64 relate to partners of EEA nationals, known as third-country nationals, and are similar to an amendment raised in the House of Commons-I think that the noble Baroness mentioned the debate that took place there either in Committee or on Report. These amendments are intended to bring within the scope of civil legal aid services applications from partners of EEA nationals who require confirmation of their right to reside in the United Kingdom where their relationship has broken down permanently as a result of domestic violence, as well as any subsequent appeal. EEA nationals and their family members, if from a third country, have a long-term right to reside in the United Kingdom if they are economically active or are able to support themselves without becoming an unreasonable burden on public funds.
	The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 make provision for family members to remain in the United Kingdom; that is that their right to reside can continue if they cease to be a family member of an EEA national because their marriage or civil partnership, on the basis of which they are a family member of an EEA national, breaks down as a result of domestic violence. The application is different for those people who apply for indefinite leave to remain under the domestic violence provisions in the Immigration Rules, where the rules that apply are different.
	Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, and as my honourable friend, Mr Djanogly, has said, we will look further at this point. I indicated earlier that we believe that some of the initial concerns raised are covered and we do not believe that the amendments are necessary. However, it is only reasonable, in the light of what was said by the noble Baroness, Lady Gale, that we ensure that we have addressed the points which she made in that regard.
	Amendments 69A and 70A deal with making legal aid available to certain categories of vulnerable persons for immigration matters. I think there are another two amendments in this group which have not been moved but I shall try to deal with them. Part of Amendment 70A -that which seeks to cover those persons who have suffered domestic violence at the hands of spouses or partners-is already covered by the Bill at paragraph 25 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, where the application for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom meets the requirements of that paragraph. We decided that, on reflection, the issues faced by those facing domestic violence was such that special provision should be made for them. Without legal aid, there is a real risk that such people will remain trapped in an abusive relationship for fear of jeopardising their immigration status. Furthermore, they have only a limited window in which to submit their immigration application when they leave their partners and after that period their access to public funds ceases. However, these factors do not apply to other categories of vulnerable persons that have been suggested in the amendments.
	As we have indicated on numerous occasions in these debates, we believe that we should target legal aid on those who need it most. In general, we want to prioritise asylum cases, which can be about life and death, over immigration cases. I do not deny for a moment the importance of such cases to the individuals concerned, but they do not raise the same issues.
	Children will not normally be applicants in asylum and immigration cases, as they are usually considered as part of their parents' application. Child applicants are much more likely in asylum cases, for which, of course, legal aid will remain available. Most immigration claims are straightforward and, in the majority of cases, we expect the child, with the help of a guardian, to be able to complete the process without recourse to specialist help. The noble Baroness, Lady Gale, asked about children's applications, their interaction with Article 6 and whether exceptional funding would be available. The answer, as I think she anticipated, is that it would not. The position in the Bill is that exceptional funding should be granted only where it is required by law; that is that denying legal aid would risk a breach of an individual's rights under EU law or the ECHR. Case law has been consistent: that immigration cases do not, as she indicated, involve such a determination and, as such, exceptional funding would not be available.
	I have sought to try to give some reassurances and I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: I thank the Minister for his reply. In some ways, I am partially encouraged by the reply but I also find it extremely complex. I need to go away and read it very carefully and then I shall be able to answer whether I am satisfied or not. In the light of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 62 withdrawn.
	Amendments 63 to 67 not moved.
	Amendment 68
	 Moved by Lord Avebury
	68: Schedule 1, page 130, line 8, after "Kingdom" insert "to a person who is liable to detention under immigration laws, or"

Lord Avebury: My Lords, these amendments, supported by the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association, which assisted in their drafting, were tabled to draw attention to and to remedy the inconsistency of the Government in claiming to protect legal aid for people whose liberty is at stake, while denying those who are liable to detention, pending their removal or deportation, the means to assert their claim before the tribunal constituted for that purpose.
	Paragraphs 22 to 24 of Schedule 1 allow a person who is detained under the Immigration Act to obtain legal aid to challenge their detention but not to contest the reasons for the refusal of their application for leave to remain. Over the past several years, more than one-quarter of appeals against refusal have been granted; the decision-making process is obviously seriously flawed. If the Government want to reduce spending on legal aid for immigration appeals they should concentrate on improving the quality of the UK Border Agency's decisions. Until now, those with genuine claims have had a reasonable chance of asserting their rights because they have been able to get legal aid. However, when Schedule 1 comes into effect, there is absolutely no doubt that some people who are entitled to remain here will be deported unlawfully.
	Among the many reasons given by respondents who were against the proposal to deprive applicants of legal aid in all immigration proceedings were the complexity of immigration legislation, the inequality of arms between the state and the individual applicant, the fact that many applicants would have little if any understanding of English law and the fact that English might not be their first language. The Government summarily dismissed all the respondents' arguments in three short paragraphs. They said that individuals in immigration cases should be capable of dealing with their immigration application and should not require a lawyer. If it is so easy to decide how to pursue immigration applications, why have Citizens Advice staff been instructed not to give advice on them but to take down the facts and send them to a solicitor?
	The Immigration Law Practitioners' Association gives four examples of cases where the claimant would have been removed if the courts had not intervened. Two of the cases went all the way to the House of Lords. I will not detain the Committee by reading the details of the cases in full, but I invite the Minister to agree that in the first case-I assume that he received the note from ILPA-the trial judge found that the appellant, a Dutch national of Somali origin, would have been deported to Somalia or held in detention indefinitely under the Immigration Act but for the efforts of his solicitor.
	In the second case, the High Court ordered the release of an individual who had been detained unlawfully for 11 months under a secret Home Office policy when there was no realistic prospect of deporting him. In the third case, the House of Lords ruled that it would rarely be proportionate to remove a person if there was a close bond with his or her spouse, who could not be expected to follow them to their country of origin, or if the effect of the removal order would be to sever a genuine and subsisting relationship between the person and their child. In the final example, the appellant was a woman from Zimbabwe who was married to a British citizen, by whom she had a child. The Home Office had decreed that she had to return to Zimbabwe and make an application to come here as a spouse.
	In these four cases and many others, it would have been extremely unlikely-I dare say impossible for the two people whose cases went to the House of Lords-for the two appellants to have succeeded without legal aid. Again, I invite my noble friend to agree with that proposition. Will he also acknowledge that cases where someone is liable to detention with a view to their removal or deportation and passes the merits threshold for legal aid are among the most serious that come before the courts? If so, it cannot be denied that among them are instances of the most egregious errors by the state, extending to the wrongful removal of British citizens who have the right of abode in the UK.
	The importance of the issues at stake, such as the absence of any alternative source of funding or of any other means of resolving claims that the individual may even be incapable of formulating without professional advice, cries out against their removal from the scope of legal aid. So, too, does the risk of unintended and perverse effects such as an increase in asylum claims by people who would have had valid reasons to ask for leave to remain on other grounds, the need to accommodate and make allowance for an increase in the number of litigants in person, and the damage to the viability of practitioners who serve mainly asylum clients through the loss of their work on other immigration cases. It is certain that meritorious claims will be lost because the applicant is not legally aided, although official statistics on appeals do not separately identify those with representation and those without either at the stage of first decision by the UKBA or on appeal. The Ministry of Justice conducted a survey of litigants in person which concluded:
	"Most evidence ... indicated that case outcomes were adversely affected",
	and:
	"The weight of the evidence indicated that lack of representation generally had a negative effect on case outcomes".
	In November 2011, the Civil Justice Council published a report on litigants in person and access to justice making recommendations on the basis that Schedule 1 remained intact. The authors warned:
	"Even if all the recommendations we make are acted upon, they will not prevent the reality that ... as a result of the reductions and changes in legal aid, there will be a denial of justice".
	The Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, in its devastating response to the consultation on the Government's legal aid proposals, drawing on the previous study by the Legal Services Commission, found:
	"In mental health and immigration, where issues are highly complex and representation is often required, the success rate is over 60%".
	The council quotes evidence of the glaring disparity in the social security and child support tribunal between the success rates of litigants who are represented and unrepresented. They are 55 per cent and 28 per cent respectively. Although, unfortunately, there are no equivalent statistics for the immigration tribunal, it concludes that throughout the administrative justice system:
	"If the proposals are pursued then the Government lays itself wide open to allegations that the withdrawal of legal aid is designed both to reduce the number of appeals ... in general, even where they would probably be successful".
	As regards immigration issues in particular:
	"The AJTC also notes the extraordinary complexity of immigration law and takes issue with the assertion that 'individuals will generally be able to represent themselves'".
	It says:
	"It is essential that appellants are properly advised and prepared before facing a highly complex process with potentially life-changing consequences".
	Detainees are uniquely and materially disadvantaged in presenting their own cases, being isolated and incapable of gathering evidence, such as witness statements, and having no funds to pay for telephone charges, registered post or the copying of documents. The AJTC goes on to conclude:
	"For all of these reasons",
	of which I have mentioned just a few, it,
	"strongly opposes the removal of legal aid for immigration advice".
	Finally, I turn to the distinction made between detention and the underlying immigration matter. Hardly any of the respondents to the consultation challenged the decision to retain legal aid in relation to detention, but some experts, notably ILPA, disputed the Government's assertion that legal aid providers would be able to distinguish between advice on detention and on the underlying reasons for the detention. It said:
	"Challenging immigration detention is necessarily and intrinsically linked to challenging the underlying immigration decision which is both the cause of, and justification for, detention".
	This needs to be spelled out for the record.
	In the case Lumba and Mighty, Lord Dyson, giving the lead judgment said that,
	"it is clearly right that, in determining whether a period of detention has become unreasonable in all the circumstances, much more weight should be given to detention during a period when the detained person is pursuing a meritorious appeal than to detention during a period when he is pursuing a hopeless one".
	The merits of the appeal are directly relevant to the lawfulness of immigration detention. If the appeal is ultimately likely to be successful, the grounds for detention, which are to effect removal, must be commensurately weaker. If the detention is at the earlier stage where the person's entitlement to enter the UK is being investigated, the same principle applies. The solicitor who advises him on the lawfulness of his detention at that point would have to look into the merits of the application for leave to enter because that would be the only practical reason for challenging his detention.
	I really hope the Government will think again about denying legal aid to immigration detainees and instead address the abysmal standards of decision-making by the UKBA, thus reducing the wholesale cost of the detention system and the administrative and legal costs of tribunals, and saving far more than they will by depriving meritorious immigrants of access to justice. I beg to move.

Lord Bach: My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, has made a very powerful case for the amendment that he has so ably moved. We support it from the opposition Front Bench, very much for the reason that he was arguing in the latter part of his speech: the complete mismatch between being allowed to get legal aid to get advice on detention but not being able to get any advice as to the underlying reasons why an individual is detained.
	The Government are quite right to have recognised that legal aid is crucial when an individual's liberty is at stake, and we see that principle in existence here in their preparedness to allow someone who is in detention to get legal advice to challenge that detention. However, how on earth can they challenge that detention-and this is the point the noble Lord was making-without also getting legal advice as to the underlying cause of that detention? It does not look as though this could work properly in practice. The Government are trying to hold fast to two principles: that an individual's liberty demands legal aid advice; but, when that matter is looked into, the reason behind their loss of liberty cannot be advised on in the same way. The noble Lord, Lord Avebury, is quite right: some really serious mistakes will go uncorrected if this provision goes through.
	To make the point absolutely clearly-and this is the point that ILPA seems to have made-challenging immigration detention is inextricably linked to challenging the immigration decision that forms the justification for detention. If the Government want to help those detained wrongly-presumably they do; no one wants to have people detained wrongly-it is pretty self-evident that they should deal with the underlying problems. A failure to do so will simply mean a return to detention-a complete waste, frankly, of public money.
	Although I have been brief, we on this side believe that the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, and the others who signed the amendment have a very good point. I would like the Minister to explain to the Committee how these provisions can actually work in practice. It looks as though there is a serious mismatch between what they will and will not allow legal aid for in this field.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Avebury for moving his amendment, which relates to issues of immigration and detention. Amendments 68 and 70 would bring into scope of legal aid several legal services in relation to rights to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for anyone who is liable to be detained under the immigration powers.
	As a preliminary to his arguments my noble friend suggested that, if the Government wished to save money, we should tackle the UKBA's decision-making. The UKBA already has a wide-ranging improvement programme under way to continue to improve the quality of its decision-making in asylum and entry claims and in points-based systems, although I would be the first to acknowledge that in any programme like that there is always scope for improvement.
	The amendment would cover those who have been refused leave to enter or remain. It would also, however, cover persons "liable to detention" pending examination while the decision to grant leave to enter is taken, or while on temporary admission pending deportation under Schedule 3 or under the auto-deport provisions in the UK Borders Act-that is where the words "liable to be detained" appear-and where removal action has been taken against them as overstayers.
	As has been said in relation to a number of issues, not least earlier today in relation to immigration issues, tough decisions have to be taken and choices made about the scope of legal aid. Nevertheless, we are being clear that where issues of liberty are at stake, legal aid should be available, subject to the means and merits tests. That is why this Bill provides that when someone is detained under the immigration powers to detain, as referred to in paragraph 22 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, legal aid will still be available to challenge their detention. The amendment however would go well beyond that principle.
	Both my noble friend Lord Avebury and the noble Lord, Lord Bach, asked how one might distinguish between immigration detention and the underlying reasons. Under the current legal aid scheme, solicitors have to deal with mixed cases where some elements of the case are in scope and some are out of scope. That is dealt with through guidance, and further guidance will be made available setting out what solicitors can and cannot do under legal aid.
	It is absolutely clear that it will be necessary for them to understand the immigration background of their client in detention. Legal aid will not cover advice on an appeal on the matter of the substance of the immigration decision but it does not preclude taking action to secure a client's liberty. My noble friend mentioned a case that had been raised by ILPA involving someone who might be deported to Somalia. There had been difficulties in removing the person to Somalia and it was expected that that person could be detained for some considerable time. Clearly, in such a situation it would be possible to challenge detention and legal aid would remain if the UKBA had no realistic prospect of removal within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the amendment takes us well beyond the situation of liberty. The phrase in the amendment, "liable to detention", covers those who are not detained.
	Amendments 68 and 70 would bring back into scope legal aid in relation to rights to enter and remain for any immigration case where a negative decision has been made, or for anyone "liable to detention" pending examination of our decision to grant leave to enter that is taken while on temporary admission pending deportation and when removal action is taken against overstayers, as opposed to being focused on those cases where the individual's liberty is at stake. Were the amendment to be passed, it would have a significant impact. Our proposals regarding immigration will bring an estimated £20 million saving. We do not believe-I have indicated that it is not easy and that it is tough-that that is appropriate in these circumstances.
	Immigration cases are generally about whether the facts of a particular case meet the Immigration Rules and are generally heard in tribunals, which are designed to allow people to represent themselves. It is important that, as well as indicating that issues affecting the liberty of the individual are within scope, the Bill makes legal aid available too to asylum seekers and those seeking protection for human rights' reasons. It also makes legal aid available in relation to matters concerning accommodation for asylum seekers and in immigration cases, as I have said, where the person's liberty is at stake.
	There are of course other categories where legal aid will be available. Immigration matters relating to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the domestic violence immigration rule will remain in scope as well as advocacy in the Upper Tribunal in such cases. Immigration judicial reviews are in scope, subject to some exceptions, and it is intended to focus legal aid on those who need it; that is, those seeking protection in the UK where persons may be at risk of persecution or torture if returned to an unsafe country or where a person's liberty is at stake.
	It has been a question of trying to prioritise and to focus help on those who need it most in the most serious cases. It is these cases where we believe that legal aid representation is justified. I anticipate that that will not satisfy my noble friend but I hope that he will understand that, in trying to address these issues, we have sought to give priority in cases such as asylum and where the liberty of the individual is at stake. In doing so, I hope he agrees that these are appropriate judgments. The consequence has been that it has not been possible to include within scope a much wider range of immigration cases. I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Avebury: In one respect, I can agree entirely with my noble and learned friend and that is that I am wholly dissatisfied with his reply, as he expected. If we are helping those who need help most, who could be possibly be higher on the list than somebody who has been detained and is therefore incapable of conducting his case effectively? As I said-my noble and learned friend did not address this point-how does he get in touch with witnesses and how does he get the money for the telephone calls, for duplicating of papers and for all the rest of the preparatory work that needs to be done in formulating a proper appeal?
	Nor did my noble and learned friend address my point that there were likely to be more cases where a person was unjustifiably refused if he did not have representation-and that comes from the figures. We know that in other types of case there is a much higher percentage of success where the appellant is represented than in cases where he conducts the case himself. The same figures would be seen if it was possible to distinguish between the two categories in immigration cases. Therefore, it follows that if people do not have representation when they are in detention, more of them will unlawfully be sent back to the countries of their origin. I think that my noble and learned friend missed the point that I made in relation to the case of the Dutch citizen of Somali origin who was threatened with deportation but was able to get representation. The solicitor showed that it would have been unlawful to report him because he was not a Somali citizen but a Dutch citizen of Somali origin. If he had been able to appeal only against his detention, it would have to be a two-stage process. Would my noble and learned friend not agree that he would first have to obtain his liberty and then get a solicitor to point out to the tribunal that he was not liable to deportation because the UKBA had falsely assumed he was a Somali citizen?
	I am most grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for the amendments. As he said, there is a complete mismatch between the facts that a person can obtain legal aid for his detention but not for the underlying reasons for the detention in the first place. I see that we will have to return to this subject on Report and I shall have to discuss what we do about it with ILPA and our other advisers. For the time being, I have no alternative but to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 68 withdrawn.
	Amendment 69
	 Moved by Lord Thomas of Gresford
	69: Schedule 1, page 130, line 12, at end insert-
	"(1A) Civil legal services provided to an individual for a matter arising out of any rule laid down under section 1(4) of the Immigration Act 1971 making provision for family members to enter or remain in the United Kingdom as the family member of a refugee or beneficiary of humanitarian protection."

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, I must apologise to my noble and learned friend for failing to address this issue when it was listed at an earlier stage. Amendment 69 is also supported by the Immigration Law Practitioners' Association, which does such tremendous work in this very difficult field and not for any great return. It is to be commended.
	Amendment 69 would retain legal aid for applications and appeals by family members of refugees and family members of those who are found to be at risk of serious harm such as torture but are not granted humanitarian protection for a refugee convention reason. The legal aid would be for applications and appeals for those reunited with a refugee recognised in the United Kingdom. When a person is recognised as a refugee or granted humanitarian protection, they are entitled under the Immigration Rules to apply to have certain family members, spouses, partners and minor children to join them. Such persons may themselves be living in danger in the country of origin, may be refugees themselves or may be living in a precarious situation in a third country. There are considerable parallels with asylum cases, which remain within scope. Without this special provision in the rules, refugees would have to wait until they were settled to have their families join them and would have to fulfil additional criteria.
	Someone who is granted humanitarian protection is at risk for some other reason than the refugee, who is at risk by reason of,
	"race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion".
	These cases concern family reunion for persons whose applications for international protection have been found to be well founded and to whom the United Kingdom's protection has been extended. The UNHCR stated in a report published in June 2010:
	"Family reunification plays a significant role in meeting the long-term needs of resettled refugees ... The family is often the strongest and most effective emotional, social and economic support network for a refugee making the difficult adjustment to a new culture and social framework".
	When in another place my right honourable friend Simon Hughes urged the Government to bring refugee family reunion back into scope for legal aid in this Bill, the Minister with responsibility for legal aid then acknowledged that these cases can be complex. He said that he would look further into those cases. That was an assertion made in another place and we are hoping that we will hear a little more on that in this Chamber.
	Several factors contribute to the complexity of these cases and the need for legal aid to be retained. First, as my noble friend Lord Avebury and others have pointed out, the United Kingdom Border Agency's record in dealing with these applications has been especially poor. Some 61 per cent to 66 per cent of refusals are overturned on appeal. It is a terrible result for a government department that 61 per cent of its decisions are found to be wrong. Secondly, the often precarious situations of applicant families overseas and the distress and trauma of sponsoring refugees in the UK mean that they are particularly ill placed to make and pursue applications by themselves in British consulates in other countries.
	The United Kingdom Border Agency also frequently disputes family relationships and accordingly many applications are protracted and evidentially complex. It alleges bad faith that the person concerned is not related. But the UK Border Agency loses 61 per cent of its cases. On appeal, the immigration judge is confined by the evidence presented to him, however careful he may be to treat litigants in person. Of course, when you are dealing with applicants who are abroad, the hearing is restricted by the absence of the family members at the appeal hearing. They are still overseas and therefore cannot be called to give evidence. Continued separation is a major obstacle to a refugee's integration into the United Kingdom.
	Refugee family reunion applications are complicated by the fact that not all applications are permitted to be made under the rules. Child refugees cannot secure family reunion and must rely on applications made outside the rules. There are all sorts of complex problems relating to family members. At the end of the day, it prevents the person who has been accepted and is able to enjoy the protection of this country from settling down and becoming integrated into our society.
	Amendment 71 deals with matters that we have already covered. It is almost an omnibus provision that deals with refugee family reunion, on which I have just addressed your Lordships, to immigration matters concerning trafficking victims, which we addressed before the dinner break, and onward appeals relating to immigration-a matter that I raised at the outset of the Committee deliberations. I beg to move, and I trust that my noble and learned friend will have his responses ready.

Lord Avebury: I warmly support my noble friend in this amendment. I reinforce what he has already said by reference to a note issued by the UNHCR dated November 2011, which I presume has been drawn to the attention of my noble and learned friend the Minister. Has he been approached directly by the UNHCR on these matters? If so, what was his response? I very much look forward to hearing from him. He is nodding, which I presume means-

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I was trying to indicate that I did not pick up what my noble friend said. I would be grateful if he could he repeat the question.

Lord Avebury: I was saying that I hope that this note, which we have all received from the UNHCR, has been sent by the UNHCR representative in the United Kingdom to noble Lords on the Front Bench. I look forward very much to knowing how they have replied.
	As my noble friend has already pointed out, the UNHCR is concerned because, although the safeguarding of asylum seekers' access to legal aid is being retained, it is worried about the way in which the Bill limits access to legal aid for families of refugees who seek to rejoin their family members in the United Kingdom. The UNHCR notes with concern that,
	"the current proposals exclude legal aid for family members of persons who have been recognised as refugees or people who have been granted humanitarian protection".
	I cannot think of a more powerful agency to make representations of this kind than the UNHCR. It almost goes as far as to say that it is a breach of the refugee convention to deny legal aid to the family members. As my noble friend pointed out, the UNHCR believes that,
	"reunification of the family unit plays an important role in ensuring the protection and well-being of individual members of a refugee family".
	It goes on to describe the adverse consequences that may follow from the denial of legal aid for these purposes.
	One point on which I think I should add to my noble friend's comments is on disputed family relationships, which are frequently a matter of continued difference between the UKBA and the applicant and which have to be resolved by reference to, for example, DNA evidence. The UNHCR asks how the costs of evidence gathering and the private legal fees that have to be borne in connection with this process can be borne by the refugee and his family. It notes that,
	"the Government's response during the consultation stage was that family reunion applications are 'generally straightforward' and that an alternative for family members is to claim asylum in their own right".
	However, the UNHCR points out that, since a refugee family are still outside the United Kingdom, they are not able to claim asylum in their own right-they would have to travel illegally to the United Kingdom to make such an application. Is that what the Government want them to do? It seems to me that, by denying them legal aid, the Government are inciting them to break our immigration laws and enter by some other means in order that they can claim asylum here in their own right. This cannot be right, and I hope that my noble friend will consider these amendments very seriously.

Lord Bach: My Lords, I can be very brief. The arguments put forward for these amendments are very powerful and I have nothing to add to them, save to say that this relates to families, and one of things that this Government claim-as all Governments do, quite rightly-is their faith in the family. It would be slightly ironic if the Government went on with the Bill as it is now published, in terms of the effect that this may have on refugee families, when they have the answers given to them by the exception provided for in the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. We think the Government should accept his amendment.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: My Lords, Amendment 69, moved by my noble friend, seeks to bring family reunion cases into the scope of legal aid. In recognising the purpose of the amendment, I also wish to indicate that the anticipated cost of that would be around £5 million a year.
	Such cases involve a person who has been granted asylum and sponsors the applications of the immediate family to join them here in the United Kingdom. Applications to join family members are immigration applications rather than asylum ones. This may to some extent respond to the point made by my noble friend Lord Avebury when he indicated that there was an encouragement to people to come in as illegal immigrants and to be asylum seekers. I have repeated on many occasions that asylum will come within the scope of legal aid, but it is widely recognised that navigating the laws is far more complex than is intended to be the case with regard to immigration applications in such cases.

Lord Avebury: I may have misled my noble friend. What I was pointing out was that it was the Government's own suggestion that family members should claim asylum in their own right and that the only method by which they could do so was to enter the United Kingdom by some unlawful means so that they could claim asylum.

Lord Wallace of Tankerness: I hear what my noble friend says. I will check, but I was not aware that the Government had encouraged people to come in in those circumstances. The point that I was about to make was that UK Border Agency guidance in these cases, when people are coming in under an immigration route, is that it sets out presumption of a grant of an application if the relevant criteria are met. The evidence required, such as marriage and birth certificates, should not require specialist legal assistance to collate. Indeed, the entry clearance officer may on occasion ask for DNA testing to prove a family relationship, but in these circumstances the test will be free of charge to the applicant.
	These cases do not require specialist legal advice and, as we have indicated with other immigration cases, it is not necessary for them to remain within the scope of civil legal aid. Nevertheless, I recognise what my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford said in moving his amendment. In spite of the fact that most cases should be relatively straightforward, as my honourable friend the parliamentary under-secretary Mr Djanogly indicated, there are some cases which are complex-I would certainly repeat what he indicated in the other place-so we will look at this again. I say this without wanting to raise an expectation, but it is important that we look at the issues where there are complex cases, and I undertake to look at that aspect again.
	On Amendment 71, as my noble friend indicated we have dealt with most of these issues in the course of the evening. I am prepared to elaborate on the answers again, but perhaps he could just take as read the answers given in respect of those cases. Again, the issue relates to the fact that, as a general rule, we have taken the view that, unlike cases of asylum, where legal aid will be in scope, in cases of immigration the number of cases that turn on a point of law are relatively low and the cost of funding them is one that we believe can be better applied and applied in a more focused way on cases where the needs are greater.
	On the question asked by my noble friend Lord Avebury about the UNHCR letter, I do not recall seeing the letter and nor does my noble friend Lord McNally. However, it is my understanding that Mr Djanogly has not only seen it but replied to it and has done so in the terms in which I have replied to the debate. In those circumstances, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: I am grateful for the assurance that the Minister has given that he will look at this matter again and consider what the attitude of the Government should be in complex cases involving family reunification.
	I would point out that, on the question of claiming asylum, the Government said in their response to the consultation:
	"Applications to join family members are treated as immigration cases, and are generally straightforward because they follow a grant of asylum".
	That is what my noble and learned friend told us just now. The Government's response went on:
	"Respondents argued that these cases are akin to claims for asylum ... if a person wishes to claim asylum it is open to that person to do so either as a dependant of a primary asylum claimant or to do so in his or her own right. Legal aid for any such asylum claim will be in scope".
	As my noble friend Lord Avebury has said, the family members with which this amendment is concerned are outside the United Kingdom and cannot claim asylum unless they get here. The only way that they can get here would be through some hazardous and clandestine journey to get to this country and make a claim. It would be unlawful under the Immigration Act 1971 for a person in this country, including a person who has been granted asylum, to assist them in any way but if they can get here and claim asylum, they then apparently get legal aid to fight their claim. That seems ludicrous. I am sure that my noble and learned friend, in considering the matter further as he has promised to do, will take that into account, but for the moment I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
	Amendment 69 withdrawn.
	Amendments 69A to 71 not moved.
	Amendment 72
	 Moved by Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
	72: Schedule 1, page 131, line 7, at end insert-
	"( ) situations where a person's financial difficulties could lead to loss of home."

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendments 82ZC and 82D in the name of my noble friends Lord Bach and Lord Beecham. In so doing, I declare an interest as chair of the Consumer Credit Counselling Service, the country's leading debt advice and solutions charity.
	Under the proposals in the Bill all legal aid for debt issues, including advice, is excluded from the scope of legal aid except for legal services provided in relation to a bankruptcy order against individuals under Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986, where the individual's estate includes their home. As I understand it, the Government's view is that debt advice is not strictly legal work and that financial matters are a far lesser priority than matters such as homelessness or loss of liberty.
	We disagree. All debt problems are underpinned by complex contractual obligations, and debt advisers typically need to advise debtors on issues of liability, consumer credit contracts, creditors' enforcement powers, statutory debt remedies and enforcement processes within the court system and beyond. While some debt advice may appear to be primarily negotiation over repayment terms and schedules, it is important to note that in fact such negotiations take place within a legal framework such as protections under the Consumer Credit Act. It is also true that the experience of my charity, the CCCS, and others in this field, such as Citizens Advice, is that most if not all of those who contact us for debt advice have other issues, such as illness, employment problems or relationship problems which have either caused the problem or contributed to it. It is this compounding effect which makes the withdrawal of legal aid for all debt issues seem such a simplistic proposal.
	Other areas where we consider that there is a good case for retaining legal aid are the important debtor protections under consumer credit legislation, which allows unfair or mis-sold consumer credit agreements to be legally challenged and ensures that citizens can challenge enforcement actions. However, I mainly want to focus on a clear lacuna that will be left from the withdrawal of legal aid for debt in relation to statutory debt relief remedies. Debt relief orders, or DROs, were introduced by Part 5 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 as a quicker and cheaper alternative to bankruptcy for those with no income and no assets. They require application via an approved intermediary working for organisations which are approved by the Insolvency Service. Approved intermediaries are experienced debt advisers who are often legal aid-funded debt caseworkers.
	DROs have proved a successful alternative to bankruptcy and are delivered at a far lower cost to the Insolvency Service. They are designed for people with debts of below £15,000 with no income or assets. The scheme enables the applicant to be discharged after 12 months with all their debts written off. It is generally thought to have been effective in supporting people who need debt relief but cannot afford bankruptcy or meet the criteria for an IVA. Indeed, more than 25,000 debt relief orders were made in 2010.
	The key reason why the scheme is successful is that it is low cost. Under the DRO scheme, the application or administration fee is £90. It is possible for the DRO scheme to work at this low cost only if the approved intermediaries are funded from elsewhere. Fees would have to be substantially increased if the DRO scheme were to be self-funding, which of course would kill it off. Until now, roughly 70 per cent of DROs in 2010 were processed by CAB debt advisers funded under legal aid. When legal aid is removed, as provided for in the Bill, these approved intermediaries will simply not be around.
	If the Bill goes ahead in its present form, it is not easy to see how the DRO system will survive. Thousands of people who would otherwise be able to write off their debts will not be able to do so. Their problems and suffering can be imagined. I cannot believe that BIS would be happy with that situation. Is this really what the Government intend?
	The obvious solution to this problem is to retain legal aid in debt cases for remedies under Part 5 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. Citizens Advice has established from its data that approximately 13 per cent of the Legal Services Commission-funded debt casework involves DROs-in other words, about £3 million of what the LSC currently spends on debt advice. We also think that there is a case for keeping within scope advice around other debtor protections and contractual rights under the Consumer Credit Act, unsecured lending, advice around remedies for creditor harassment, disputing liability for debts and court enforcement of debts by bailiffs who, it is alleged, often exceed their legal powers. We estimate that this would be between 20 per cent and 30 per cent of current work-that is, around £5 million of what is currently funded by the LSC on debt advice. We think that this is justified and ask the Government to think again about removing all debt from legal aid. I beg to move.

Lord Best: I shall speak to Amendment 72 and make the case for legal aid in housing cases beyond those where someone faces imminent loss of their home.
	The private rented sector has no regulator, in stark contrast to the social housing sector, nor is there an ombudsman to consider complaints against private landlords as there is for complaints against housing associations and council landlords. There is a voluntary ombudsman scheme for complaints about managing and letting agents, and I declare my interest as chair of the independent council of the Property Ombudsman. However, that redress scheme-

Lord Beecham: Is the noble Lord speaking to Amendment 72 or Amendment 72A? Amendment 72 is about debt.

Lord Best: I shall return to this later.

Lord McNally: I do not think the noble Lord should worry. At this time of night it becomes a bit of a blur for us all.
	Amendments 72 and 82ZC would bring into scope debt matters that are not covered in Schedule 1 and which we intend no longer to fund. We are faced, as we have said before, with tough choices in this current fiscal climate, but this has allowed us to focus resources on those who need them most in the most serious cases where legal advice and representation are justified. We estimate that we will continue to spend around £50 million on social welfare law overall.
	Amendment 72 relates to paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 and appears to be aimed at making legally aided advice, assistance and representation available where a person's financial difficulties, such as debt problems, could potentially lead to the individual losing their home.
	Amendment 82ZC would bring into scope all debt matters not covered in Schedule 1. In our consultation on legal aid reform, we proposed that funding should be prioritised on cases where the individual's home is at immediate risk. We are therefore retaining legal aid in relation to court orders for possession or sale of the home and in relation to eviction. We generally consider that other debt matters are a lower priority and therefore do not justify public funding for legal advice and representation.
	We recognise that early advice can be helpful in a range of contexts. However, what people often need is general advice, for example on welfare benefits, debt or housing, rather than legal advice. There are many alternative sources of help with debt issues, including Credit Action, the National Debtline, the Consumer Credit Counselling Service and local authorities, which also direct people to local sources of advice and assistance on debt matters. In addition, the Money Advice Trust has recently launched My Money Steps, an online tool for providing advice for people with debt problems. The Consumer Credit Counselling Service also offers a free online debt remedy service.
	We also recognise the argument that withdrawal of legal aid for any issue could lead, by a chain of events, to serious consequences. We considered this point carefully when formulating our final proposals. However, our view is that the limited public funds for legal advice and representation should be focused on those cases where the client faces serious direct consequences. Therefore, we do not propose to devote these limited public funds to less important cases on the basis that they could indirectly lead to more serious consequences for that person.
	It is also important to recognise that the Bill does not require legal proceedings to have been issued before legal aid can be made available. Legal aid will be available where action for repossession or eviction is contemplated-for example, where a person receives a letter threatening repossession action in the absence of payment. Therefore, legal aid will be available to a person threatened with repossession action for mortgage or rent arrears, for example to negotiate with the mortgage lenders. It should also be noted that we will retain funding for the housing possession court duty scheme. It offers free legal advice and representation to anyone in danger of eviction or having property repossessed, on the day of the hearing, regardless of their means. Research shows that 77 per cent of clients who receive this last-minute advice avoid the immediate loss of their home. Under the circumstances, I hope the noble Lord will consider withdrawing his amendment.
	Amendment 82D appears to be aimed at bringing into scope debt relief remedies under Part 5 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and, in particular, as the noble Lord said, debt relief orders. As I have already said, we consider certain debt matters to be a high priority for funding. That is why we are retaining legal aid for debt cases where the individual's home is at immediate risk of repossession because of rent or mortgage arrears or involuntary bankruptcy. We recognise that debt problems can be difficult for the individuals concerned. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that what is often required is practical advice to resolve issues, rather than advice of a legal nature.
	It is important to note that debt relief orders are relatively informal procedures. Advisers act as approved intermediaries and assist debtors in applying to the Insolvency Service for a debt relief order. I reiterate that individuals who have debt issues are able to seek advice from alternative routes. For example, the Insolvency Service website provides guidance and leaflets, and information is available through the insolvency inquiry line. Importantly, it should be noted that debt relief orders are used by people who owe limited amounts of money and have no assets. Therefore, they do not involve a person's home being at immediate risk. They are clearly not analogous to cases in which a home owner is at immediate risk of losing their home as a result of involuntary bankruptcy. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by what I have said and will not press these amendments.

Lord Howarth of Newport: Can the Minister assure the Committee with complete confidence that every single one of the organisations that he has named in his remarks are confident that they will be in a position to provide debt advice-indeed, sufficient personalised debt advice-to the people who will need it? Has he taken into account that the number of people sinking into the toils of debt is increasing hand over fist as the economy deteriorates?

Lord McNally: No, of course I cannot give that assurance, but neither do I assume the absolute worst case in everything that we discuss, as the noble Lord seems to do in each of his interventions.

Lord Stevenson of Balmacara: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Best, for trying to come to my aid. I am sorry that he was not able to continue with that. I am sure that he would have been able to include debt into the case that he was making, skilled orator that he is. However, this is a dialogue and I would like to respond to a few of the points that the Minister made.
	We have heard the rhetoric about tough choices a number of times in these debates and no doubt we will hear it again. I wonder whether we might get a second script. Perhaps we could work together on that and enjoy a variation on the theme. We on this side of the House accept that legal aid costs have to go down, and have said so. We understand what the Minister is saying but we think that we have other ways of doing that. However, the same question emerges whichever way you approach this: namely, in saving a cost on an annual basis are the Government providing value for money in the long run? We have severe doubts that that is happening.
	As my noble friend Lord Howarth mentioned, debts are increasing although perhaps not quite in the way that he indicated. CCCS, the charity which I chair, receives approximately 500,000 inquiries a year. Our average client owes more than £25,000 to more than eight different lenders. These people have a debt problem. The debts are not necessarily related to housing, to which a different contractual basis often applies, but arise because people overstretch themselves. As I tried to say in my opening address, they also arise because other things happen to these people; for example, they lose their jobs, suffer bereavement or become ill. This is not an easy area to talk about. It is not helpful to be overly simplistic and talk about owner-occupiers whose mortgages are at risk when many of these people will be in rented accommodation. However, the problems arising from losing their homes will be just as bad. I do not see any solution coming forward for those people.
	The main point that I was trying to get across in my address concerned the DRO effect. I am afraid that the Minister did not answer the question that I posed: namely, what fee will be necessary to enable this service to be continued? It is presently £90. It seems to me that it will go up to nearer the fee that is charged for a full bankruptcy of £900. What will happen to debt advisers? Will funds be available to keep that generic debt advice going, particularly in the citizens advice area? As we explained, the only reason that the DRO system has continued is that the debt advisers are largely paid for by legal aid funds. If that goes, are we saying that those people who are in severe difficulty with their debts will have to rely on a website, which they probably cannot access because they do not have the necessary equipment, or guidance in leaflets? I do not think that that is a satisfactory solution to what is clearly a very serious problem.
	These are very difficult issues that are part of a broader context of social welfare law. We shall probably have to come back to them but in the interim I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 72 withdrawn.
	Amendment 72A
	 Moved by Lord Shipley
	72A: Schedule 1, page 131, line 7, at end insert-
	"( ) a demolition order under section 82A of the Housing Act 1985 or section 6A of the Housing Act 1988."

Lord Shipley: I rise to move Amendment 72A and to speak to Amendments 72B to 72D, 74C, 77A to 77H, 77K, 78A and 78B. That makes a total of 16 amendments, but they are interrelated so I hope that at this late hour it will not take too long to speak to them.
	As it stands, the Bill would limit housing and debt legal aid to homelessness, loss of home and very serious cases of disrepair. However, there are major problems with the definitions that would enable an individual to qualify for legal advice and support. This set of amendments forms a set of proposals that would address this difficulty.
	The Bill currently applies a very tight legalistic test in making legal aid available in cases involving court orders for sale or possession or for eviction proceedings. The nature of the test would make it very difficult to solve a problem at an early stage, which would be practical, fair and effective both for the individual and the legal system.
	These amendments would make it easier for an individual in financial difficulties that could lead to the loss of their home to get help at the pre-litigation stage in a case, for example, involving arrears. The cost of allowing the advice process to start earlier could be as low as around £3 million, but could solve problems earlier and save money later when litigation occurs.
	Specifically, Amendments 72B and 72C would enable an individual threatened with the loss of their home, due to the failure to pay either the rent or the mortgage, to get advice on any underlying benefit problems. The problem is that the proposals in the Bill are that all benefits work is to be removed from the scope of legal aid, except in cases that go to judicial review.
	At present, legal aid helps to fund support to defend possession proceedings as well as to resolve underlying benefit issues. Although in theory the Government have said that the loss of the home will continue to be prioritised for legal aid funding, the Bill will in fact prevent advisers from resolving benefits problems that lead to eviction proceedings. This is despite the fact that early intervention to resolve benefits issues often prevents these situations from escalating into possession proceedings. The danger is that the exclusion of benefits work from legal aid will tie the hands of advisers who are trying to prevent homelessness and will lead to many more unresolved cases filling the county courts. The courts will have more adjourned hearings and will ultimately have to make more possession orders because there is no one to resolve the benefits issue. This could result in higher costs to the taxpayer as a consequence.
	Amendment 74C enables people to obtain advice where their right to occupy their home has been terminated for reasons entirely beyond their control and for which they bear no responsibility. The Bill as currently worded removes the entitlement to legal aid-funded advice from people who are regarded as "trespassers in law", even if they were perfectly lawful occupiers when they first moved into the premises and they may indeed have been living there lawfully for many years.
	The policy intention seems to be to exclude squatters from legally aided advice. However, a consequence of the wording is to exclude unfairly others who unknowingly may be counted as trespassers and who may need legal advice. The term "trespasser" is not synonymous with "squatter", which denotes those who enter premises that they have no lawful right to occupy. A trespasser is someone who currently has no right in law to occupy their accommodation. In other words, a squatter is and has been a trespasser from day one of their occupation, but other people may have become trespassers, often without knowing it, when circumstances change.
	This change of status occurs in common situations such as the following: a person who takes a tenancy when the landlord is actually a tenant too and cannot sub-let-the sub-tenant is a lawful occupier only until the head landlord terminates the landlord's tenancy, making the sub-tenant a trespasser; a person who takes a tenancy from a landlord when the landlord has a mortgage on the property on which he then defaults, leading to the lender securing a possession order-the occupier becomes a trespasser through no fault of their own; or where there is a joint tenancy and the relationship breaks down, one partner terminates the entire tenancy and the other partner is left, often after many years of occupation, as a trespasser in their own home. In cases such as these-and there are many more similar examples-there will be a need for good legal advice on all the options for many people on very low incomes.
	Amendments 77A to 77H, 77K, 78A and 78B relate to the rights of tenants and the powers of landlords. A difficulty with the Bill as it stands is that it decreases the powers of vulnerable tenants. For example, essential repairs and maintenance may not be done by a landlord but it may be impossible for a vulnerable tenant to do anything about it unless legal aid is available for disrepair and harassment damages claims. Amendment 77B extends the range of disrepair cases within the scope of lega1 aid by providing that legal aid should be available in cases where there is a risk of harm to the health or safety of the individual, not only where the risk is "serious". Trivial and unmeritorious cases claims would still be excluded by the operation of the legal aid merits test.
	Amendments 77D, 77H and 77K expand the class of persons whose health or safety is at risk to include anyone who resides in the property as a household member, even if he or she is not related to the tenant. Amendments 77A, 77C, 77E and 77F would allow funding to continue subject to means and merits to enable a tenant to claim damages where the landlord has carried out repairs.
	Amendments 78A and 78B would ensure that legal aid continues to be available for people needing to pursue a damages claim. In that case, most legal remedies used against difficult landlords include a claim for damages even where the tenant is seeking an injunction. That is necessary because, in contract law, damages are the primary civil remedy and an injunction will be granted only where damages could not be an adequate form of compensation. The Bill will remove damages claims from the scope of legal aid but leave injunctions within scope, although in successful damages claims legal aid costs will be recompensed in the award.
	In future, the Government intend damages to be funded by conditional fee agreements, which will require a client to find a lawyer willing to act for them on that basis. It is unlikely that that will be feasible in all but the most exceptional cases. In practice, the decoupling of damages from injunctions has the effect of offering only a part remedy to those needing to rely on legal aid. The law entitling tenants to claim for damages will remain on the statute books, but the low-income client dependent on legal aid will have no way to access that form of redress.
	In the case of illegal eviction, the Government have been persuaded that both damages and injunctions should remain eligible for legal aid. In Committee in the House of Commons, the Government put forward amendments to that effect. However, in cases of harassment and disrepair, damagesclaims are still currently to be excluded from legal aid funding.
	The cost of the amendments could be low. The Law Society has estimated that 60 per cent of the Government's estimated savings in social welfare will not be made because of knock-on costs. I hope that some further work can be done before Report to ensure that the impact of the Bill can be minimised.
	I have one final point. The Supreme Court, citing the European Court of Human Rights, has recently upheld the need for the legal system to put in place appropriate safeguards where something as serious as eviction is concerned. It stated:
	"The loss of one's home is a most extreme form of interference with the right to respect for the home. Any person at risk of an interference of this magnitude should in principle be able to have the proportionality of the measure determined by an independent tribunal ... notwithstanding that, under domestic law, his right of occupation has come to an end".
	That is exactly the position of occupiers in the examples I have mentioned. The legal system cannot provide appropriate safeguards if such individuals cannot receive legal advice. The amendments would make legal aid available to ensure that low-income tenants can receive advice on their occupancy rights and ensure that people are not unfairly denied advice where they have major tenancy problems or where their home is about to be taken away from them.
	I hope that my noble friend will see the amendments as intended to help the administration of justice and make it more effective, rather than to hinder it. I beg to move.

Lord Best: My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 72A and support the case made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, for legal aid in housing cases to go beyond those where someone faces imminent loss of their home. I have made the case that the private rented sector has no regulator and no ombudsman. Therefore, private rented tenants are in a different position from consumers of other necessities such as electricity, gas, water, telephone or even financial services. If tenants are in dispute with their landlords, the only way of obtaining redress may well be to go to court.
	That being so, legal advice can be of enormous help, not least in explaining to some tenants that they do not have a case and that it would be a waste of the time of the tenant and the courts to go down the route of litigation. Thanks to the current legal aid system, a publicly funded solicitor can advise tenants at an early stage that they should not pursue a hopeless case. If legal advice is not available, more tenants will try to proceed through the courts with ill advised cases as litigants in person, causing the courts and landlords-both private and public-to incur irrecoverable legal costs for wasted time litigating nonsense. My barrister colleague, Peter Marcus, who specialises in housing, tells me that he handles cases where, even if the landlord makes a successful application to have the tenant's case struck out, the landlord none the less incurs significant irrecoverable legal fees.
	Of course, the case for legal aid for housing matters goes much deeper than that. Justifiable cases against landlords, regrettably, are only too common in this sector. There are some 1.2 million private landlords and some are ignorant of their responsibilities, while a minority are deliberately exploitative. However, while legal aid is currently available to even the poorest tenant, the threat of litigation has teeth. Landlords know that, despite the absence of regulation or dispute resolution by an ombudsman, tenants advised by law centres or citizens advice bureaux can pursue them through the courts, with the landlord facing considerable costs when they lose the case. Without Amendment 72A, however, the disreputable landlord would see that threats from landlords of legal action would be empty, as tenants would not be able to take the matter forward unless the case concerned the likelihood of the imminent loss of their home.
	Informing bad landlords that, however awful their behaviour, they will not be taken to court is like telling Somali pirates that they will never be held to account if they board ships and demand fantastic ransoms. It seems bound to lead to an escalation of criminality. Removing recourse to legal aid removes the capacity of tenants credibly to threaten litigation, leaving them with no way out of the misery of living in a property where the heating system does not work, where there is no management of anti-social neighbours, where disrepair is a major issue and where landlords simply refuse to answer letters or phone calls. As we all know, acute shortages mean that tenants, unlike consumers in other areas, do not have the luxury of being able to shop around and find a better property elsewhere.
	The other way in which housing differs from other services lies in the legal complexities that surround it. Quite apart from the extensive body of landlord/tenant legislation, the ever changing entitlements to benefits-for example, to local housing allowances-are fiendishly complicated. Social landlords very often provide expert welfare benefits advice but private landlords, of course, do not. The ordinary consumer-the tenant-cannot be expected to have full knowledge of the legal niceties to deploy in a tribunal hearing; hence the need for professional advice, for which legal aid provides the funding mechanism. Take this away and not only will landlords be able to break the law with impunity but tenants who are ignorant of their entitlements or who are victims of incompetence at the hands of bureaucrats will never see justice.
	The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, has made the case for legal aid housing advice preventing problems escalating to homelessness, and legal aid help for housing cases has to go much wider than stepping in at the last minute when possession of the home is imminent. Of course, many cases are not about eviction. Moreover, some of the cases where eviction has occurred may be about ancillary aspects of the actions of the landlord-it is not uncommon for tenants who are unlawfully evicted to have all their possessions thrown out of the property. If the landlord has previously exercised violence or harassment, the tenant may have no wish to get back their former home but merely to get back their belongings or obtain compensation for belongings destroyed. It would be perverse if a tenant could not get legal aid in such cases unless they declared that they wanted to go back into a property to which it would be unreasonable, if not unsafe, to return.
	Regrettably, although we now depend on the private rented sector to house many poorer households, it is fraught with conflict that often requires a legal input to get sorted. With benefits advice being taken out of scope and the likely closure of many citizens advice bureaux as a result, housing is badly affected by the Bill. This surely is one area of our national life where legal aid is essential. Its withdrawal will not only cause misery but will cost central and local government money in picking up the pieces. I support the amendment.

Lord Howarth of Newport: My Lords, the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Best, was well worth waiting for. This is a very important and valuable group of amendments and I endorse the arguments so powerfully stated by the noble Lords who have spoken. Under the Government's proposals in the Bill, legal aid will no longer be available for damages claims in relation to tenancy disputes; for example, disrepair. CLG tells us that more than 40 per cent of private rented dwellings do not meet the decent homes standard. Tenants will still be able to get legal aid to seek injunctions to get the work done, although only where there is serious risk of harm to the health or safety of the household. So there is a very high threshold for one to get legal aid for an injunction of that kind.
	Under the current arrangements, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, explained, bad landlords know that the longer that they delay in carrying out the repairs, the greater the damages that they will have to pay. Therefore, the current arrangement, whereby legal aid is available for damages suits for disrepair, constitutes an incentive on landlords to carry out the repairs relatively promptly. Without the availability of legal aid for such damages claims, the pressure on landlords not to let their properties fall into disrepair will be removed.
	Illegal eviction, actual or threatened, is a horrible reality for all too many people. Under the Government's proposals, legal aid will be available only to secure an injunction for the tenant to be reinstated to the property from which he has been illegally evicted. Again, as the noble Lord said, it is most likely that tenants will not want to go back to a tenancy with that same landlord. They will want to secure recovery of their possessions but they will not want to go back to that landlord. Under the Government's proposals, the worst landlords will be able to get away with the worst behaviour and their victims will not be protected and will not be able to obtain compensation. The availability, through legal aid, of damages claims against bad landlords is a deterrent against bad behaviour; and the aggravated and exemplary damages that are, from time to time, awarded because the court takes a particularly severe view of the behaviour of a landlord are a most important deterrent. We will not be able to see that working in the future.
	These problems are all too extensive. Environmental health officers testify to the fact that there are too many bad landlords and that many of them behave with the peculiar ruthlessness with which unfortunately people tend to act in housing matters; 90 per cent of environmental health officers say that they have personal experience of landlords harassing or illegally evicting tenants. The proportions of people availing themselves of private rented accommodation are rising at the moment. The Localism Act encourages local authorities now to place homeless households in the private rented sector. The benefits cap and the cuts to local housing allowance will drive families lower down the scale of the private rented sector towards the bottom end. It seems bizarre that legal aid will not be available to people facing housing problems until they are actually on the precipice of losing their homes. It is obvious that early intervention to deal with the underlying causes is a sensible policy to prevent the underlying problems deteriorating. It is both kinder and more economic.
	Removing welfare benefit and debt cases from the scope of legal aid will mean, as my noble friend Lord Stevenson pointed out, that we will see a compounding effect of people getting deeper and deeper into trouble until they face homelessness. Under the Government's proposals, only then will they be able to get legal aid to help extricate them from the crisis that they have been allowed to get into.
	This policy will increase insecurity and distress among tenants. It will add to the pressure on tribunals and courts, as the noble Lords, Lord Shipley and Lord Best, told us. It will increase costs to the taxpayer because of the consequences of the distress and of the problems that will be without remedy.
	The Minister prayed in aid time and again in debates on different parts of this foolish and iniquitous Bill the requirement of the Treasury that the Ministry of Justice should make its contribution to reducing the deficit. The Treasury will certainly not be swayed by the pathos of vulnerable people finding themselves in greater difficulty than they need be in, but it should be swayed by the prospect of increased costs being shunted around Whitehall so that we end up with no reduction of the deficit but possibly an increase in it. I very much hope that the Treasury will review the policy that is proposed in the Bill before we get to Report. I hope that it will look at the arguments and figures put forward by Dr Cookson of King's College. The central case on which the Minister relies-that all this, miserable though it may be, is inescapably necessary in order to reduce the deficit-is profoundly flawed. I hope that on Report we will see major government amendments to the Bill.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My Lords, after three excellent speeches I will make only one point, following directly from the last point made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. What I may perhaps call the Cookson report-the King's College report-quantifies certain knock-on costs. What it does not do is look at indirect knock-on costs. For example, in a case such as the one my noble friend referred to when he moved the amendment of somebody not getting timely advice and as a result finding that he and his family were on the street with the local authority having to pick up the problem and provide housing, along with the welfare fallout and so on, the indirect costs were not included in the figures of the King's College report. That makes the self-interest of the Government in listening to and agreeing the amendments in this group all the more acute.
	My only other point was made by all three preceding speakers but is worth emphasising. The noble Lord, Lord Best, drew an analogy with Somali pirates. He talked of a small minority of exploitative landlords. That is absolutely fair; it is only a small minority of private landlords. However, they are concentrated among poor tenancies. If we throw our minds back to Rachman, we will remember that his tenants were among the poorest in London. That was no accident. Landlords who are of that evil mind know that poor tenants are least able to protect and stand up for themselves, and most easily harassed. Again, it is an issue of self-interest on the part of the Treasury to recognise that. If it does, it will see the sense of the amendments in this group without getting into morality and justice.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I confess to feeling very troubled by what I have heard in the Chamber during this debate. I will say a few words about my concerns in particular about vulnerable families in private accommodation. A few years ago I accompanied a health visitor in the borough of Redbridge in north-east London just north of West Ham. We visited a number of families living in very poor conditions in private property. In one such home the basement was flooded and the landlord had taken no action to remedy this. Another was overcrowded. A mother and her two young children shared one room with water almost running down the walls. The third, and most shocking, was a home in which the shower and the lavatory were somehow combined in one system. It may be a small proportion of landlords, but there seemed to be a lot of them in Redbridge, back then, at least. I declare my interest as a landlord. I hope that the Minister can offer some real reassurance in his reply that the most vulnerable individuals and families in society are not going to suffer significantly because of what the Government propose.

Lord Beecham: My Lords, I come to this debate informed not only, as ever, by the noble Lord, Lord Best, whose expertise in matters of housing is second to none in your Lordships' House, but by my experience over many years representing an inner-city ward in Newcastle that has a mix of housing. It has owner-occupiers, a substantial number of council houses, houses owned by registered social landlords and a significant number of private rented properties, many of which are, I have to say, poorly managed and which present many problems to the tenants. It is certainly true that, as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has said, some landlords are exploitative. Others are simply incapable for one reason or another of managing their properties adequately. They do not have the resources or the skill, or they may not live locally. Whatever the reason, it is the tenants who suffer. In these circumstances, there has to be some redress.
	I will be speaking to Amendment 81, which seeks to cut to the chase in terms of the overall issue. The amendment so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, deals with a series of issues, but Amendment 81 simply seeks to restore legal aid across the piece in housing matters, which strikes my noble friends and me as probably the most efficacious way of dealing with the problem. That is not in any way to minimise the strength of the arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley. He and I have been opening and closing debates across the council chamber for about 35 years, and it is a pleasure to continue that long-standing tradition.
	Housing is now becoming one of the critical areas of public policy. For those engaged in not only the policy but the daily life that is influenced by housing, it is obvious that matters are getting increasingly difficult. We have spiralling rents and a shortage of available accommodation exacerbated, as other noble Lords have said, by pending changes to housing benefits that are likely to lead to still greater pressure on the private rented sector. At the same time, councils are having increasing difficulty in maintaining their stock as capital programmes are reduced and repairs and investment in existing council properties become more difficult to achieve. It must be said that not all councils are wonderful managers of property. Council tenants also have their problems and need redress as, occasionally, do the tenants of registered social landlords. What will occur as a result of the changes that the Bill proposes is that 40 per cent of housing cases-52,000 cases-will lose legal help, often from organisations such as Shelter rather than from solicitors but sometimes from solicitors, and that will save the Exchequer some £10 million. There will be 1,200 cases where legal representation will no longer be available. That will save the Exchequer £3 million. These are not inordinately large sums one might think, and other noble Lords have pointed out that the potential on-cost to other services could be considerably greater. Under the provisions of the Bill, there will be exceptional case funding, up to 25 per cent for some proceedings. I do not know whether the Minister is able to indicate the likely take-up. Up to 25 per cent can, of course, mean from virtually nothing up to 25 per cent, and it is not entirely clear what proceedings are envisaged in the term "some proceedings". A little enlightenment on that would be helpful.
	As we have heard, legal aid will still be available for eviction cases, but in effect at the last gasp and not at a stage when matters might be resolved earlier, potentially to the benefit of both sides. That must be a more cost-effective way of dealing with it. However, we are not just dealing with money; we are dealing with people's lives, with families and individuals living in stressful conditions once the threat-explicit or otherwise, legal or otherwise-is made, and that must also have a bearing on how society reacts in terms of the assistance it is prepared to offer.
	Of course, much of the problem arises in the private sector, although it should be clear that it is a minority of landlords who are deliberately exploiting and neglecting their tenants. However, it is disconcerting that 100 per cent of environmental health officers encounter persistent failures on the part of landlords to carry out their obligations. Every environmental health officer has cases of that kind to deal with. Sixty per cent of them say that more than half the cases they are involved with affect vulnerable people, so we are dealing with a significant and very widespread problem affecting many vulnerable people.
	A very strong case has been made by previous speakers around the issue of damages. It seems absurd that damages claims for distress, hardship or loss or damage to possessions will not be covered by legal aid that might be available to deal with evictions. It is clearly necessary to restore legal aid and assistance for a damages claim alongside repair orders, for example. After all, at the moment it is possible for a court to award aggravated or even exemplary damages in particularly bad cases, which is a clear indication of the extent of the problem. Of course, if legal aid is not available, the situation is simply going to get worse.
	I have no doubt the Minister will fall back yet again-and I am not blaming him, that is the job that he has to do on behalf of the Government-on saying that there are alternatives to legal aid, but that is not a realistic view. Local authorities certainly have housing departments; they often have housing advice services, but these are also under pressure. The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, would no doubt confirm that in the last year of the previous administration in Newcastle there was a reduction in the number of people employed precisely in this area of dealing with private landlords; he is nodding his agreement.
	Shelter, the body most concerned with and most effective in helping tenants, is sustaining a 70 per cent cut in its anticipated capacity to offer advice. I was rather surprised to learn that this is not just a problem of the cities, as one might think-of the Newcastles and Manchesters and Birminghams. If Shelter's figures are to be believed-and there is no reason to dispute them-the reduction in the number of cases and the income of Shelter branches will actually be greater in Dorset and Somerset than in Manchester and Newcastle. So we are not talking about a specifically urban problem-not that it should make any difference where these things occur-we are talking about a very widespread problem reaching right across the country. It is clearly necessary to provide access to as much help as possible. It may very well be required to be legal help from the legal profession. But in many cases it would be through precisely the kind of organisation that normally Ministers would be able to pray in aid as being available. They simply will not be available on the scale required. Amendment 81 seeks to restore legal aid for housing. As I have already indicated, the direct cost would not be inordinate but the indirect savings to the public purse would be greater if it is available.
	As we have seen earlier today, Amendment 90ZZB has been spatchcocked into this group. It is based on a Law Society proposal to ensure that legal aid is available for advocacy, once again, in the Court of Protection for people in relation to the right of respect for a person's home or their private life, which comes under the European convention. The Law Society's view is that if the Bill is not amended someone who suffers from learning disabilities or dementia, and is facing a forced removal from their home by a relative or a public authority, would have no legal aid to be represented before the Court of Protection. Although there may be other issues around deprivation of family life, some cases would not be within the scope of legal aid if the Bill is implemented as drafted. That is particularly the case where a vulnerable person does not have any family but is still removed from his or her home. Unless funding is made available, the official solicitor would not be available to assist. I do not quite know why the amendment has been put in this group-it seems to relate to other business affecting the Court of Protection-except that there is a clear housing connection. That is also a matter of concern.
	The noble Lord, Lord Shipley, raised the issue of trespassers. By sheer coincidence, I received an e-mail today on behalf of a constituent who suffers from very poor health and disability, and has been caring for a relative who has died. He is now concerned about his position vis-à-vis his occupancy of the house. Technically, he is a trespasser-or he will be as soon as the arm's-length management company which manages the house tells him that he has to go. He would not be able to receive legal advice under the terms of this Bill. That puts into very clear light the difficulties which the Bill would create.
	Bad housing and the trauma of eviction and homelessness lead to damage to individuals and families, and clearly have social and, ultimately, financial costs which have to be borne by the public purse. For legal aid in these cases to be restricted by a mantra that it is to be available only in respect of cases affecting life and liberty is to create a two-tier system of justice, which is particularly objectionable in such an important area as housing on an individual's life and the lives of communities. Having heard the very strong arguments from all around this house, not least from at least part of the coalition Benches, I hope that the Government will rethink their position. If they proceed with the Bill in its present form, this would be one of the gravest errors that they would make. I urge them to listen to their colleagues in this place and those in the Commons who, in fairness, made similar points. It is not too late to see sense and to retain rights which can make a significant difference to people's lives.

Lord McNally: My Lords, this large group includes a number of government amendments, which I presume are acceptable in their being mainly technical. I am extremely pleased to be sandwiched between my noble friend Lord Shipley and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, as far as this debate is concerned. It is a great tribute to that great city of Newcastle that two of its most pre-eminent city leaders should now be giving such good service in this House and is a reflection of the quality of our civic leadership.
	As is obvious, this group of amendments has provided a very useful opportunity to examine our proposals as they affect housing. I do not underestimate the importance of housing as an issue. Like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, I am old enough to remember Rachmanism and when and how it entered our language. I can still remember the shock that the initial showing of "Cathy Come Home" had on British society in the late 1960s. There is no doubt that housing matters, as this debate has reflected.
	As I said earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, a number of the points that were made either looked at worst-case scenarios or avoided exactly what the Government are providing for in the Bill. For example, when all these measures have gone through, we will still be spending some £35 million on housing-related legal aid.
	During the passage of the Bill and in light of respondents' views in consultation, we decided that legal aid should be available for cases of unlawful eviction. We amended the Bill in Commons Committee to ensure that legal aid continues to be available in cases of unlawful eviction for lawful occupiers without a tenancy agreement. Therefore, those who are unlawfully evicted can get legal aid, not only for the case of the eviction but for claims for damages and damage to their goods. We are also retaining legal aid for housing disrepair where it is alleged that the disrepair poses a serious risk to health or life. This, too, will give some protection to tenants. Legal aid will also remain where a tenant is threatened with eviction for early advice on the merits of their case. The merits test, which applies to all legal aid cases, will help prevent public funds being wasted on hopeless cases brought by tenants-a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Best. So we are listening. I shall not repeat the mantra, but we are concentrating limited funds on what we think are the most important cases.
	At this hour, I shall go through the amendments to enable noble Lords to see where we are coming from on the issues raised by them. Amendment 81, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, acknowledged, appears to bring into scope housing law areas that are not covered in Schedule 1 and which we intend no longer to fund. We consider that many housing cases are primarily about money or property, and that these issues are not of importance when compared with such fundamental issues as homelessness or the immediate safety of individuals.
	As I have already made clear, we intend to retain housing matters in scope only where the individual's home is at immediate risk. Accordingly, legal aid will be available in relation to court orders for the possession or sale of an individual's home and eviction from the home. We are also retaining legal aid for housing disrepair cases where there is a serious risk of harm to the health or safety of the individual or their family, and legal services are provided to ensure that the landlord remedies the disrepair. Legal aid will also be retained for those who are homeless or threatened with homelessness and are seeking homelessness assistance from the local authority.
	Amendment 72A is aimed at making legal aid available where a tenant of a private registered provider of social housing, registered social landlord, housing action trust or local housing authority is facing a demotion of their secure or assured tenancy as a result of anti-social behaviour or use of the premises for unlawful purposes.
	If an individual's tenancy is demoted, it is replaced with a less secure form of tenancy. Demotion orders are designed to send clear warnings to tenants who are found to have behaved anti-socially or used their home for unlawful purposes. A court can grant a demotion order only where it is satisfied that the alleged behaviour has occurred and that it is reasonable to make the order.
	Demotion orders are sought where there is anti-social behaviour but the landlords want to continue working with the tenants to improve their behaviour rather than evicting them outright. Accordingly, the individual is not at immediate risk of losing their home- as with, for example, an application for a possession order-and the Government therefore consider that the provision of legal aid is not justified in these circumstances.
	We acknowledge that where a court demotes the tenancy of an individual, it is easier for the landlord subsequently to seek their eviction. However, the granting of the demotion order does not necessarily mean that possession proceedings will be brought, and the tenancy will revert to secure or assured status after 12 months, provided that the landlord has not issued a notice seeking possession during the demotion period-for example, because of further anti-social behaviour. However, where that is not the case and in consequence a possession order is sought by a landlord, legal aid will be available at that point.
	Where a local housing authority or housing action trust decides to seek possession, the demoted tenant has the statutory right to seek an internal review of that decision. Legal help will be available for that under paragraph 28(1)(a) of Part 1 of Schedule 1. Legal aid will also be available in possession proceedings against a demoted tenant.
	Where the landlord is a public authority and the tenant raises proportionality under Article 8 of the ECHR as a defence to the possession proceedings, case law makes clear that the court must consider proportionality. In addition, where a social landlord obtains a demotion order and subsequently seeks possession of the property, legal aid will be available for the tenant in relation to any judicial review of the landlord's decision to bring possession proceedings.
	Amendments 72B and 72C seek to make legally aided advice available in relation to welfare benefit entitlement where the individual is at immediate risk of losing their home and the benefits in question relate to housing costs-for example, housing benefit or the support for mortgage interest component of income support or pension credit.
	Legal aid will continue to be available where the home is at immediate risk through the repossession or sale of the home, or eviction. However, legal aid will not be retained for advice on welfare benefits matters. While we recognise that many people rely on benefits, these cases are primarily about financial entitlement and we generally consider their importance to be lower than cases concerning, for example, the liberty or safety of a person.
	For those who need assistance on a welfare benefits matters, factual advice is available from, for example, Jobcentre Plus, the benefits inquiry line and the tribunal itself. Accordingly, where possession action results from mortgage or rent arrears caused by a welfare benefits issue, we do not believe that legal aid should be provided in relation to the welfare benefits matter.
	I have already explained the Government's reasoning for this. We consider that the tribunal for resolving disputes is generally accessible without the need for legal assistance. Where the benefits dispute is ongoing at the point where possession action is taken, legal aid will be available in relation to the possession action, and it can be used to argue for an adjournment of possession proceedings-for example, if it appears that the client may be able to make the necessary payments once their benefits dispute has been resolved.
	The Government understand that in cases where private landlords bring possession proceedings against their tenants, they will generally give the tenants reasonable notice that they are being asked to leave. Legal aid will be available to help tenants engage with landlords to try and resolve the actual or threatened possession issue wherever possible, including, if possible, coming to an agreement about delaying the possession matter until the benefit matter is resolved.
	Amendment 72D relates to the loss-of-home matters at paragraph 28 of Schedule 1. It appears that the intention, by lifting certain exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1, is to make legal aid available for a wide range of potential claims in tort and for welfare benefit matters within the context of eviction and possession. The Government amended paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 at Commons Committee stage to lift certain exclusions in Part 2 of the schedule in order to give effect to the original policy intention that legal aid should continue to be available for counterclaims to possession proceedings. It was important to do so as such counterclaims have the potential to keep clients from becoming homeless. We also lifted those exclusions in relation to unlawful eviction, in order to ensure that our policy that legal aid should continue to be available for such matters was given effect.
	The provisions that we introduced, now at paragraph 28(6)(a) and (b), lift the exclusions for trespass to person, to property and to land, and breach of a statutory duty in respect of counterclaims to possession proceedings and unlawful eviction proceedings. We believe that the provisions in paragraph 28 already sufficiently lift relevant exclusions in Part 2 of Schedule 1 as are necessary for the purpose of paragraph 28.
	Amendment 72D would go much further and is, we believe, intended potentially to allow legal aid funding for any tort claim that may arise in the context of a loss of home. Indeed, it might even in some circumstances make legal aid funding available to a landlord to bring a damages claim against a tenant within the context of eviction.
	In relation to tort claims more broadly, they are being more generally excluded from the scope of legal aid. The Government take the view that these cases are essentially claims for money or damages, which are a lower priority for funding than cases that involve more fundamental issues. Conditional fee agreements may provide a viable alternative means of funding such claims.
	We are retaining legal aid for the most serious damages claims against public authorities where the issue is an abuse of position or power or a significant breach of human rights, or for any case concerning alleged abuse of a child or vulnerable adult, or alleged sexual offence. We are also retaining funding for claims under the Equality Act 2010.
	On welfare benefits, with the exceptions of judicial reviews and claims related to the contravention of the Equality Act 2010, we have decided to remove welfare benefits matters from scope, for the reasons that I gave the House earlier.
	Amendment 74C is aimed at ensuring that the provisions of sub-paragraph 28(10) of Schedule 1, which relate to trespassers facing eviction, exclude from legal aid only those who are in occupation as a trespasser and who began their occupation as such. Legal aid will generally be available for possession and eviction matters under paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. However, the Government do not believe that it is justifiable to use taxpayers' money to provide legal aid funding in circumstances where an individual has unarguably both entered and remained on a property or site as a trespasser and is facing eviction. Such cases are intended to be excluded by paragraph 28(10) of Part 1 of Schedule 1.
	The Government agree with the objectives behind this amendment and the concern motivated by it, namely that paragraph 28(10) as drafted could be read as having a different effect from that intended. These provisions could possibly be read as preventing an individual from obtaining legal aid for eviction if they unarguably entered as a trespasser but then regularised their arrangement by, for example, entering into a tenancy. The provision could also be interpreted as excluding cases from legal aid where an individual had initial consent to be present-for example, as a tenant-but no longer has such consent, for example, because of a dispute with their landlord.
	As government Amendments 74A, 74B and 74D concern the same point, I will deal with them together. These amendments do not represent a change in policy; rather, they are aimed at giving better effect to our stated policy. They therefore address the same objective as Amendment 74C. The Government's amendments are more appropriate to meet the concerns that have been expressed because they leave no room for doubt that the provision achieves the effect that I have described and that the Government have always intended. These government amendments put beyond doubt that the exclusion in paragraph 28 of Schedule 1 in relation to trespassers will apply only when the person is both unarguably occupying a property as a trespasser and began their occupation as such. I hope that noble Lords will be reassured by that clarification.
	The next group of amendments relates to the provisions in paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, concerning housing disrepair cases. Amendments 77A, 77C and 77E relate to legal aid for damages claims by tenants relating to disrepair in rented homes-in particular, ensuring that when legal aid has been granted for a housing disrepair case, if the landlord makes arrangements for the repairs to be carried out, or carries them out, legal aid can continue for the damages aspect of the claim until the conclusion of the case. We have prioritised funding on cases which concern such fundamental issues as homelessness and the safety of the individual or their family. We are therefore retaining legal aid when serious disrepairs threaten the health of the client or their family and the client wishes to bring an action against their landlord to remove or reduce that risk. We are, however, generally excluding damages claims from the scope of legal aid because we take the view that these cases are essentially claims for money, which are a lower priority for funding than cases which involve more fundamental issues. We also consider that conditional fee agreements offer an alternative means of funding such claims.
	It may be that the intention of this and related amendments is generally to extend Schedule 1 to cover disrepair damages claims. In this context, we note that Amendment 77G disapplies a range of the exclusions set out in Part 2 of Schedule 1 which concern causes of action which can be used to obtain damages. As I have already said, we do not consider that damages claims for housing disrepair are a sufficient priority for funding and that conditional fee agreements present a viable alternative means to fund such claims. We recognise that, when a housing disrepair claim is funded under paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to remove or reduce the serious risk of harm arising from disrepair, and the claim also includes a damages element, legal aid could be extended to cover the excluded damages aspect of the claim. This could happen under the rules for connected matters made under paragraph 40 of Part 1 of Schedule 1.
	Amendment 77F appears to be intended, in such cases, to allow funding for the damages aspect of a claim for disrepair to continue to be funded even where the disrepair itself has been addressed by the landlord. We do not consider this to be appropriate or necessary. I have already explained that we do not consider damages claims to be a high priority. In addition, where a landlord has carried out repairs, or has been ordered to do so, this should remove any doubt as to liability for the disrepair. If there continues to be a meaningful damages claim and a reasonable prospect of recovering damages, the client should be able to continue the damages aspect of the claim under a conditional fee agreement. This amendment may also, in part, be motivated by a concern that failure to fund the damages aspect of the case will prevent the legal aid fund from recovering any unrecouped costs. If so, this amendment is unnecessary. Where the damages aspect of a case continued under a conditional fee agreement, if the client were successful in obtaining damages, the statutory charge would ensure that any unrecouped funds expended at the earlier stages of the case by the legal aid fund would be recouped.
	In addition, noble Lords should be aware that legal aid will not in general be withdrawn where it is in the interests of the legal aid fund for it to continue. In an unusual case where the damages aspect of a funded case could not be continued under a conditional fee agreement, legal aid for a housing disrepair case could continue to its conclusion to protect public funds by obtaining a costs order, even when repairs have been carried out.
	Regarding Amendment 77B, paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 provides that legal aid is available for disrepair cases concerning,
	"the removal or reduction of a serious risk of harm to the health or safety of the individual or a relevant member of the individual's family".
	Amendment 77B deletes "serious" and therefore extends funding to cases where there is any risk to health or safety, however small. The Government's intention throughout this reform process has been to focus our constrained resources on the most important cases. That is why the provisions in the Bill target legal aid on those disrepair cases where it is alleged that there is a serious risk to health or safety-it is important to stress the word "alleged" because claimants will not be required to prove the seriousness of the disrepair before funding can be granted. In any case where it is reasonably alleged that disrepair poses a serious risk to health or safety, legal aid will be available to enable the merits of the claim to be investigated. This would include, for example, instruction of a joint expert where possible to investigate the disrepair, in line with the housing disrepair pre-action protocol. While I recognise that some disrepairs start out small and then deteriorate, the reality is that we have to target funding as best we can. That means we cannot fund trivial cases.
	Amendments 77D, 77H and 77K appear to be aimed at making legal aid available in disrepair matters under paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, not only where the disrepair poses a threat to the health or safety of the legal aid client or a member of their family, but where the individual whose health or safety is at risk is a household member who is not related to the client. We have clearly stated our intention that legal aid should continue to be available in relation to remedying household disrepairs where it is the legal aid client, or a member of their family, whose health or safety is said to be at serious risk as a consequence of the disrepair. We consider it appropriate that, for example, an individual can apply for legal aid on behalf of their child or partner whose health is jeopardised. However, we see no reason why funding should be extended to other occupiers. These amendments could make schemes vulnerable to abuse by, for example, enabling a person who does not qualify for funding on financial eligibility grounds to obtain legal aid for a disrepair matter by virtue of having a housemate who qualifies for legal aid. We believe that our definition of the relevant family member, set out in paragraph 30(3), is broad enough to capture members of the household who have a sufficiently strong connection to the legal aid client.
	Government Amendment 77J relates to the definition of "home" used in relation to housing disrepair matters at paragraph 30 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. This is a minor, technical amendment which addresses a slight discrepancy between the definitions of "home" used in paragraph 30(4) and in paragraph 28(9). The latter paragraph includes "other vehicle or structure" in the definition, but paragraph 30(4) refers only to "other structure". Amendment 77J addresses this unintentional discrepancy and ensures consistency in Schedule 1.
	Amendments 78A and 78B appear to be aimed at making legal aid available if a residential occupier of a property brings a claim for damages where they have been harassed, perhaps by their landlord. The Government position is clear: limited legal aid resources should not be focused on cases concerning financial advancement and the obtaining of monetary damages, unless the claim has significant additional importance. For example, legal aid will remain available for damages claims concerning abuses of position or power, or significant breaches of human rights by a public authority, or for claims concerning sexual assault, or abuse of a child or vulnerable adult.
	These amendments seek to protect residents from unscrupulous landlords. I reassure noble Lords that there is already significant protection for residents. Paragraph 28 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 provides legal aid in relation to the eviction of an individual from their home, which will include damages claims against a landlord in relation to the unlawful eviction of a residential occupier. In addition, paragraph 32 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 provides legal aid so that those suffering harassment can obtain a protective injunction under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. An injunction could be granted to prevent interference with the peace or comfort of a resident or to prevent services being unreasonably withheld by a landlord. Breach of such an injunction can bring a prison term of up to five years. For other meritorious damages claims that fall outside the scheme, a conditional fee agreement could be used.
	On the point that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, made at the end of his speech about Amendment 90ZZA, we believe that the Bill contains significant safeguards in respect of mental health treatment. Amendment 90ZZB, however desirable, goes beyond what is currently provided by the current civil legal aid scheme. Because we have had to focus our resources, we have had to focus on those interests of the individual that are really of the most vital importance. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will withdraw these and other amendments.
	I know that that was quite a gallop through a very detailed set of amendments about what I fully acknowledge is an important issue, and I am sure that noble Lords will want to take tomorrow's Hansard as their bedtime reading. I hope that they will see that some of the issues raised by the noble Earl, the noble Lord, Lord Best, and others are already covered by the Bill and that the Government have listened to some of these concerns. Perhaps we will return to some of them on Report. In the mean time, I ask noble Lords from both ends of Newcastle to withdraw their amendments.

Lord Thomas of Gresford: My Lords, listening to this debate on housing reminds me of being told when I was very young that a stitch in time saved nine, that for want of a nail a shoe was lost or what would happen if you went out courting on Ilkley Moor without your hat on-I could not think of anything relating to the Lambton Worm, but I am sure there was something along those lines as well-the point being that the Government are prepared to fund at the most expensive end, when you get to court or near to it. I think of all those days as a solicitor when you settle things by picking up the phone, writing a letter or meeting face to face. That is the hidden part of the iceberg that I do not think the Ministry of Justice appreciates at all. It is sad that there is a perverse incentive for lawyers to escalate a case to the point at which they are about to go to court, as opposed to funding at a lower level where things can be sorted out as they always have been. That is a brief comment; I have sat here long enough, and I think I am entitled to make it.

Lord Shipley: My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his contributions to identifying what is at the heart of this. I am grateful to the Minister for the very full answers that he has given to this set of amendments, but of course broadly speaking what he said is what the Bill says-it was a restatement of the current position.
	I ask the Minister to look again at two things. One is the King's College/Law Society evidence base for what the knock-on costs might actually be. The contribution of my noble friend Lord Phillips helped us to understand that some of the indirect costs have not been counted in the King's College calculations. That being so, there might well be an evidence base that tells us that it will be more expensive. As opposed to saving a little money, it might end up costing the Government more.
	Secondly, I wonder whether we might look at the basis of the cost-shunting around Whitehall, which I take very seriously. When cuts are required, there is a tendency in Whitehall departments to do things that deliver the cuts in that department but cause someone else additional cost. That other department tends not to pick up that cost until it has happened and there is suddenly no alternative.
	We have had a full and frank debate. Many of us in the Committee think that there is a problem that we need to address in greater detail. It may well prove to be in the interests of the Government to save money by adopting some of the amendments that have been proposed this evening. However, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
	Amendment 72A withdrawn.
	Amendments 72B to 72D not moved.
	House resumed.

House adjourned at 11.42 pm.